State of Karnataka Vs. Hanmanthrao
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 1002 of 1995
Petitioner: State of Karnataka
Respondent: Hanmanthrao
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 1002 of 1995
Judges: U.C. BANERJEE & B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Oct 29, 2002
Head Note:
CONSTITUTION
Article 136 with Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 448, 307, 324 – Interference by Supreme Court – High Court finding considerable doubt about complicity of accused, recording acquittal on benefit of doubt. Held that it is not a case which calls for interference under Article 136. (Paras 4, 5)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. The state is in appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore on the ground of benefit of doubt.
2. Incidentally, the accused was charged for the offences under sections 448, 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code and the learned sessions judge was pleased to sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- with a default clause as well. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
3. Subsequently, the matter was taken to the High Court and the High Court recorded the finding, as noticed above, of acquittal on consideration of the doctrine of benefit of doubt. The High Court in its order records as below:
“14. It is the evidence of PW.1 that when he received the blow, he was able to see the appellant through the electric light which was burning in the padasala. He has admitted that there was no meter to use the electric light in his house and that a wire connection is taken from the house of Maruthi Rao, one of his relative staying in the next house. The scene of offence panchnama does not show the existence of any electric light in that place and it is not spoken to by the other witnesses except PW.1 and PW.2. Evidence of PW.1 further shows that after he and his wife were shifted by PW.4 in a tempo initially they went to Humnabad police station where PW.8 was present. PW.8 after having noticed the nature of injuries sustained by PW.1 has immediately accompanied them to the hospital. But later it is revealed that PW.8 has not visited the hospital. On the contrary one police constable no. 432 has accompanied PW.1 and PW.2. PW.8 has admitted in his evidence that he has not noted in the station house diary the visit of PW.1, PW.2 and PW.4 as he felt that it was not necessary. According to PW.8 he visited the hospital at about 6.00 a.m. and recorded a complaint as narrated by PW.1. Since according to PW.3 the injuries were grievous in nature there was no indication whether PW.8 has obtained the permission of PW.3 to record the complaint of PW.1.
15. On a perusal of the complaint exhibit P.1, it is seen that it does not contain the time of recording the statement. PW.8 is said to have registered that case on the basis of this complaint as per exhibit P.1. It is also in the evidence of PW.8 that the house of the magistrate of Humnabad is only a five minutes walking distance. But the endorsement shows that the complaint and FIR were received by the judicial magistrate at about 2.00 p.m. The prosecution has not explained the delay. From all these, the obvious conclusion that one can reach is that the complaint was recorded subsequent to 6.00 a.m.”
4. In fine, the High Court concluded that on the assessment of both direct and circumstantial evidence, there is a considerable doubt to prove the complicity of the guilt of the appellant and the doubt thus ought to be extended in favour of the appellant and hence the order of acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt.
5. The learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal has taken us through different parts of the evidence as well and submitted that the High Court is in manifest error in recording a doubt in the matter. We are however, unable to record our concurrence therewith. The High Court has considered the matter in a proper perspective which is otherwise plausible and there is no amount of perversity involved warranting the intervention of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution against an order of acquittal.
On the wake of the aforesaid, this appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.
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1. The state is in appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore on the ground of benefit of doubt.
2. Incidentally, the accused was charged for the offences under sections 448, 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code and the learned sessions judge was pleased to sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- with a default clause as well. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
3. Subsequently, the matter was taken to the High Court and the High Court recorded the finding, as noticed above, of acquittal on consideration of the doctrine of benefit of doubt. The High Court in its order records as below:
“14. It is the evidence of PW.1 that when he received the blow, he was able to see the appellant through the electric light which was burning in the padasala. He has admitted that there was no meter to use the electric light in his house and that a wire connection is taken from the house of Maruthi Rao, one of his relative staying in the next house. The scene of offence panchnama does not show the existence of any electric light in that place and it is not spoken to by the other witnesses except PW.1 and PW.2. Evidence of PW.1 further shows that after he and his wife were shifted by PW.4 in a tempo initially they went to Humnabad police station where PW.8 was present. PW.8 after having noticed the nature of injuries sustained by PW.1 has immediately accompanied them to the hospital. But later it is revealed that PW.8 has not visited the hospital. On the contrary one police constable no. 432 has accompanied PW.1 and PW.2. PW.8 has admitted in his evidence that he has not noted in the station house diary the visit of PW.1, PW.2 and PW.4 as he felt that it was not necessary. According to PW.8 he visited the hospital at about 6.00 a.m. and recorded a complaint as narrated by PW.1. Since according to PW.3 the injuries were grievous in nature there was no indication whether PW.8 has obtained the permission of PW.3 to record the complaint of PW.1.
15. On a perusal of the complaint exhibit P.1, it is seen that it does not contain the time of recording the statement. PW.8 is said to have registered that case on the basis of this complaint as per exhibit P.1. It is also in the evidence of PW.8 that the house of the magistrate of Humnabad is only a five minutes walking distance. But the endorsement shows that the complaint and FIR were received by the judicial magistrate at about 2.00 p.m. The prosecution has not explained the delay. From all these, the obvious conclusion that one can reach is that the complaint was recorded subsequent to 6.00 a.m.”
4. In fine, the High Court concluded that on the assessment of both direct and circumstantial evidence, there is a considerable doubt to prove the complicity of the guilt of the appellant and the doubt thus ought to be extended in favour of the appellant and hence the order of acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt.
5. The learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal has taken us through different parts of the evidence as well and submitted that the High Court is in manifest error in recording a doubt in the matter. We are however, unable to record our concurrence therewith. The High Court has considered the matter in a proper perspective which is otherwise plausible and there is no amount of perversity involved warranting the intervention of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution against an order of acquittal.
On the wake of the aforesaid, this appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.
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