State of Jharkhand and Ors. Vs. Bijay Kumar and Ors.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 1270 of 2008
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.16466 of 2006]
[From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2006 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, in W.P. (S) No. 1599 of 2005]
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.16466 of 2006]
[From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2006 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, in W.P. (S) No. 1599 of 2005]
Petitioner: State of Jharkhand and Ors.
Respondent: Bijay Kumar and Ors.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 1270 of 2008
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.16466 of 2006]
[From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2006 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, in W.P. (S) No. 1599 of 2005]
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.16466 of 2006]
[From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2006 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, in W.P. (S) No. 1599 of 2005]
Judges: S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Feb 14, 2008
Appearances:
Mr. B.B. Singh, Mr. Kumar Rajesh and Mr. Rajesh Kr. Pathak, Advocates for the Appellants.
Mr. P.P. Rao, Senior Advocate, Mr. Guntur Prabhakar, Advocate with him for the Respondent.
Mr. P.P. Rao, Senior Advocate, Mr. Guntur Prabhakar, Advocate with him for the Respondent.
Head Note:
SERVICE and Labour LAWS
Public employment – Recruitment of Technical Assistants in the Animal Husbandry Department – Bihar Fodder Scam – Consequent cancellation of all illegal appointments made by the authorities – On a challenge by some of the persons whose services were terminated, Supreme Court while holding that they had no right to continue in service, giving certain directions with respect to those appellants only in exercise of its powers under Article 142 – Court specifically directing that its directions should not be treated as precedent in future but should be treated as a one time exercise only – In a subsequent writ filed by persons who were not parties to the earlier proceedings High Court giving similar directions in favour of the petitioners – Validity. Held in view of the subsequent developments like bifurcation of the State, lapse of over ten years, the directions given by the High Court cannot be sustained. Only because some persons had approached the Apex Court and obtained a favourable order the same cannot be extended to others to which they are not otherwise entitled to.
Public employment – Recruitment of Technical Assistants in the Animal Husbandry Department – Bihar Fodder Scam – Consequent cancellation of all illegal appointments made by the authorities – On a challenge by some of the persons whose services were terminated, Supreme Court while holding that they had no right to continue in service, giving certain directions with respect to those appellants only in exercise of its powers under Article 142 – Court specifically directing that its directions should not be treated as precedent in future but should be treated as a one time exercise only – In a subsequent writ filed by persons who were not parties to the earlier proceedings High Court giving similar directions in favour of the petitioners – Validity. Held in view of the subsequent developments like bifurcation of the State, lapse of over ten years, the directions given by the High Court cannot be sustained. Only because some persons had approached the Apex Court and obtained a favourable order the same cannot be extended to others to which they are not otherwise entitled to.
Held:
The core question, therefore, which arises for our consideration is as to whether the High Court had any jurisdiction to issue a similar direction relying on or on the basis of the orders of this Court which had been passed in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution and confined only to the appellants of those cases. (Para 16)
Indisputably, Respondents were not parties to the said orders. No benefit thereof, thus, could be extended in their favour. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, could not have issued the aforementioned directions. (Para 17)
Constitution of India conferred a special jurisdiction in this Court only. Although power of judicial review has been conferred on the High Courts, it had not been given any special jurisdiction as has been done on the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, very difficult to comprehend that the High Court could issue the impugned direction which, in effect and substance, would be violative thereof. (Para 18)
There is a sea change in the situation in the field of public employment. Ten years have passed. A new State has come into being. Thousands of persons have acquired similar or higher qualifications. They have got their names registered in the employment exchanges. The job opportunities in a specialized field being limited, those who are now entitled to be considered, may not be considered at all, if the order of the High Court is allowed to operate. (Para 22)
Constitutional guarantee of equality as envisaged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India must be protected.
While passing one order or the other, we should not forget the interest of those who are not before us. Citizens have human right of development and offer of appointment on such posts should be directed to be made only on merit. Only because some persons had approached this Court and obtained an order, the same should not be extended to others to which they are not otherwise entitled to, namely, weightage in service over the new applicants. (Para 23)
Indisputably, Respondents were not parties to the said orders. No benefit thereof, thus, could be extended in their favour. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, could not have issued the aforementioned directions. (Para 17)
Constitution of India conferred a special jurisdiction in this Court only. Although power of judicial review has been conferred on the High Courts, it had not been given any special jurisdiction as has been done on the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, very difficult to comprehend that the High Court could issue the impugned direction which, in effect and substance, would be violative thereof. (Para 18)
There is a sea change in the situation in the field of public employment. Ten years have passed. A new State has come into being. Thousands of persons have acquired similar or higher qualifications. They have got their names registered in the employment exchanges. The job opportunities in a specialized field being limited, those who are now entitled to be considered, may not be considered at all, if the order of the High Court is allowed to operate. (Para 22)
Constitutional guarantee of equality as envisaged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India must be protected.
While passing one order or the other, we should not forget the interest of those who are not before us. Citizens have human right of development and offer of appointment on such posts should be directed to be made only on merit. Only because some persons had approached this Court and obtained an order, the same should not be extended to others to which they are not otherwise entitled to, namely, weightage in service over the new applicants. (Para 23)
Cases Reffered:
1. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Ors. v. Sajal Kumar Roy and Ors. [JT 2006 (9) SC 549] (Para 21)
2. Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Ors. [1975 (3) SCR 960] (Para 11)
3. B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors. [1966 (3) SCR 682] (Para 11)
2. Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Ors. [1975 (3) SCR 960] (Para 11)
3. B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors. [1966 (3) SCR 682] (Para 11)
JUDGEMENT:
S.B. Sinha, J.
Leave granted.
1. Respondents herein were appointed on ad hoc basis in Frozen Semen Bank Project as Technical Assistants in the Department of Animal Husbandry of the Government of Bihar. The said appointments were made by the Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, Ranchi.
2. In the year 1996, a scam known as ‘Fodder Scam’ came to light and all unauthorized appointments were declared illegal by the State, inter alia, on the premise :
‘1. The Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, Ranchi was not competent to make any such appointment.
2. No advertisement was issued before making such appointment.
3. No reservation policy was followed.
4. The number of persons appointed,
were much more than the sanctioned post and
5. Besides these many other rules and norms of appointment were also flouted.’
3. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, the services of the respondents were terminated in 1997. Services of some other employees were also terminated on 23.10.1998. They filed writ petitions before the then Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court, which were dismissed.
4. Letters Patent Appeals preferred thereagainst were also dismissed observing that in the event their cases are considered for appointment, relaxation in respect of age and weightage in the future appointment should be given.
5. One Umakant Sinha and others approached this Court. By a judgment and order dated 23.7.2003, this Court while opining that ad hoc appointees have no
right to claim regularization in the service, directed:
‘In this view of the matter, we direct the State of Jharkhand to consider at the earliest for recruiting Technical Assistant for the Semen Bank Project and ti fill up the existing vacancies within a period of three months from today. For that purpose the Respondent-State is directed to constitute a Selection Committee as per the existing Rules within a period of three months from today.
(ii) The appellants whose services are terminated may apply to the Secretary of the Animal Husbandry Department within a period of one month for being re-appointed or for regularization of their services. The Committee shall consider
the eligibility, suitability, past record as
well as the educational qualifications
of the appellants as per the rules as on today.
(iii) The Committee shall give relaxation of age and weightage over outsiders as directed by the High Court. However, if the appellants are found unsuitable for some reasons, it would be open to the Committee to reject their applications.
Appropriate authority shall issue orders
for appointment after considering the
roster and the merit list, on available vacancies.
The appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. We, however, make it clear that this case shall not be treated as precedent as we have decided it purely on the facts and in the peculiar circumstances of this case.’
(Emphasis supplied)
6. An interlocutory application was filed for extension of time to comply with the said order and by an order dated 2.12.2003, three months’ time was granted for constitution of the Committee. It was clarified that directions by this Court were in relation to the appellants in the said appeals.
7. Another writ petition, however, was filed in the High Court of Jharkhand which came into being in November 2000 by Bijay Kumar and others. The said writ petition was also dismissed by an order dated 6.2.2004. Special Leave Petitions were also filed thereagainst and by a judgment and order dated 10.4.2006, a Bench of this Court directed :
‘We are of the view that the issue should be resolved finally and should not be kept pending. The earlier order of this Court was passed on 23.7.2003. The right to be selected thereunder cannot continue indefinitely. Therefore, we direct : (1) that the Respondent-Authority shall advertise in the local newspapers having wide circulation of the holding of selections for the purpose of filling of those vacancies which according to the Rules, are to be filled by direct appointment. (2) Applications should be asked for from these ad hoc employees who were appointed in the Frozen Semen Bank Project between 1988 to 1992 and whose services were terminated in 1998. No such employee who has already been considered by the Selection Committee under the order dated 23.7.2003 shall apply. (3) No appointment already made either in the normal course or pursuant to the earlier order of this Court shall be disturbed. (4) The advertisement shall specify the last date with which the candidate concerned shall apply for consideration including thereon proof that the candidate had served with the Respondents. (5) The selection shall be made by the Selection Committee only against the available vacancies. Preference shall be given to those who have longer tenure of service over those who have shorter tenure of service, other things being equal. (6) All other conditions in the order dated 23.7.2003 shall be operative as far as the procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee to be set up pursuant to this order is concerned. (7) This shall be a one time exercise. No further application shall be entertained by such ad hoc employees. This fact should also be mentioned in the advertisement.’
(Emphasis supplied)
8. An advertisement by the appellant was issued. Questioning the legality of the said advertisement, a writ petition was filed before the Jharkhand High Court which was marked as Writ Petition (S) No.156 of 2005. A direction was issued therein that the process of selection should be completed within four months.
9. Respondents, however, filed another writ petition before the High Court which by reason of the impugned judgment dated 30.6.2006 was disposed of, directing :
‘In view of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench on 23rd June, 2006 in W.P.(S) No.156 of 2005 (Chandra Kant and ors. v. State of Jharkhand and ors.) Supreme Court decision dated 10th April, 2006 and earlier decision dated 23rd July, 2003 passed in Civil Appeal nos.5342-5343 of 2003 and analogous cases, this application is disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to apply (those who have not applied in pursuance of the advertisement to the post of Technical Assistant), if any advertisement is issued in future.’
10. Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that the aforementioned direction of the High Court, if implemented, would run contrary to and inconsistent with the directions contained in this Court’s orders dated 23.7.2003, 2.122003 and 10.4.2006. It was urged that this Court, in the aforementioned orders, having directed not to treat the same as precedent as also one time exercise, the directions issued by the High Court are clearly violative thereof.
11. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, urged that one time exercise directed to be carried out by this Court had not been fully complied with and, thus, the High Court was entitled to pass the impugned order. It was submitted that this Court, in any event, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, can issue necessary directions so as to extend the benefits also to those who had not approached this Court earlier. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Ors. [1975 (3) SCR 960] and B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors. [1966 (3) SCR 682]. It was contended that advertisement having been issued in July 2006 and the impugned order having been passed by the High Court in June 2006 and furthermore in view of the fact that the respondents have appeared in the examination, this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
12. Respondents herein were appointed in 1992. They were removed from service in 1997. They did not question the said orders of termination. We have noticed hereinbefore that Abhay Kumar, Uma Kant Sinha and others had questioned the orders of their termination from service before the Patna High Court.
13. This Court in its order dated 23.7.2003, although opined that they had no right to continue in service, issued some directions evidently in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
14. The said order was to be kept confined only to the appellants thereof, was reiterated by this Court in its order dated 2.12.2003.
15. It may be true that while Abhay Kumar and others approached this Court aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 16.2.2004 of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, this Court, in its order dated 10.4.2006 intended to resolve the issue finally. It was in that situation opined that the right to be selected cannot continue indefinitely. This Court dealt with the grievances of those employees whose services have been terminated in the year 1998.
16. The core question, therefore, which arises for our consideration is as to whether the High Court had any jurisdiction to issue a similar direction relying on or on the basis of the orders of this Court which had been passed in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution and confined only to the appellants of those cases.
17. Indisputably, Respondents were not parties to the said orders. No benefit thereof, thus, could be extended in their favour. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, could not have issued the aforementioned directions.
18. Constitution of India conferred a special jurisdiction in this Court only. Although power of judicial review has been conferred on the High Courts, it had not been given any special jurisdiction as has been done on the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, very difficult to comprehend that the High Court could issue the impugned direction which, in effect and substance, would be violative thereof.
19. Reliance placed by Mr. Rao on Amrit Lal Berry (supra) is not apposite. When a law is declared by this Court, it becomes the law of land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Indisputably, therefore, such law would enure to the benefit of the persons similarly situated but it is incomprehensible that when this Court grants some special benefits to the parties who are before it and confined the relief only to them, such a benefit can be extended by the High Court relying on or on the basis thereof. The matter might have been different if this Court had not issued such directions, namely, the said order should be kept confined to the parties before it. When this Court declared that no further application should be entertained at the instance of other ad hoc employees in the name of parity or otherwise, the High Court could not have issued a direction which would run counter to the spirit of the said order.
20. Submission of Mr. Rao that notwithstanding the orders dated 23.7.2003 and 10.4.2006, the High Court have committed no mistake in issuing the impugned directions, is stated to be rejected. This Court intended to pass a final order. The said order should have been allowed to attain finality. If a third order can be issued, others who are waiting on the fence may be held to be entitled to file a fourth application. The process, thus, would go on unendingly. Relaxation given for a limited purpose would become a rule and not the exception.
21. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Ors. v. Sajal Kumar Roy and Ors. [JT 2006 (9) SC 549 ; 2006 (8) SCC 671], dealing with the question of age relaxation, it was held:
‘The appointing authorities are required to apply their mind while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the age-limits. Discretion of the authorities is required to be exercised only for deserving candidates and upon recommendations of the Appointing Committee/Selection Committee. The requirements to comply with the rules, it is trite, were required to be complied with fairly and reasonably. They were bound by the rules. The discretionary jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation of age provided for in the rules and within the four corners thereof. As the respondents do not come within the purview of the exception contained in Article 45 of the Education Code, in our opinion, the Tribunal and consequently, the High Court committed a manifest error in issuing the aforementioned directions.’
22. There is a sea change in the situation in the field of public employment. Ten years have passed. A new State has come into being. Thousands of persons have acquired similar or higher qualifications. They have got their names registered in the employment exchanges. The job opportunities in a specialized field being limited, those who are now entitled to be considered, may not be considered at all, if the order of the High Court is allowed to operate.
23. Constitutional guarantee of equality as envisaged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India must be protected. While passing one order or the other, we should not forget the interest of those who are not before us. Citizens have human right of development and offer of appointment on such posts should be directed to be made only on merit. Only because some persons had approached this Court and obtained an order, the same should not be extended to others to which they are not otherwise entitled to, namely, weightage in service over the new applicants.
24. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Leave granted.
1. Respondents herein were appointed on ad hoc basis in Frozen Semen Bank Project as Technical Assistants in the Department of Animal Husbandry of the Government of Bihar. The said appointments were made by the Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, Ranchi.
2. In the year 1996, a scam known as ‘Fodder Scam’ came to light and all unauthorized appointments were declared illegal by the State, inter alia, on the premise :
‘1. The Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, Ranchi was not competent to make any such appointment.
2. No advertisement was issued before making such appointment.
3. No reservation policy was followed.
4. The number of persons appointed,
were much more than the sanctioned post and
5. Besides these many other rules and norms of appointment were also flouted.’
3. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, the services of the respondents were terminated in 1997. Services of some other employees were also terminated on 23.10.1998. They filed writ petitions before the then Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court, which were dismissed.
4. Letters Patent Appeals preferred thereagainst were also dismissed observing that in the event their cases are considered for appointment, relaxation in respect of age and weightage in the future appointment should be given.
5. One Umakant Sinha and others approached this Court. By a judgment and order dated 23.7.2003, this Court while opining that ad hoc appointees have no
right to claim regularization in the service, directed:
‘In this view of the matter, we direct the State of Jharkhand to consider at the earliest for recruiting Technical Assistant for the Semen Bank Project and ti fill up the existing vacancies within a period of three months from today. For that purpose the Respondent-State is directed to constitute a Selection Committee as per the existing Rules within a period of three months from today.
(ii) The appellants whose services are terminated may apply to the Secretary of the Animal Husbandry Department within a period of one month for being re-appointed or for regularization of their services. The Committee shall consider
the eligibility, suitability, past record as
well as the educational qualifications
of the appellants as per the rules as on today.
(iii) The Committee shall give relaxation of age and weightage over outsiders as directed by the High Court. However, if the appellants are found unsuitable for some reasons, it would be open to the Committee to reject their applications.
Appropriate authority shall issue orders
for appointment after considering the
roster and the merit list, on available vacancies.
The appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. We, however, make it clear that this case shall not be treated as precedent as we have decided it purely on the facts and in the peculiar circumstances of this case.’
(Emphasis supplied)
6. An interlocutory application was filed for extension of time to comply with the said order and by an order dated 2.12.2003, three months’ time was granted for constitution of the Committee. It was clarified that directions by this Court were in relation to the appellants in the said appeals.
7. Another writ petition, however, was filed in the High Court of Jharkhand which came into being in November 2000 by Bijay Kumar and others. The said writ petition was also dismissed by an order dated 6.2.2004. Special Leave Petitions were also filed thereagainst and by a judgment and order dated 10.4.2006, a Bench of this Court directed :
‘We are of the view that the issue should be resolved finally and should not be kept pending. The earlier order of this Court was passed on 23.7.2003. The right to be selected thereunder cannot continue indefinitely. Therefore, we direct : (1) that the Respondent-Authority shall advertise in the local newspapers having wide circulation of the holding of selections for the purpose of filling of those vacancies which according to the Rules, are to be filled by direct appointment. (2) Applications should be asked for from these ad hoc employees who were appointed in the Frozen Semen Bank Project between 1988 to 1992 and whose services were terminated in 1998. No such employee who has already been considered by the Selection Committee under the order dated 23.7.2003 shall apply. (3) No appointment already made either in the normal course or pursuant to the earlier order of this Court shall be disturbed. (4) The advertisement shall specify the last date with which the candidate concerned shall apply for consideration including thereon proof that the candidate had served with the Respondents. (5) The selection shall be made by the Selection Committee only against the available vacancies. Preference shall be given to those who have longer tenure of service over those who have shorter tenure of service, other things being equal. (6) All other conditions in the order dated 23.7.2003 shall be operative as far as the procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee to be set up pursuant to this order is concerned. (7) This shall be a one time exercise. No further application shall be entertained by such ad hoc employees. This fact should also be mentioned in the advertisement.’
(Emphasis supplied)
8. An advertisement by the appellant was issued. Questioning the legality of the said advertisement, a writ petition was filed before the Jharkhand High Court which was marked as Writ Petition (S) No.156 of 2005. A direction was issued therein that the process of selection should be completed within four months.
9. Respondents, however, filed another writ petition before the High Court which by reason of the impugned judgment dated 30.6.2006 was disposed of, directing :
‘In view of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench on 23rd June, 2006 in W.P.(S) No.156 of 2005 (Chandra Kant and ors. v. State of Jharkhand and ors.) Supreme Court decision dated 10th April, 2006 and earlier decision dated 23rd July, 2003 passed in Civil Appeal nos.5342-5343 of 2003 and analogous cases, this application is disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to apply (those who have not applied in pursuance of the advertisement to the post of Technical Assistant), if any advertisement is issued in future.’
10. Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that the aforementioned direction of the High Court, if implemented, would run contrary to and inconsistent with the directions contained in this Court’s orders dated 23.7.2003, 2.122003 and 10.4.2006. It was urged that this Court, in the aforementioned orders, having directed not to treat the same as precedent as also one time exercise, the directions issued by the High Court are clearly violative thereof.
11. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, urged that one time exercise directed to be carried out by this Court had not been fully complied with and, thus, the High Court was entitled to pass the impugned order. It was submitted that this Court, in any event, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, can issue necessary directions so as to extend the benefits also to those who had not approached this Court earlier. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Ors. [1975 (3) SCR 960] and B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors. [1966 (3) SCR 682]. It was contended that advertisement having been issued in July 2006 and the impugned order having been passed by the High Court in June 2006 and furthermore in view of the fact that the respondents have appeared in the examination, this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
12. Respondents herein were appointed in 1992. They were removed from service in 1997. They did not question the said orders of termination. We have noticed hereinbefore that Abhay Kumar, Uma Kant Sinha and others had questioned the orders of their termination from service before the Patna High Court.
13. This Court in its order dated 23.7.2003, although opined that they had no right to continue in service, issued some directions evidently in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
14. The said order was to be kept confined only to the appellants thereof, was reiterated by this Court in its order dated 2.12.2003.
15. It may be true that while Abhay Kumar and others approached this Court aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 16.2.2004 of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, this Court, in its order dated 10.4.2006 intended to resolve the issue finally. It was in that situation opined that the right to be selected cannot continue indefinitely. This Court dealt with the grievances of those employees whose services have been terminated in the year 1998.
16. The core question, therefore, which arises for our consideration is as to whether the High Court had any jurisdiction to issue a similar direction relying on or on the basis of the orders of this Court which had been passed in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution and confined only to the appellants of those cases.
17. Indisputably, Respondents were not parties to the said orders. No benefit thereof, thus, could be extended in their favour. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, could not have issued the aforementioned directions.
18. Constitution of India conferred a special jurisdiction in this Court only. Although power of judicial review has been conferred on the High Courts, it had not been given any special jurisdiction as has been done on the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, very difficult to comprehend that the High Court could issue the impugned direction which, in effect and substance, would be violative thereof.
19. Reliance placed by Mr. Rao on Amrit Lal Berry (supra) is not apposite. When a law is declared by this Court, it becomes the law of land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Indisputably, therefore, such law would enure to the benefit of the persons similarly situated but it is incomprehensible that when this Court grants some special benefits to the parties who are before it and confined the relief only to them, such a benefit can be extended by the High Court relying on or on the basis thereof. The matter might have been different if this Court had not issued such directions, namely, the said order should be kept confined to the parties before it. When this Court declared that no further application should be entertained at the instance of other ad hoc employees in the name of parity or otherwise, the High Court could not have issued a direction which would run counter to the spirit of the said order.
20. Submission of Mr. Rao that notwithstanding the orders dated 23.7.2003 and 10.4.2006, the High Court have committed no mistake in issuing the impugned directions, is stated to be rejected. This Court intended to pass a final order. The said order should have been allowed to attain finality. If a third order can be issued, others who are waiting on the fence may be held to be entitled to file a fourth application. The process, thus, would go on unendingly. Relaxation given for a limited purpose would become a rule and not the exception.
21. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Ors. v. Sajal Kumar Roy and Ors. [JT 2006 (9) SC 549 ; 2006 (8) SCC 671], dealing with the question of age relaxation, it was held:
‘The appointing authorities are required to apply their mind while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the age-limits. Discretion of the authorities is required to be exercised only for deserving candidates and upon recommendations of the Appointing Committee/Selection Committee. The requirements to comply with the rules, it is trite, were required to be complied with fairly and reasonably. They were bound by the rules. The discretionary jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation of age provided for in the rules and within the four corners thereof. As the respondents do not come within the purview of the exception contained in Article 45 of the Education Code, in our opinion, the Tribunal and consequently, the High Court committed a manifest error in issuing the aforementioned directions.’
22. There is a sea change in the situation in the field of public employment. Ten years have passed. A new State has come into being. Thousands of persons have acquired similar or higher qualifications. They have got their names registered in the employment exchanges. The job opportunities in a specialized field being limited, those who are now entitled to be considered, may not be considered at all, if the order of the High Court is allowed to operate.
23. Constitutional guarantee of equality as envisaged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India must be protected. While passing one order or the other, we should not forget the interest of those who are not before us. Citizens have human right of development and offer of appointment on such posts should be directed to be made only on merit. Only because some persons had approached this Court and obtained an order, the same should not be extended to others to which they are not otherwise entitled to, namely, weightage in service over the new applicants.
24. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
