Tripura Gramin Bank & Ors. Vs. Tarit Baran Roy & Anr.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 1096 of 1998
Petitioner: Tripura Gramin Bank & Ors.
Respondent: Tarit Baran Roy & Anr.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 1096 of 1998
Judges: G.B. PATTANAIK & B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Jan 31, 2001
Head Note:
SERVICE LAW / CIVIL LAW
Civil Procedure Code, 1908
Section 100 – Second appeal – High Court reappreciating evidence and interfering in quantum of punishment – High Court itself holding 5 charges to have been proved and delinquent being negli-gent – Punishment of dismissal in domestic enquiry – Challenge in civil suit – High Court finding punishment to be grossly dispro-portionate. Held that on facts, High Court could not have inter-fered with quantum of punishment as that concept is under Indus-trial Disputes Act, which is inapplicable to Government servants and employees governed by rules. Appeal allowed.
Held:
A cashier of a Bank, who has been found to have grossly derelict-ed his duties and negligent even by the High Court and as many as 5 charges relating to the same have been upheld by the High Court, it would not be possible for the High Court in second appeal to interfere with the quantum of punishment. The High Court grossly erred in law in interfering with the quantum of punishment on the application of the principle that the punish-ment is grossly disproportionate to the quantum of delinquency, obviously referable to Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Those principles engrafted in Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be engrafted into the disciplinary proceed-ings either in relation to Government servant or other employee whose service conditions are governed by set of rules and not the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. (Para 4)
Cases Reffered:
1. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahesh Kr. Mishra (JT 2000 (3) SC 173) (Para 4)
2. Colour-Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. (JT 1998 (1) SC 455) (Para 4)
3. B.C. Chaturvedi v. U.O.I. (JT 1995 (8) SC 65) (Para 3)
4. U.O.I. v. Sardar Bahudar (1972 (4) SCC 618) (Para 3)
5. State of Orissa v. M. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (AIR 1963 SC 779) (Para 3)
2. Colour-Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. (JT 1998 (1) SC 455) (Para 4)
3. B.C. Chaturvedi v. U.O.I. (JT 1995 (8) SC 65) (Para 3)
4. U.O.I. v. Sardar Bahudar (1972 (4) SCC 618) (Para 3)
5. State of Orissa v. M. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (AIR 1963 SC 779) (Para 3)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Defendants are in appeal against the judgment of Gauhati High Court (Agartala Bench) in Second Appeal No. 1/1993. The plaintiff was a cashier in the Gramin Bank and was appointed as such on 11.1.1983. While he was continuing as a cashier, as several irregularities and illegalities could be noticed, he was suspend-ed with effect from 12.11.1984 and a disciplinary proceeding was initiated. He was served with a set of charges and he also re-plied to those charges. In the enquiry conducted, the charges were held to be established and on the basis of the finding of the enquiry officer the disciplinary authority finally imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. He preferred an appeal against the same to the departmental authorities and having been unsuccessful therein, filed the suit seeking a declaration that the order of dismissal from service is illegal and void. Before the trial court, the employer Bank denied the allegations made in the plaint and further contended that the disciplinary proceed-ings have been taken in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and there has been no infirmity in the procedure conducted by the enquiry officer and therefore the order of dismissal cannot be held to be invalid on any account. The trial Judge, however, agreed with the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiff and decreed the suit on a finding that the enquiry itself stood vitiated on account of violation of principle of natural justice. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court, the Bank preferred the appeal, which was registered as Title Appeal No. 32/1991. The Additional District Judge, West Tripura allowed the appeal and came to a conclusion that against an order of a domestic Tribunal, civil court would be entitled to interfere with the finding thereon only when the court would come to a conclusion that there has been a denial of natural justice or there has been a violation of Fundamental Right and it would not be open for the civil court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the materials on which the enquiry officer found the charges to have been established against a delinquent servant. The lower Appellate Court then came to the conclusion that all the allegations were based on documents only, which were duly inspected by the respondent (plaintiff) and there was no denial of reasonable opportunity even though some of the witnesses were not examined and further so long as the enquiry is properly conducted and the principles of natural justice are complied with, the departmental authorities are the sole Judges of the facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of the evi-dence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the civil court. The judgment and decree of the trial Judge having been set aside and the appeal having been allowed, the plaintiff preferred the second appeal to the High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment appears to have re-examined the materials on the basis of which charges were levelled against the plaintiff as well as the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer on those charges. In respect of some of the charges, the High Court came to the conclusion that though charges could not have been said to have been established on the materials on record, the High Court however came to the conclusion that the charges 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11 which relate to misconduct of the plaintiff must be held to have been established in the case. High Court was persuaded to agree with the submission made on behalf of the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff that since the plaintiff was not aware of maintenance of the books of accounts and registers there might be some omissions in making those entries regarding withdrawal and deposits of different customers but since the so called charge of defalcation cannot be held to have been established, the ultimate punishment inflicted upon must be held to be disproportionate, snatching away the only source of livelihood of the plaintiff, who was the only earning member of the family. With this conclusion, the High Court having set aside the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and having affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court, the Bank is in appeal.
2. Be it be stated that in paragraph 25 of the impugned judgment, the High Court has recorded its finding “it appears that there was considerable negligence on the part of the plaintiff-appellant discharging his duties as cashier of the respondent-Bank. Since the plaintiff-appellant has not discharged his duties properly and while discharging his duties the plaintiff-appellant has acted negligently, I am of the view that he should not be entitled to the back pay and allowances.”
3. Mr. Goswami, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the defendant-appellant contends that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in exercising its power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by reappreciating the materials on the basis of which the enquiry officer came to the conclusion about the finding of guilt of delinquent Government servant and there-fore the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law. Mr. Goswa-mi, further contended that the High Court itself having found that at least 5 of the charges must be held to have been estab-lished against the delinquent and that the plaintiff was dis-charging his duties negligently as cashier and did not discharge his duties properly and acted negligently, it was improper on the part of the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punish-ment and setting aside an order of dismissal. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel places reliance on the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. U.O.I. (JT 1995 (8) SC 65 = 1995 (6) SCC 749). In that particular case, this Court has taken note of several earlier decisions on the point starting from State of Orissa v. M. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (AIR 1963 SC 779), U.O.I. v. Sardar Bahudar (1972 (4) SCC 618) and a host of other decisions and has recorded the conclusion that it would not be proper for the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the conscience of the Court is found to be shocking and this must be done only in rare cases where facts situation so demand.
4. Mr. Goel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, contended that though there were as many as 11 charges but the gravamen of charge relates to defalcation and if that cannot be held to have been established beyond reasonable doubt, on the residue of charges ultimately which relates to irregularities and illegalities in the discharge of duties as a cashier, an order of dismissal would be shocking to the conscience and therefore the High Court was well within its jurisdiction to interfere with the order of dismissal in the second appeal. Mr. Goel relies upon a later judgment of this Court in the case of Colour-Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. (JT 1998 (1) SC 455 = 1998 (3) SCC 192) as well as the decision of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahesh Kr. Mishra (JT 2000 (3) SC 173 = 2000 (3) SCC 450). In the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation’s case the Court, after noticing the earlier judgment of Chaturvedi on which Mr. Goswami relied upon, came to hold that the High Court can interfere with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee, if that penalty shocks the conscience of the Court and therefore it may not be correct that in no case on quantum of punishment the Court would not be justified in interfering with the quantum of punish-ment. We need not go into this question in the present set of facts and circumstances inasmuch as a cashier of a Bank, who has been found to have grossly derelicted his duties and negligent, even by the High Court and as many as 5 charges relating to the same have been upheld by the High Court, it would not be possible for the High Court in second appeal to interfere with the quantum of punishment. Having examined the impugned judgment of the High Court we have no manner of doubt that the High Court grossly erred in law in interfering with the quantum of punishment on the application of the principle that the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the quantum of delinquency, obviously refer-able to Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In our opinion, those principles engrafted in Section 11-A of the Indus-trial Disputes Act cannot be engrafted into the disciplinary proceedings either in relation to Government servant or other employee whose service conditions are governed by set of rules and not the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. That apart, in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction, it was not open for the High Court to reappreciate the materials on the basis of which the enquiry officer arrived at his conclusion, and come to a different finding and on this score also the impugned judgment is vitiated. In the aforesaid premises, the impugned judgment of the High Court in second appeal cannot be sustained. We accord-ingly quash the same and suit stands dismissed. This appeal is allowed.
1. Defendants are in appeal against the judgment of Gauhati High Court (Agartala Bench) in Second Appeal No. 1/1993. The plaintiff was a cashier in the Gramin Bank and was appointed as such on 11.1.1983. While he was continuing as a cashier, as several irregularities and illegalities could be noticed, he was suspend-ed with effect from 12.11.1984 and a disciplinary proceeding was initiated. He was served with a set of charges and he also re-plied to those charges. In the enquiry conducted, the charges were held to be established and on the basis of the finding of the enquiry officer the disciplinary authority finally imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. He preferred an appeal against the same to the departmental authorities and having been unsuccessful therein, filed the suit seeking a declaration that the order of dismissal from service is illegal and void. Before the trial court, the employer Bank denied the allegations made in the plaint and further contended that the disciplinary proceed-ings have been taken in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and there has been no infirmity in the procedure conducted by the enquiry officer and therefore the order of dismissal cannot be held to be invalid on any account. The trial Judge, however, agreed with the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiff and decreed the suit on a finding that the enquiry itself stood vitiated on account of violation of principle of natural justice. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court, the Bank preferred the appeal, which was registered as Title Appeal No. 32/1991. The Additional District Judge, West Tripura allowed the appeal and came to a conclusion that against an order of a domestic Tribunal, civil court would be entitled to interfere with the finding thereon only when the court would come to a conclusion that there has been a denial of natural justice or there has been a violation of Fundamental Right and it would not be open for the civil court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the materials on which the enquiry officer found the charges to have been established against a delinquent servant. The lower Appellate Court then came to the conclusion that all the allegations were based on documents only, which were duly inspected by the respondent (plaintiff) and there was no denial of reasonable opportunity even though some of the witnesses were not examined and further so long as the enquiry is properly conducted and the principles of natural justice are complied with, the departmental authorities are the sole Judges of the facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of the evi-dence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the civil court. The judgment and decree of the trial Judge having been set aside and the appeal having been allowed, the plaintiff preferred the second appeal to the High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment appears to have re-examined the materials on the basis of which charges were levelled against the plaintiff as well as the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer on those charges. In respect of some of the charges, the High Court came to the conclusion that though charges could not have been said to have been established on the materials on record, the High Court however came to the conclusion that the charges 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11 which relate to misconduct of the plaintiff must be held to have been established in the case. High Court was persuaded to agree with the submission made on behalf of the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff that since the plaintiff was not aware of maintenance of the books of accounts and registers there might be some omissions in making those entries regarding withdrawal and deposits of different customers but since the so called charge of defalcation cannot be held to have been established, the ultimate punishment inflicted upon must be held to be disproportionate, snatching away the only source of livelihood of the plaintiff, who was the only earning member of the family. With this conclusion, the High Court having set aside the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and having affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court, the Bank is in appeal.
2. Be it be stated that in paragraph 25 of the impugned judgment, the High Court has recorded its finding “it appears that there was considerable negligence on the part of the plaintiff-appellant discharging his duties as cashier of the respondent-Bank. Since the plaintiff-appellant has not discharged his duties properly and while discharging his duties the plaintiff-appellant has acted negligently, I am of the view that he should not be entitled to the back pay and allowances.”
3. Mr. Goswami, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the defendant-appellant contends that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in exercising its power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by reappreciating the materials on the basis of which the enquiry officer came to the conclusion about the finding of guilt of delinquent Government servant and there-fore the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law. Mr. Goswa-mi, further contended that the High Court itself having found that at least 5 of the charges must be held to have been estab-lished against the delinquent and that the plaintiff was dis-charging his duties negligently as cashier and did not discharge his duties properly and acted negligently, it was improper on the part of the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punish-ment and setting aside an order of dismissal. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel places reliance on the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. U.O.I. (JT 1995 (8) SC 65 = 1995 (6) SCC 749). In that particular case, this Court has taken note of several earlier decisions on the point starting from State of Orissa v. M. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (AIR 1963 SC 779), U.O.I. v. Sardar Bahudar (1972 (4) SCC 618) and a host of other decisions and has recorded the conclusion that it would not be proper for the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the conscience of the Court is found to be shocking and this must be done only in rare cases where facts situation so demand.
4. Mr. Goel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, contended that though there were as many as 11 charges but the gravamen of charge relates to defalcation and if that cannot be held to have been established beyond reasonable doubt, on the residue of charges ultimately which relates to irregularities and illegalities in the discharge of duties as a cashier, an order of dismissal would be shocking to the conscience and therefore the High Court was well within its jurisdiction to interfere with the order of dismissal in the second appeal. Mr. Goel relies upon a later judgment of this Court in the case of Colour-Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. (JT 1998 (1) SC 455 = 1998 (3) SCC 192) as well as the decision of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahesh Kr. Mishra (JT 2000 (3) SC 173 = 2000 (3) SCC 450). In the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation’s case the Court, after noticing the earlier judgment of Chaturvedi on which Mr. Goswami relied upon, came to hold that the High Court can interfere with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee, if that penalty shocks the conscience of the Court and therefore it may not be correct that in no case on quantum of punishment the Court would not be justified in interfering with the quantum of punish-ment. We need not go into this question in the present set of facts and circumstances inasmuch as a cashier of a Bank, who has been found to have grossly derelicted his duties and negligent, even by the High Court and as many as 5 charges relating to the same have been upheld by the High Court, it would not be possible for the High Court in second appeal to interfere with the quantum of punishment. Having examined the impugned judgment of the High Court we have no manner of doubt that the High Court grossly erred in law in interfering with the quantum of punishment on the application of the principle that the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the quantum of delinquency, obviously refer-able to Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In our opinion, those principles engrafted in Section 11-A of the Indus-trial Disputes Act cannot be engrafted into the disciplinary proceedings either in relation to Government servant or other employee whose service conditions are governed by set of rules and not the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. That apart, in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction, it was not open for the High Court to reappreciate the materials on the basis of which the enquiry officer arrived at his conclusion, and come to a different finding and on this score also the impugned judgment is vitiated. In the aforesaid premises, the impugned judgment of the High Court in second appeal cannot be sustained. We accord-ingly quash the same and suit stands dismissed. This appeal is allowed.
