Union of India and Anr. Vs. Hansoli Devi and Ors.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 9477 of 1994
With C.A. Nos. 9520-22/94, 9478/94, 9526-9530/94, 9523-25/94, SLP (C) Nos. 5385-86/2001, 5383-84 of 2001 and CA No. 8748 of 1995
(From the Judgment and Order dated 4.1.93 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in C.W.P. No. 241 of 1992)
With C.A. Nos. 9520-22/94, 9478/94, 9526-9530/94, 9523-25/94, SLP (C) Nos. 5385-86/2001, 5383-84 of 2001 and CA No. 8748 of 1995
(From the Judgment and Order dated 4.1.93 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in C.W.P. No. 241 of 1992)
Petitioner: Union of India and Anr.
Respondent: Hansoli Devi and Ors.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 9477 of 1994
With C.A. Nos. 9520-22/94, 9478/94, 9526-9530/94, 9523-25/94, SLP (C) Nos. 5385-86/2001, 5383-84 of 2001 and CA No. 8748 of 1995
(From the Judgment and Order dated 4.1.93 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in C.W.P. No. 241 of 1992)
With C.A. Nos. 9520-22/94, 9478/94, 9526-9530/94, 9523-25/94, SLP (C) Nos. 5385-86/2001, 5383-84 of 2001 and CA No. 8748 of 1995
(From the Judgment and Order dated 4.1.93 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in C.W.P. No. 241 of 1992)
Judges: A.P. MISRA & UMESH C. BANERJEE, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Apr 17, 2001
Appearances:
Mr. P.P. Malhotra, Mr. S.K. Bagga, Senior Advocates, Mr. K.C. Kaushik, Mr. Ajay Sharma, Mr. B. Krishna Prasad, Mr. C. Radha Krishna, Mr. G. Prabhakar, (Mr. Seeraj Bagga) Advocate for Mrs. Sureshta Bagga, (Mr. Lokesh Kumar) Advocate for Mr. R.S. Suri, Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Ms. Shobha, Mr. S.K. Mehta, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, Mr. S.M. Sarin, Mr. P.N. Puri, Mr. A.T.M. Sampath, Mr. K.V. Satyanarayana, Mr. V. Balaji, Mr. R. Santhana Krishnan, Mrs. Rajani K. Prasad, (Mr. S.K. Patnaik), Advocate for Mr. K.R. Nagaraja, Mr. T. Sridharan, Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy, Ms. Aparna Bhat, Mr. Y. Prabhakara Rao, Mrs. Amita Gupta, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, Advocates with them for the appearing parties.
Head Note:
LAND ACQUISITION
Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Section 28A – Compensation for land acquisition – Application for re-determination of the compensation – Limitation – Starting point of limitation of three months – Three Judge Bench of Su-preme Court in Pradeep Kumari’s case holding that the starting point of limitation is from the date of making the Award on the basis of which re-determination is sought – Two Judge Bench, however, holding in Babua Ram’ case that the limitation would commence from the date of the first Award. Held, the question of commencement of limitation and interpretation of Section 28A are required to be examined by a large Bench of five Judges. Matter accordingly directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. (Paras 7 and 8)
Cases Reffered:
1. State of Tripura & Anr. v. Roop Chand Das & Ors. (1997 (5) SCC 757) (Para 7)
2. Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigues and Another v. Land Acqui-sition Collector and Another (1996 (6) SCC 746) (Para 6)
3. Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigues and Another v. Land Acqui-sition Collector and Another (1996 (1) SCC 88) (Para 7)
4. Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others (1995 (2) SCC 736) (Para 1)
5. Union of India & Ors. v. Karnail Singh & Ors. (1995 (2) SCC 728) (Para 3)
6. Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1995 (2) SCC 689) (Para 3)
2. Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigues and Another v. Land Acqui-sition Collector and Another (1996 (6) SCC 746) (Para 6)
3. Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigues and Another v. Land Acqui-sition Collector and Another (1996 (1) SCC 88) (Para 7)
4. Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others (1995 (2) SCC 736) (Para 1)
5. Union of India & Ors. v. Karnail Singh & Ors. (1995 (2) SCC 728) (Para 3)
6. Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1995 (2) SCC 689) (Para 3)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. The issue involved in the matter under consideration pertains to Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (as inserted by Act 68 of 1984). A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others (1995 (2) SCC 736) came to a conclusion that the starting point of limitation of 3 months as prescribed under Section 28A for making application for re-determination of compensation ought to be the date of making of the Award on the basis of which re-determination is sought. In Pradeep Kumari’s case (supra) six conditions have been mentioned in order to enable a person to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him, and the abovenoted six conditions are as below :
“(i) An Award has been made by the court under Part III after the coming into force of Section 28-A;
(ii) By the said Award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference;
(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to which the said Award relates;
(iv) The person moving the application did not make an applica-tion to the Collector under Section 18;
(v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the Award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is sought; and
(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28A for re-determination of compensation by an applicant.”
2. In paragraph 11 of the Report in the last noted decision, this Court categorically held that since the cause of action for moving the application for re-determination of compensation under Section 28A arises from the Award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought, the principle that “once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the court” can have no application because the limitation for moving the application under Section 28A will begin to run only from the date of the Award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought.
3. On the wake of the aforesaid, this Court expressed its inabil-ity to agree with the view expressed in Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1995 (2) SCC 689) and Union of India & Ors. v. Karnail Singh & Ors. (1995 (2) SCC 728).
4. Incidentally, a two Judge Bench of this Court in Babua Ram’s case (supra) held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the first Award made on a reference under Sec-tion 18 of the Act and successive Awards cannot save the period of limitation. This view was reiterated in the decision in Kar-nail Singh (supra) wherein this Court held that the limitation of three months for an application for re-determination of compensa-tion must be computed from the date of the earliest Award made by a civil court and not the judgment rendered by an Appellate Court.
5. The dissention as noticed above between the three Judges Bench and the two Judges bench judgments however is rather restrictive since in both Babua Ram and Karnail Singh, they sought to confine the right to seek determination to the earliest Award made by the court under Section 18 of the Act after the introduction of Section 28A into the Act.
6. Subsequently, however, in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigues and Another v. Land Acquisition Collector and Another (1996 (6) SCC 746), a three Judges Bench observed that there is no doubt that the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of the court’s Award under Section 18 on the basis whereof re-determination is sought.
7. In State of Tripura & Anr. v. Roop Chand Das & Ors. (1997 (5) SCC 757) a two Judges Bench of this Court in a later decision and upon reference to the decision in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rod-rigues and Another v. Land Acquisition Collector and Another (1996 (1) SCC 88) duly recorded the events noticed above but in view of the contentions raised formulated two questions. The questions being :
“1. Whether the Award of the Court, i.e. civil court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include judgment and decree of the appellate court under Section 54?
2. Whether each successive Award or judgment and decree (if answer on question 1 is positive) would give cause of action to file application under Section 28A; if so construed, does not such a construction violate the language used in Section 28A when Parliament advisedly, did not use such expressions?”
8. The questions having the backdrop of the incidents and the state of law thus were required to be examined by larger Bench of the five-Judges as to the proper interpretation of Section 28A on the issue of limitation. Similar is the situation presently before us and having regard to the issue involved herein, we also feel it expedient to record that such a pronouncement of a larger Bench is required to be made on the issue pertaining to limita-tion insofar as Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act (as amended) is concerned. In the normal course of events we would have framed certain questions for determination but since the issue such as fairly elaborated in two questions noted in Jose Antonio’s decision (supra) we do not feel it expedient to intro-duce further questions since answer to the same would resolve the principal disputes in most of these matters placed before this Bench excepting however in two matters (SLP (CC) No. 2919 of 2000, BBMB, Punjab v. Sita Devi & Anr.; and SLP (CC) No. 3141 of 2000, BBMB Punjab v. Basu Dev & Anr.) wherein Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Advocate appearing in support of the petitions raised following two questions which we also feel it expedient to record herein for the benefit of adjudication by the larger Bench. The questions being:
“1(a) Whether dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay amounts to “not filing an application” within the meaning of Section 28A of the Land Acqui-sition Act, 1894?
(b) Whether a person whose application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is dismissed on the ground of delay or any other technical ground is entitled to maintain an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act?
2. Whether a person who has received the compensation without protest pursuant to the Award of the Land Acquisition Collector and has not filed an application seeking reference under Section 18 is “a person aggrieved” within the meaning of Section 28A?”
9. Though various other suggestions have come forth from the Bar but the questions noticed in Jose Antonio’s decision (supra) in our view would otherwise cover the field for which difficulties are being experienced as noticed hereinbefore.
10. On the wake of the aforesaid we do feel it expedient also to record that above noted two questions require examination by a larger Bench of at least five Judges by reason of the pendency of the various matters in this Court.
11. Notices thus be issued to the respondents returnable within four weeks. Dasti service to be taken out in addition.
12. The Registry is directed to place these matters before the Hon. Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.
1. The issue involved in the matter under consideration pertains to Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (as inserted by Act 68 of 1984). A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others (1995 (2) SCC 736) came to a conclusion that the starting point of limitation of 3 months as prescribed under Section 28A for making application for re-determination of compensation ought to be the date of making of the Award on the basis of which re-determination is sought. In Pradeep Kumari’s case (supra) six conditions have been mentioned in order to enable a person to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him, and the abovenoted six conditions are as below :
“(i) An Award has been made by the court under Part III after the coming into force of Section 28-A;
(ii) By the said Award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference;
(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to which the said Award relates;
(iv) The person moving the application did not make an applica-tion to the Collector under Section 18;
(v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the Award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is sought; and
(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28A for re-determination of compensation by an applicant.”
2. In paragraph 11 of the Report in the last noted decision, this Court categorically held that since the cause of action for moving the application for re-determination of compensation under Section 28A arises from the Award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought, the principle that “once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the court” can have no application because the limitation for moving the application under Section 28A will begin to run only from the date of the Award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought.
3. On the wake of the aforesaid, this Court expressed its inabil-ity to agree with the view expressed in Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1995 (2) SCC 689) and Union of India & Ors. v. Karnail Singh & Ors. (1995 (2) SCC 728).
4. Incidentally, a two Judge Bench of this Court in Babua Ram’s case (supra) held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the first Award made on a reference under Sec-tion 18 of the Act and successive Awards cannot save the period of limitation. This view was reiterated in the decision in Kar-nail Singh (supra) wherein this Court held that the limitation of three months for an application for re-determination of compensa-tion must be computed from the date of the earliest Award made by a civil court and not the judgment rendered by an Appellate Court.
5. The dissention as noticed above between the three Judges Bench and the two Judges bench judgments however is rather restrictive since in both Babua Ram and Karnail Singh, they sought to confine the right to seek determination to the earliest Award made by the court under Section 18 of the Act after the introduction of Section 28A into the Act.
6. Subsequently, however, in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigues and Another v. Land Acquisition Collector and Another (1996 (6) SCC 746), a three Judges Bench observed that there is no doubt that the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of the court’s Award under Section 18 on the basis whereof re-determination is sought.
7. In State of Tripura & Anr. v. Roop Chand Das & Ors. (1997 (5) SCC 757) a two Judges Bench of this Court in a later decision and upon reference to the decision in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rod-rigues and Another v. Land Acquisition Collector and Another (1996 (1) SCC 88) duly recorded the events noticed above but in view of the contentions raised formulated two questions. The questions being :
“1. Whether the Award of the Court, i.e. civil court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include judgment and decree of the appellate court under Section 54?
2. Whether each successive Award or judgment and decree (if answer on question 1 is positive) would give cause of action to file application under Section 28A; if so construed, does not such a construction violate the language used in Section 28A when Parliament advisedly, did not use such expressions?”
8. The questions having the backdrop of the incidents and the state of law thus were required to be examined by larger Bench of the five-Judges as to the proper interpretation of Section 28A on the issue of limitation. Similar is the situation presently before us and having regard to the issue involved herein, we also feel it expedient to record that such a pronouncement of a larger Bench is required to be made on the issue pertaining to limita-tion insofar as Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act (as amended) is concerned. In the normal course of events we would have framed certain questions for determination but since the issue such as fairly elaborated in two questions noted in Jose Antonio’s decision (supra) we do not feel it expedient to intro-duce further questions since answer to the same would resolve the principal disputes in most of these matters placed before this Bench excepting however in two matters (SLP (CC) No. 2919 of 2000, BBMB, Punjab v. Sita Devi & Anr.; and SLP (CC) No. 3141 of 2000, BBMB Punjab v. Basu Dev & Anr.) wherein Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Advocate appearing in support of the petitions raised following two questions which we also feel it expedient to record herein for the benefit of adjudication by the larger Bench. The questions being:
“1(a) Whether dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay amounts to “not filing an application” within the meaning of Section 28A of the Land Acqui-sition Act, 1894?
(b) Whether a person whose application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is dismissed on the ground of delay or any other technical ground is entitled to maintain an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act?
2. Whether a person who has received the compensation without protest pursuant to the Award of the Land Acquisition Collector and has not filed an application seeking reference under Section 18 is “a person aggrieved” within the meaning of Section 28A?”
9. Though various other suggestions have come forth from the Bar but the questions noticed in Jose Antonio’s decision (supra) in our view would otherwise cover the field for which difficulties are being experienced as noticed hereinbefore.
10. On the wake of the aforesaid we do feel it expedient also to record that above noted two questions require examination by a larger Bench of at least five Judges by reason of the pendency of the various matters in this Court.
11. Notices thus be issued to the respondents returnable within four weeks. Dasti service to be taken out in addition.
12. The Registry is directed to place these matters before the Hon. Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.
