State of Punjab Vs. Kesar Singh
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 751 of 1996.
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) 644 of 1996)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 18.1.1996 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl.Misc.No. 12243-M of 1995)
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) 644 of 1996)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 18.1.1996 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl.Misc.No. 12243-M of 1995)
Petitioner: State of Punjab
Respondent: Kesar Singh
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 751 of 1996.
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) 644 of 1996)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 18.1.1996 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl.Misc.No. 12243-M of 1995)
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) 644 of 1996)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 18.1.1996 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl.Misc.No. 12243-M of 1995)
Judges: A.S.ANAND & S.B.MAJMUDAR, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Jul 22, 1996
Appearances:
Mr. R.S.Suri, Advocate for the Appellant.
Mr. H.K.Puri, Mr. Rajesh Srivastava and Mr. Ujjwal Banerjee, Advocates for the Respondent.
Head Note:
CRIMINAL LAW
Code of Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure Code – Sections 482, 433 – Held right to exercise power under S.433 to release prematurely vests in Govt. to be exercised in accordance with rules and established principles and High Court could not order release in an application under section 482 – Held at best High Court could direct consideration of the premature release by Govt. – Set aside.
Held:
The mandate of Section 433 Cr.P.C. enables the Government in an appropriate case to commute the sentence of a convict and to prematurely order his release before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the courts. Clauses (b) of Section 433. Cr.P.C. provides that the sentence of imprisonment for life may be commuted for imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or fine. Undisputedly, the respondent had not completed 14 years sentence when he filed the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking premature release. The direction of the High Court therefore to prematurely release the respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could not have been made. That apart, even if the High Court could give such a direction, it could only direct consideration of the case of premature release by the Government and could not have ordered the premature release of the respondent itself. The right to exercise the power under Section 433 Cr.P.C. vests in the Government and has to be exercised by the Government in accordance with the rules and established principles. The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained and is hereby set aside. (Para 3)
JUDGEMENT:
O R D E R
1. Special leave granted.
2. The respondent was convicted for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment by the judgment and order dated May 28, 1987. After he had undergone a little more than 8 years of sentence he filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh Seeking premature release. The High Court by the impugned order dated January 18. 1986 considered the case on its merits and allowed the petition directing the release of the respondent forthwith. The State is aggrieved of the order dated January 18, 1986, hence this appeal.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion the direction given by the High Court was not at all appropriate or permissible in law. The mandate of Section 433 Cr.P.C. enables the Government in an appropriate case to commute the sentence of a convict and to prematurely order his release before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the courts. Clauses (b) of Section 433. Cr.P.C. provides that the sentence of imprisonment for life may be commuted for imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or fine. Undisputedly, the respondent had not completed 14 years sentence when he filed the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking premature release. The direction of the High Court therefore to prematurely release the respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could not have been made. That apart, even if the High Court could give such a direction, it could only direct consideration of the case of premature release by the Government and could not have ordered the premature release of the respondent itself. The right to exercise the power under Section 433 Cr.P.C. vests in the Government and has to be exercised by the Government in accordance with the rules and established principles. The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained and is hereby set aside.
4. This order shall, however, not come in the way of the respondent for approaching the Government for communication of his sentence and premature release in terms of the order issued by the Governor of Punjab on March 6, 1985. As and when such an application is made, the State Government shall decide that application on merits uninfluenced by this order or by the observations made by the High Court in the impugned order.
1. Special leave granted.
2. The respondent was convicted for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment by the judgment and order dated May 28, 1987. After he had undergone a little more than 8 years of sentence he filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh Seeking premature release. The High Court by the impugned order dated January 18. 1986 considered the case on its merits and allowed the petition directing the release of the respondent forthwith. The State is aggrieved of the order dated January 18, 1986, hence this appeal.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion the direction given by the High Court was not at all appropriate or permissible in law. The mandate of Section 433 Cr.P.C. enables the Government in an appropriate case to commute the sentence of a convict and to prematurely order his release before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the courts. Clauses (b) of Section 433. Cr.P.C. provides that the sentence of imprisonment for life may be commuted for imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or fine. Undisputedly, the respondent had not completed 14 years sentence when he filed the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking premature release. The direction of the High Court therefore to prematurely release the respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could not have been made. That apart, even if the High Court could give such a direction, it could only direct consideration of the case of premature release by the Government and could not have ordered the premature release of the respondent itself. The right to exercise the power under Section 433 Cr.P.C. vests in the Government and has to be exercised by the Government in accordance with the rules and established principles. The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained and is hereby set aside.
4. This order shall, however, not come in the way of the respondent for approaching the Government for communication of his sentence and premature release in terms of the order issued by the Governor of Punjab on March 6, 1985. As and when such an application is made, the State Government shall decide that application on merits uninfluenced by this order or by the observations made by the High Court in the impugned order.
