State of U.P. Vs. Amar Singh
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1998
Petitioner: State of U.P.
Respondent: Amar Singh
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1998
Judges: Dr. A.S. ANAND, CJI, R.C. LAHOTI & SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Jul 24, 2001
Head Note:
CRIMINAL LAW
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 376 – Sentence – Violence against women – Trial court imposing sentence of 8 years’ RI – High Court reducing it to the period already undergone and fine of Rs. 5000/- – If commensurates with crime. Held that in such matters, leniency would be wholly misplaced. High Court orders set aside but considering the married life of accused and other factors, sentenced to undergo RI for 2 years and fine of Rs. 5000/-.
Held:
Crimes of violence against women need to be severely dealt with and the sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant factors bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence which is commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in such cases and public abhorrence of crime should be reflected through imposition of appropriate sentence by the court. The courts must sensitize themselves while dealing with such cases. In cases of crime against women, leniency in the matter of sentence is wholly misplaced unless there exist special and adequate reasons. (Para 4)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad dated 1st August, 1997 whereby while maintaining conviction of the respondent for an offence under section 376 IPC, the sentence of imprisonment was reduced from 8 years’ rigorous imprisonment, as imposed by the trial court, to the period already undergone. Sentence of payment of fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment was also imposed by the High Court. The only complaint, the state government has against the judgment of the High Court is that the sentence awarded by the High Court is grossly inadequate.
2. Since the conviction of the respondent, as recorded by the trial court, was not put in issue by him before the High Court and has been confirmed and has not been questioned before us either, we are relieved of the necessity of recapitulating the facts leading to the filing of this appeal.
3. After going through the judgment of the High Court, we find that the High Court has not properly appreciated its responsibility, as a sentencing court. (The sentence awarded by the High Court is not adequate considering the gravity of the offence). We, therefore, consider it our plain duty to interfere in the matter of sentence.
4. This Court has repeatedly said that crimes of violence against women need to be severely dealt with and the sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant factors bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence which is commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in such cases and public abhorrence of crime should be reflected through imposition of appropriate sentence by the court. The courts must sensitize themselves while dealing with such cases. These salutary principles have been completely overlooked by the High Court which adopted a rather casual approach in reducing the sentence to the period already undergone, without even trying to ascertain as to what was the total period of sentence which the respondent had undergone. In cases of crime against women, leniency in the matter of sentence is wholly misplaced unless there exist special and adequate reasons. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order of the High Court reducing the sentence to the period already undergone and imposing a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, as already noticed.
5. A minimum sentence of 10 years for an offence under section 376 (2) clause (f) came to be introduced by the Legislature by amendment Act 43 of 1983. Thus, at the time when an offence in this case was committed, this provision was not on the statute book. Therefore, the question of imposition of at least minimum sentence under clause (f) of section 376(2) does not arise.
6. There are various factors, which we must take into consideration while considering the issue of enhancement of sentence.
7. The occurrence took place, as already noticed, on 1st March, 1979 – more than 22 years ago. We are informed that the respondent has since got married and has a number of children of his own. We are also informed that the prosecutrix has also got married and is settled in her life. The High Court had reduced the sentence in 1997. The respondent is in custody after leave was granted by this Court and bail refused to him. Keeping all these factors in view, we consider it appropriate to enhance the sentence from the one imposed by the High Court to a period of two years’ rigorous imprisonment while maintaining sentence of fine and imprisonment in default of payment of fine as imposed by the High Court. The respondent shall be entitled to the benefit of the period already spent by him in jail as an under-trial as well as after his conviction and after grant of leave by this Court.
8. The appeal succeeds to the above extent and is disposed of.
1. This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad dated 1st August, 1997 whereby while maintaining conviction of the respondent for an offence under section 376 IPC, the sentence of imprisonment was reduced from 8 years’ rigorous imprisonment, as imposed by the trial court, to the period already undergone. Sentence of payment of fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment was also imposed by the High Court. The only complaint, the state government has against the judgment of the High Court is that the sentence awarded by the High Court is grossly inadequate.
2. Since the conviction of the respondent, as recorded by the trial court, was not put in issue by him before the High Court and has been confirmed and has not been questioned before us either, we are relieved of the necessity of recapitulating the facts leading to the filing of this appeal.
3. After going through the judgment of the High Court, we find that the High Court has not properly appreciated its responsibility, as a sentencing court. (The sentence awarded by the High Court is not adequate considering the gravity of the offence). We, therefore, consider it our plain duty to interfere in the matter of sentence.
4. This Court has repeatedly said that crimes of violence against women need to be severely dealt with and the sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant factors bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence which is commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in such cases and public abhorrence of crime should be reflected through imposition of appropriate sentence by the court. The courts must sensitize themselves while dealing with such cases. These salutary principles have been completely overlooked by the High Court which adopted a rather casual approach in reducing the sentence to the period already undergone, without even trying to ascertain as to what was the total period of sentence which the respondent had undergone. In cases of crime against women, leniency in the matter of sentence is wholly misplaced unless there exist special and adequate reasons. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order of the High Court reducing the sentence to the period already undergone and imposing a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, as already noticed.
5. A minimum sentence of 10 years for an offence under section 376 (2) clause (f) came to be introduced by the Legislature by amendment Act 43 of 1983. Thus, at the time when an offence in this case was committed, this provision was not on the statute book. Therefore, the question of imposition of at least minimum sentence under clause (f) of section 376(2) does not arise.
6. There are various factors, which we must take into consideration while considering the issue of enhancement of sentence.
7. The occurrence took place, as already noticed, on 1st March, 1979 – more than 22 years ago. We are informed that the respondent has since got married and has a number of children of his own. We are also informed that the prosecutrix has also got married and is settled in her life. The High Court had reduced the sentence in 1997. The respondent is in custody after leave was granted by this Court and bail refused to him. Keeping all these factors in view, we consider it appropriate to enhance the sentence from the one imposed by the High Court to a period of two years’ rigorous imprisonment while maintaining sentence of fine and imprisonment in default of payment of fine as imposed by the High Court. The respondent shall be entitled to the benefit of the period already spent by him in jail as an under-trial as well as after his conviction and after grant of leave by this Court.
8. The appeal succeeds to the above extent and is disposed of.
