State of West Bengal Vs. Ansar Sheikh
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1051-1052 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1567-1568 of 2001)
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1567-1568 of 2001)
Petitioner: State of West Bengal
Respondent: Ansar Sheikh
Apeal: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1051-1052 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1567-1568 of 2001)
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1567-1568 of 2001)
Judges: G.B. PATTANAIK & RUMA PAL, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Oct 16, 2001
Head Note:
CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Sections 222, 228 – Defect in framing charge – Effects – Murder case – Conviction recorded and death sentence imposed – In reference, High Court remitting the matter for de novo trial as time and place of occurrence not mentioned – Factually, the time and place of occurrence, more or less with precision, mentioned – If accused prejudiced. Held that having perused the charge, High Court committed error in setting aside the conviction and sending it for de novo trial.
Held:
The object of framing a charge as engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure is to give a clear idea of what the accused is being tried for and what are the essential facts he is required to meet in the trial. Unless and until the charge framed could be said to be such that the accused was misled or that such framing of charge has really caused any prejudice in the defence of the accused, the appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the conviction and sentence on the ground of so-called defect in the framing of charge.(Para 4)
Cases Reffered:
1. Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal ((1964) 3 SCR 237 at 244) (Para 3)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the impugned judgment of Calcutta High Court by which two criminal appeals stood disposed of and the High Court, after setting aside the conviction under section 302 IPC and award of death sentence, remitted the matter to the trial judge for de novo trial, on a finding that the trial judge has committed serious error in not mentioning the time and place of occurrence in the charge framed.
3. Learned additional solicitor general contended before us that the conclusion of the High Court is erroneous both in law and also on facts. According to him, factually the charge indicates more or less with precision, the date and place when the alleged offence was committed and further contends that in view of the law laid down by this Court in Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal ((1964) 3 SCR 237 at 244), the conclusion of the High Court must be held to be erroneous. He also stated that the accused has never made any grievance with regard to the defect in the charge before the learned sessions judge. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that in a case where death sentence has been referred to the High Court for confirmation, it should not be treated to be an appeal but in continuation of the trial and, therefore, the appellate court would be justified in looking into the charge framed and find out whether such charge could really prejudice the accused or not.
4. The object of framing a charge as engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure is to give a clear idea of what the accused is being tried for and what are the essential facts he is required to meet in the trial. Unless and until the charge framed could be said to be such that the accused was misled or that such framing of charge has really caused any prejudice in the defence of the accused, the appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the conviction and sentence on the ground of so-called defect in the framing of charge. The decision relied upon by the learned A.S.G. squarely supports this conclusion of ours. Having regard to the charges framed in this case, as shown at pages 5-6 of the paper book, and the impugned judgment of the Calcutta High Court, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court was totally in error in setting aside the conviction and the sentence awarded by the sessions judge and in remitting the matter to the sessions judge for de novo trial. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the Calcutta High Court and remit criminal appeal nos. 203 and 232 of 1999 to the High Court for re-disposal in accordance with law. Since it is a case of death reference, the High Court would do well in taking up the case immediately after the pooja vacation. We would request the learned Chief Justice of the High Court to post the matter before a bench of which any of the learned judges who have passed the impugned order would not be a member.
5. These appeals stand allowed accordingly.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the impugned judgment of Calcutta High Court by which two criminal appeals stood disposed of and the High Court, after setting aside the conviction under section 302 IPC and award of death sentence, remitted the matter to the trial judge for de novo trial, on a finding that the trial judge has committed serious error in not mentioning the time and place of occurrence in the charge framed.
3. Learned additional solicitor general contended before us that the conclusion of the High Court is erroneous both in law and also on facts. According to him, factually the charge indicates more or less with precision, the date and place when the alleged offence was committed and further contends that in view of the law laid down by this Court in Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal ((1964) 3 SCR 237 at 244), the conclusion of the High Court must be held to be erroneous. He also stated that the accused has never made any grievance with regard to the defect in the charge before the learned sessions judge. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that in a case where death sentence has been referred to the High Court for confirmation, it should not be treated to be an appeal but in continuation of the trial and, therefore, the appellate court would be justified in looking into the charge framed and find out whether such charge could really prejudice the accused or not.
4. The object of framing a charge as engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure is to give a clear idea of what the accused is being tried for and what are the essential facts he is required to meet in the trial. Unless and until the charge framed could be said to be such that the accused was misled or that such framing of charge has really caused any prejudice in the defence of the accused, the appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the conviction and sentence on the ground of so-called defect in the framing of charge. The decision relied upon by the learned A.S.G. squarely supports this conclusion of ours. Having regard to the charges framed in this case, as shown at pages 5-6 of the paper book, and the impugned judgment of the Calcutta High Court, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court was totally in error in setting aside the conviction and the sentence awarded by the sessions judge and in remitting the matter to the sessions judge for de novo trial. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the Calcutta High Court and remit criminal appeal nos. 203 and 232 of 1999 to the High Court for re-disposal in accordance with law. Since it is a case of death reference, the High Court would do well in taking up the case immediately after the pooja vacation. We would request the learned Chief Justice of the High Court to post the matter before a bench of which any of the learned judges who have passed the impugned order would not be a member.
5. These appeals stand allowed accordingly.
