Sushinder Singh Vs. Gurjinder Singh & Anr.
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 8090 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 8090 of 1999
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Scope and jurisdiction – Contempt Petition filed in the High Court – Notice issued – Rule discharged subsequently – Thereafter some orders were passed which affected the Appellant adversely – SLP filed – Whether it was correct on
the part of the High Court to pass or-ders when it was not seized off the matter. Held: No. Con-tention regarding the nature of order being clarificatory in nature were rejected. Objections regarding non-maintainability of the appeal at the instance of the Appellant on the ground of his not being aggrieved party also rejected. Objectionable portion of the order set aside. Appeal allowed.
1. Leave granted.
2. A notice in contempt had been issued by the High Court to the Appellant. However by an order made on 19.1.99 the Rule in that matter was discharged. The High Court nevertheless proceeded to make the order in the following terms thereby by giving several directions to the parties in the matter:
“Respondent-Mining Department, Punjab shall allow the petitioner – Gurjinder Singh so far as the extraction of sand, bajri etc. is concerned from the Shamlat land vesting in the Gram Panchayat under Section 4 and 5 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regula-tion) Act, 1961 situated in village Adhrera Hadbast No. 122 on the terms and conditions of lease to be settled by the Gram Panchayat with him, if not already settled. Mining officer of the Department of Industries, Punjab shall not allow Respondent No. 2 Sukhvinder Singh or anybody else to extract sand etc. from that land. The money deposited by Respondent No. 2 with the Mining Department of the State of Punjab shall be refunded to him with interest at the rate of Rs. 12% per annum. If in pursuance of the auction held in favour of Sukhvinder Singh – Respondent by the Mining Department of the State of Punjab, Sukhvinder Singh-Respondent has extracted any sand, bajri etc., the Mining Depart-ment may, if advised, institute suit for compensation against him in appropriate court of law.”
3. It is this portion of the order that is under challenge. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that having discharged the Appellant the proceedings stood terminated and hence there is no question of issuing directions by the High Court; that when the Court is no longer seized of the ‘lis’ travelled far beyond scope of the contempt proceeding. We find great force in this submis-sion.
4. Learned counsel for the Respondents, however, pointed out that this Court should not interfere with the order made by the High Court which gives effect to its earlier orders and it is only by way of clarification that certain observations have been made in the course of the order and the Appellant is not an aggrieved party at all and he cannot challenge this order in appeal.
5. The Appellant was a party to the proceedings before the High Court and when in that order certain reliefs have been granted to the parties, certainly he can be stated to be an aggrieved party by the order of the High Court. Therefore, we find no force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the Respondents that this appeal is not maintainable at the instance of the Appellant.
6. On the question that the High Court has merely clarified the position by referring to the earlier proceedings, we may state that if the High Court had already given directions in those two orders to which the learned Counsel referred to, there was no need to make these observations in the course of the contempt proceedings. Hence, those observations need not have been made as it is always open to the parties to work out their respective rights as provided in those two orders. Therefore, we think it is appropriate to set aside that part of the order to which we adverted to earlier. The remaining portion of the order stands intact. The appeal is allowed accordingly.