The Range Forest Officer Vs. S.T. Hadimani
Email(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16371 of 2000)
With C.A.No. 1284 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16626 of 2000)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.1999 of the Karnataka High Court in W.A.No. 3962 of 1999)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16371 of 2000)
With C.A.No. 1284 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16626 of 2000)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.1999 of the Karnataka High Court in W.A.No. 3962 of 1999)
Appellant.
Mr. Mohan V. Katarki and Mr. Ashok Kumar Sharma, Advocates for the Respondent.
Termination of service – Temporary services – Termination without retrenchment compensation – Burden of proof – Termination of the services of respondent without any retrenchment compensation – Management justifying the termination holding that the respondent had not worked for 240 days – Tribunal holding the termination to be invalid relying on the affidavit of the respondent to the effect that he had worked for 240 days in a year – Validity – Whether the burden is on the employee to prove that he had rendered service for 240 days in a year or on the management to prove that the person had not worked for 240 days. Held, since it was the claim of the respondent that he had worked for 240 days which was denied by the management, it was for the respondent to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of the affidavit cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence. Award of the tribunal therefore liable to be set aside.
1. Leave granted.
2. In the instant case, dispute was referred to the labour court that the respondent had worked for 240 days and his service had been terminated without paying him any retrenchment compensation. The appellant herein did not accept this and contended that the respondent had not worked for 240 days. The tribunal vide its award dated 10th August, 1998, came to the conclusion that the service had been terminated without giving retrenchment compensation. In arriving at the conclusion that the respondent had worked for 240 days, the tribunal stated that the burden was on the management to show that there was justification in termination of the service and that the affidavit of the workman was sufficient to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a year.
3. For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant is an “industry” or not, though reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Pratam Singh Narsinh Parmar (JT 2001 (3) SC 326). In our opinion, the tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the Management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an
affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. However, Mr. Hedge appearing for the Department states that the state is really interested in getting the law settled and the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate grounds on the same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two months from today.
4. The appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
