State of Maharashtra and Another Vs. Gopalprasad Govindprasad Agarwaland Others
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 305 of 1997
with
Criminal Appeal No. 778 of 1989
with
Criminal Appeal No. 778 of 1989
Petitioner: State of Maharashtra and Another
Respondent: Gopalprasad Govindprasad Agarwaland Others
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 305 of 1997
with
Criminal Appeal No. 778 of 1989
with
Criminal Appeal No. 778 of 1989
Judges: M.K. MUKHERJEE & S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Mar 20, 1997
Head Note:
CRIMINAL
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954
Sections 16(1)(a)(i), 20 – Conviction under – Same set aside by Appellate Court on grounds of improper consent for prosecution – View approved by High Court – Order granting consent fulfilling requirements. Held that appellate court and High Court were not justified in concluding that consent was improper. Appeal however dismissed as offence took place 20 years ago. (Paras 4,5)
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954
Sections 16(1)(a)(i), 20 – Conviction under – Same set aside by Appellate Court on grounds of improper consent for prosecution – View approved by High Court – Order granting consent fulfilling requirements. Held that appellate court and High Court were not justified in concluding that consent was improper. Appeal however dismissed as offence took place 20 years ago. (Paras 4,5)
Cases Reffered:
1. A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab (JT 1986 SC 566)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 619 of 1997.
2. Against the respondents in these appeals two separate prose-cutions were launched under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (“Act” for short) at the instance of a Food Inspector of the Food and Drug Administration Depart-ment, State of Maharashtra on the accusation that they had ex-posed for sale chilli powder and turmeric (whole) in their shop, which on analysis were found to be adulterated. The trial court convicted them for the above offences and aggrieved thereby they preferred appeals in the Court of Session. The appellate court set aside their convictions solely on the ground that the written consent given under Section 20 of the Act for their prosecutions was not proper as the authority concerned did not give reasons therefor. In recording such finding the appellate court relied upon the judgment of this Court in A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab (JT 1986 SC 566) wherein it has been observed that the consent-ing authority can give its consent in writing on being satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and on recording reasons for the launching of such prosecution in public interest.
3. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal the appellant filed petitions under Section 378 Cr.PC.in the High Court seeking leave to prefer appeals therefrom but such leave was refused on the ground that the acquittal was justified. Hence these appeals.
4. To ascertain whether the orders granting consent were proper or not we called for and looked into the relevant orders. Our such exercise persuades us to hold that the appellate court and, for that matter, the High Court, were not justified in concluding that the consent was not proper. The orders show that the Joint Commissioner, Food and Drug, Pune Division (the con-senting authority) had gone through the relevant records of the cases including the reports of the Public Analyst and he specifi-cally recorded therein that the prosecutions against the appell-ants were called for the alleged offences committed. In our view the orders granting consent fulfill all the requirements of Sec-tion 20 of the Act.
5. Ordinarily, after recording the above findings we are re-quired to set aside the impugned acquittal and remand the matter for disposal of the appeals on their merits but having regard to the fact that since the offences were allegedly committed almost 20 years have elapsed we do not feel inclined to take such a course of action. We, therefore, dismiss the appeals with the above observations.
1. Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 619 of 1997.
2. Against the respondents in these appeals two separate prose-cutions were launched under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (“Act” for short) at the instance of a Food Inspector of the Food and Drug Administration Depart-ment, State of Maharashtra on the accusation that they had ex-posed for sale chilli powder and turmeric (whole) in their shop, which on analysis were found to be adulterated. The trial court convicted them for the above offences and aggrieved thereby they preferred appeals in the Court of Session. The appellate court set aside their convictions solely on the ground that the written consent given under Section 20 of the Act for their prosecutions was not proper as the authority concerned did not give reasons therefor. In recording such finding the appellate court relied upon the judgment of this Court in A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab (JT 1986 SC 566) wherein it has been observed that the consent-ing authority can give its consent in writing on being satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and on recording reasons for the launching of such prosecution in public interest.
3. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal the appellant filed petitions under Section 378 Cr.PC.in the High Court seeking leave to prefer appeals therefrom but such leave was refused on the ground that the acquittal was justified. Hence these appeals.
4. To ascertain whether the orders granting consent were proper or not we called for and looked into the relevant orders. Our such exercise persuades us to hold that the appellate court and, for that matter, the High Court, were not justified in concluding that the consent was not proper. The orders show that the Joint Commissioner, Food and Drug, Pune Division (the con-senting authority) had gone through the relevant records of the cases including the reports of the Public Analyst and he specifi-cally recorded therein that the prosecutions against the appell-ants were called for the alleged offences committed. In our view the orders granting consent fulfill all the requirements of Sec-tion 20 of the Act.
5. Ordinarily, after recording the above findings we are re-quired to set aside the impugned acquittal and remand the matter for disposal of the appeals on their merits but having regard to the fact that since the offences were allegedly committed almost 20 years have elapsed we do not feel inclined to take such a course of action. We, therefore, dismiss the appeals with the above observations.
