Vasant Ramachandara Deshpande Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others
Appeal: Civil Appeal No. 16985 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23892 of 1996)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23892 of 1996)
Petitioner: Vasant Ramachandara Deshpande
Respondent: State of Maharashtra and Others
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 16985 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23892 of 1996)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23892 of 1996)
Judges: K. RAMASWAMY & G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Dec 16, 1996
Head Note:
LIMITATION
Limitation Act, 1963
Article 58 of the Schedule – Limitation period – Three years from date when right to sue first accrues. Held that the right to sue accrued when the order of compulsory retirement was made and it became effective. Suit is barred by limitation. Appeal dismissed.(Para 2)
Limitation Act, 1963
Article 58 of the Schedule – Limitation period – Three years from date when right to sue first accrues. Held that the right to sue accrued when the order of compulsory retirement was made and it became effective. Suit is barred by limitation. Appeal dismissed.(Para 2)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order made on 4-9-1996 of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribun-al, Nagpur Bench in Transfer Application No. 532 of 1992 (Reg. Civil Suit No. 963 of 1980). The respondent-Government compulso-rily retired the appellant from service, in exercise of its power, by order dated 29-12-1973 giving three months’ notice to the appellant. It became effective from 28-10-1974. The suit was filed after issuance of the notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on 28-7-1980. Article 58 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages limitation period for filing suit for any other declaration, i.e., three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. It would, therefore, be seen that in a suit for declaration that the order of compulsory retirement was invalid under Article 311 or any other law, comes under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limita-tion Act. Thus the right to sue accrued when the order of compul-sory retirement was made on 29-12-1973 and it became effective from 28-10-1974. That being the date on which the right to seek such declaration accrued and became effective in respect of the appellant for the first time, the period of limitation would start from that date. Even after excluding the time required for issuance of the notice under Section 80, the suit is barred by limitation. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that it was time-barred. Under these circumstances, we do not find any error of law warranting inter-ference.
3. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order made on 4-9-1996 of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribun-al, Nagpur Bench in Transfer Application No. 532 of 1992 (Reg. Civil Suit No. 963 of 1980). The respondent-Government compulso-rily retired the appellant from service, in exercise of its power, by order dated 29-12-1973 giving three months’ notice to the appellant. It became effective from 28-10-1974. The suit was filed after issuance of the notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on 28-7-1980. Article 58 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages limitation period for filing suit for any other declaration, i.e., three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. It would, therefore, be seen that in a suit for declaration that the order of compulsory retirement was invalid under Article 311 or any other law, comes under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limita-tion Act. Thus the right to sue accrued when the order of compul-sory retirement was made on 29-12-1973 and it became effective from 28-10-1974. That being the date on which the right to seek such declaration accrued and became effective in respect of the appellant for the first time, the period of limitation would start from that date. Even after excluding the time required for issuance of the notice under Section 80, the suit is barred by limitation. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that it was time-barred. Under these circumstances, we do not find any error of law warranting inter-ference.
3. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.