Shoran Lal Sharma Vs. Deputy Director of Education, Meerut & Ors.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 2232 of 1999
Petitioner: Shoran Lal Sharma
Respondent: Deputy Director of Education, Meerut & Ors.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 2232 of 1999
Judges: G. B. PATTANAIK & B. N. AGRAWAL, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Mar 27, 2001
Head Note:
SERVICE LAWS
Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (2 of 1921)
Section 16-G(7) – Sus-pension – Effectiveness – Competency of Managing Committee to pass suspension orders – Termination – Effective date – Managing Committee coming into existence in March 1977 – Headmaster sus-pended on 16.7.77 – Resolution terminating his service passed on 7.11.77 – Dispute over validity of said Committee – Civil court in a suit holding it to be valid on 6.4.79 – Termination approved by Distt. Inspector of Schools on 24.4.80. Held, that validity of Managing Committee was upheld. However, termination would be effective only when approved. Since, approval was on 24.4.80, the employee would get benefits upto that date and he shall be deemed in service till then. (Paras 3, 4)
Cases Reffered:
1. Nand Deo Pandey v. Committee of Management & Ors. (1991 AIR SC 413) (Para 2)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 11765 of 1993. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. The appellant was Headmas-ter of a Junior School, and the school in question was recognised by the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Board in the year 1973. The school was admitted to the benefit of the grants-in-aid in the year 1976, and thus, the institution became an aided institution. In 1977, elections to the Managing Committee of the school took place, and it appears that again in March 1977, another set of persons were elected as the members of the Managing Committee. The appellant, who was continuing as Headmaster, was suspended from service by the said Managing Committee on 16.7.1977. A set of charge sheet was also served upon him, and finally an order of termination was passed by the Resolution of the Managing Commit-tee dated 7.11.1977. Under the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, no order of termination would be effective unless approved by the competent educational authority. The Resolution of the Managing Committee dated 7.11.1977 initially had not been approved by the District Inspector of Schools, but the Management approached the appellate authority, namely, the Deputy Director of Education, and the said Deputy Director of Education remanded the matter for re-consideration of the Dis-trict Inspector of Schools. After the matter came back, the District Inspector of Schools approved the order of termination on 24.4.1980, and thus the order of termination of the appellant became effective in the eyes of law with effect from the said date. Against the said order of approval, the Headmaster ap-proached in appeal to the Deputy Director. The Deputy Director initially did not entertain the appeal, as being time barred. The appellant then approached the High Court, and on the direction of the High Court that the appeal be disposed of on merits, the said Deputy Director entertained the appeal and disposed it of on merits by order dated 12.3.1993. The Appellate authority dis-missed the appeal and agreed with the order of approval passed by the District Inspector of Schools. The appellant being aggrieved, filed a writ petition before the High Court, and the High Court by the impugned judgment having refused to interfere with the order of termination, the present appeal has been preferred.
2. Mr. J. P. Saxena, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant raised two contentions before us in assailing the legality of the order of termination passed by the Managing Committee, and approved by the competent educational authority. One, on the date the appellant was placed under suspension and on the date of initiation of a disciplinary proceedings on the basis of which, the appellant’s services stood terminated, the status of the Managing Committee itself was under dispute, and therefore the said Managing Committee was not entitled to initiate any proceedings, and consequently the entire proceedings stood vi-tiated. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Nand Deo Pandey v. Committee of Management & Ors. (1991 AIR SC 413). The learned Counsel also further contended that under the relevant provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, more particularly under Sub-section (7) of Section 16-G, the order of suspension not being approved by the appropriate authority within the specified period would cease to be operative in the eyes of law, and therefore the appellant must be deemed to be in service after expiry of 60 days from the date of the order of suspension, and therefore he would be entitled to full salary for the period till the order of termination was passed.
3. So far as the first contention is concerned, it is not dis-puted that on the date of initiation of the proceedings and the date on which the appellant was placed under suspension, there was some dispute as to the legal status of the Managing Commit-tee, which came into existence in March, 1977. In a duly consti-tuted suit, by an order of the competent civil court dated 6.4.1979, the said Managing Committee has been held to be legally valid Managing Committee. The decision on which the learned Counsel has placed reliance will have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case inasmuch as in that case the delinquent employee had approached the Court at the very initiation of the proceedings, and the Court therefore had di-rected that in view of the pendency of the dispute, it would be more appropriate that the enquiry in question could be made by the nominee of the Deputy Director of Education. In the case in hand, not only the enquiry proceeded on the basis of charge sheet submitted by the Managing Committee, which came into existence in March 1977, but the entire gamut of enquiry was conducted, termi-nation order was passed, and that order was sent for approval to the competent authority, and finally the competent authority approved the same. That apart, the educational authority did approve the Managing Committee, which came into existence by virtue of election made in March 1977, and further as has been stated earlier, the competent civil court has already held the Managing Committee to be legal and valid. In the aforesaid prem-ises, there is absolutely no infirmity with the order of suspen-sion passed, and the order of termination passed by the Managing Committee on the basis of a finding of an enquiry, and therefore we do not find any substance in the arguments of the learned Counsel that entire process of initiation of the proceedings as well as the order of termination is vitiated on that score. The said contention of the learned Counsel therefore stands rejected.
4. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is no doubt true, as indicated in Sub-section (7) of Section 16-G of the Act that an order of suspension unless approved in writing by the Inspector would not remain in force for more than 60 days from the date of the suspension, but this contention does not appear to have raised before the High Court in the impugned judgment, and further it depends upon the fact whether the order of suspen-sion had, in fact, been approved by the Inspector within the specified period or not. But it goes without saying that the order of termination would be effective in the eyes of law, the same being approved by the competent educational authority, and in the case in hand, the approval has been accorded on 24.4.1980. Necessarily therefore the appellant must be deemed to be continuing in service till 24.4.1980 and as such would be entitled to all the pecuniary benefits that would be available to him under law till 24.4.1980. The appropriate educational author-ity may consider the relevant facts and decide the quantum of benefit, which the appellant would be entitled to on the basis that he was suspended on 16.7.1977, and his services validly stood terminated on 24.4.1980, the same being approved by the educational authority.
5. The appeal is disposed of.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 11765 of 1993. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. The appellant was Headmas-ter of a Junior School, and the school in question was recognised by the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Board in the year 1973. The school was admitted to the benefit of the grants-in-aid in the year 1976, and thus, the institution became an aided institution. In 1977, elections to the Managing Committee of the school took place, and it appears that again in March 1977, another set of persons were elected as the members of the Managing Committee. The appellant, who was continuing as Headmaster, was suspended from service by the said Managing Committee on 16.7.1977. A set of charge sheet was also served upon him, and finally an order of termination was passed by the Resolution of the Managing Commit-tee dated 7.11.1977. Under the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, no order of termination would be effective unless approved by the competent educational authority. The Resolution of the Managing Committee dated 7.11.1977 initially had not been approved by the District Inspector of Schools, but the Management approached the appellate authority, namely, the Deputy Director of Education, and the said Deputy Director of Education remanded the matter for re-consideration of the Dis-trict Inspector of Schools. After the matter came back, the District Inspector of Schools approved the order of termination on 24.4.1980, and thus the order of termination of the appellant became effective in the eyes of law with effect from the said date. Against the said order of approval, the Headmaster ap-proached in appeal to the Deputy Director. The Deputy Director initially did not entertain the appeal, as being time barred. The appellant then approached the High Court, and on the direction of the High Court that the appeal be disposed of on merits, the said Deputy Director entertained the appeal and disposed it of on merits by order dated 12.3.1993. The Appellate authority dis-missed the appeal and agreed with the order of approval passed by the District Inspector of Schools. The appellant being aggrieved, filed a writ petition before the High Court, and the High Court by the impugned judgment having refused to interfere with the order of termination, the present appeal has been preferred.
2. Mr. J. P. Saxena, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant raised two contentions before us in assailing the legality of the order of termination passed by the Managing Committee, and approved by the competent educational authority. One, on the date the appellant was placed under suspension and on the date of initiation of a disciplinary proceedings on the basis of which, the appellant’s services stood terminated, the status of the Managing Committee itself was under dispute, and therefore the said Managing Committee was not entitled to initiate any proceedings, and consequently the entire proceedings stood vi-tiated. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Nand Deo Pandey v. Committee of Management & Ors. (1991 AIR SC 413). The learned Counsel also further contended that under the relevant provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, more particularly under Sub-section (7) of Section 16-G, the order of suspension not being approved by the appropriate authority within the specified period would cease to be operative in the eyes of law, and therefore the appellant must be deemed to be in service after expiry of 60 days from the date of the order of suspension, and therefore he would be entitled to full salary for the period till the order of termination was passed.
3. So far as the first contention is concerned, it is not dis-puted that on the date of initiation of the proceedings and the date on which the appellant was placed under suspension, there was some dispute as to the legal status of the Managing Commit-tee, which came into existence in March, 1977. In a duly consti-tuted suit, by an order of the competent civil court dated 6.4.1979, the said Managing Committee has been held to be legally valid Managing Committee. The decision on which the learned Counsel has placed reliance will have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case inasmuch as in that case the delinquent employee had approached the Court at the very initiation of the proceedings, and the Court therefore had di-rected that in view of the pendency of the dispute, it would be more appropriate that the enquiry in question could be made by the nominee of the Deputy Director of Education. In the case in hand, not only the enquiry proceeded on the basis of charge sheet submitted by the Managing Committee, which came into existence in March 1977, but the entire gamut of enquiry was conducted, termi-nation order was passed, and that order was sent for approval to the competent authority, and finally the competent authority approved the same. That apart, the educational authority did approve the Managing Committee, which came into existence by virtue of election made in March 1977, and further as has been stated earlier, the competent civil court has already held the Managing Committee to be legal and valid. In the aforesaid prem-ises, there is absolutely no infirmity with the order of suspen-sion passed, and the order of termination passed by the Managing Committee on the basis of a finding of an enquiry, and therefore we do not find any substance in the arguments of the learned Counsel that entire process of initiation of the proceedings as well as the order of termination is vitiated on that score. The said contention of the learned Counsel therefore stands rejected.
4. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is no doubt true, as indicated in Sub-section (7) of Section 16-G of the Act that an order of suspension unless approved in writing by the Inspector would not remain in force for more than 60 days from the date of the suspension, but this contention does not appear to have raised before the High Court in the impugned judgment, and further it depends upon the fact whether the order of suspen-sion had, in fact, been approved by the Inspector within the specified period or not. But it goes without saying that the order of termination would be effective in the eyes of law, the same being approved by the competent educational authority, and in the case in hand, the approval has been accorded on 24.4.1980. Necessarily therefore the appellant must be deemed to be continuing in service till 24.4.1980 and as such would be entitled to all the pecuniary benefits that would be available to him under law till 24.4.1980. The appropriate educational author-ity may consider the relevant facts and decide the quantum of benefit, which the appellant would be entitled to on the basis that he was suspended on 16.7.1977, and his services validly stood terminated on 24.4.1980, the same being approved by the educational authority.
5. The appeal is disposed of.
