Rukmini Narvekar Vs. Vijaya Satardekar and Ors.
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal Nos.1576-1577 of 2008
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7387-88 of 2007]
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7387-88 of 2007]
Petitioner: Rukmini Narvekar
Respondent: Vijaya Satardekar and Ors.
Apeal: Criminal Appeal Nos.1576-1577 of 2008
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7387-88 of 2007]
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7387-88 of 2007]
Judges: Altamas Kabir & Markandey Katju, J.
Date of Judgment: Oct 03, 2008
Head Note:
Criminal Laws
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Section 482 – Constitution of India, 1950, Article 226 – Quashing of complaint and proceedings – Allegation that complainant and her husband fraudulently made to sign papers by Respondent-advocate – Papers granting power of attorney, misrepresented as papers necessary to give Respondent authority to represent them in court -Same used to execute sale deed in favour of Respondent No. 2 – Complainant and her husband both illiterate – Writ by Respondent allowed by High Court by relying on the evidence adduced in Civil Suit – Whether such evidence could have been used to quash criminal proceedings – Whether at the time of the framing of charges only material produced by prosecution can be looked into and not that produced by defence. Held, that findings in a civil suit are binding in a criminal case. In this case civil court did not rule out possibility of undue influence, however evidence contained admission that certain amount was received from Respondent No. 1. Proceedings were not malafide and allegations in the FIR if treated to be correct prima facie made out an offence against the Respondent No. 1. Material produced by defence at the time of framing of charges can be looked into in very rare cases, where defence produces some material which shows that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. That not being the case, criminal case against Respondent No.1 could not have been quashed. There being no material to show that Respondent No. 2 was involved criminal proceeding against her was rightly quashed.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Section 482 – Constitution of India, 1950, Article 226 – Quashing of complaint and proceedings – Allegation that complainant and her husband fraudulently made to sign papers by Respondent-advocate – Papers granting power of attorney, misrepresented as papers necessary to give Respondent authority to represent them in court -Same used to execute sale deed in favour of Respondent No. 2 – Complainant and her husband both illiterate – Writ by Respondent allowed by High Court by relying on the evidence adduced in Civil Suit – Whether such evidence could have been used to quash criminal proceedings – Whether at the time of the framing of charges only material produced by prosecution can be looked into and not that produced by defence. Held, that findings in a civil suit are binding in a criminal case. In this case civil court did not rule out possibility of undue influence, however evidence contained admission that certain amount was received from Respondent No. 1. Proceedings were not malafide and allegations in the FIR if treated to be correct prima facie made out an offence against the Respondent No. 1. Material produced by defence at the time of framing of charges can be looked into in very rare cases, where defence produces some material which shows that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. That not being the case, criminal case against Respondent No.1 could not have been quashed. There being no material to show that Respondent No. 2 was involved criminal proceeding against her was rightly quashed.
Held:
Held
The allegations in the FIR if treated to be correct prima facie make out an offence against the respondent, Ranjit Satardekar. (Para 12)
The evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar is a very detailed one and some contradictory statements appear to have been given by him e.g. that the amount was paid by Ranjit Satardekar as a loan, and this contradicts the version that the money was paid as a sale consideration. In the judgment of the Civil Court it has been held that undue influence cannot be ruled out. In these circumstances it cannot be said that at this stage the proceedings in the criminal case were totally mala fide and with ulterior motive. (Para 14)
Serious allegations have been made against him in the FIR. The relation of a lawyer and his client is like a fiduciary relationship, and the lawyer has to act in the interest of his client. However, it is alleged in the FIR that Ranjit Satardekar deceived the complainant and her husband in the manner aforesaid. This was not a fit case for quashing of the criminal proceedings Ranjit Satardekar in exercise of the powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution. (Para 15)
There may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. (Para 17)
There is no material whatsoever either mentioned in the FIR or produced by the prosecution to show that Vijaya Satardekar was in any way involved in the alleged criminal offence committed by her husband Ranjit Satardekar. Therefore, the criminal proceeding against Vijaya Satardekar was rightly quashed by the High Court. (Para 22)
Findings of a civil suit and criminal case – Whether binding on each other on same facts – Earlier view that findings of civil suit binding in criminal case but not vice-versa, held, has been watered down. (Para 10)
The allegations in the FIR if treated to be correct prima facie make out an offence against the respondent, Ranjit Satardekar. (Para 12)
The evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar is a very detailed one and some contradictory statements appear to have been given by him e.g. that the amount was paid by Ranjit Satardekar as a loan, and this contradicts the version that the money was paid as a sale consideration. In the judgment of the Civil Court it has been held that undue influence cannot be ruled out. In these circumstances it cannot be said that at this stage the proceedings in the criminal case were totally mala fide and with ulterior motive. (Para 14)
Serious allegations have been made against him in the FIR. The relation of a lawyer and his client is like a fiduciary relationship, and the lawyer has to act in the interest of his client. However, it is alleged in the FIR that Ranjit Satardekar deceived the complainant and her husband in the manner aforesaid. This was not a fit case for quashing of the criminal proceedings Ranjit Satardekar in exercise of the powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution. (Para 15)
There may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. (Para 17)
There is no material whatsoever either mentioned in the FIR or produced by the prosecution to show that Vijaya Satardekar was in any way involved in the alleged criminal offence committed by her husband Ranjit Satardekar. Therefore, the criminal proceeding against Vijaya Satardekar was rightly quashed by the High Court. (Para 22)
Findings of a civil suit and criminal case – Whether binding on each other on same facts – Earlier view that findings of civil suit binding in criminal case but not vice-versa, held, has been watered down. (Para 10)
Cases Reffered:
Cases Referred:
1. Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Anr. [JT 2008 (8) SC 621] (Para 17)
2. Dr. Monica Kumar and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. [JT 2008 (7) SC 5994] (Para 20)
3. Minu Kumari and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [JT 2006 (4) SC 569] (Para 11)
4. Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr. [JT 2005 (3) SC 195] (Para 10)
5. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. N.R. Vairamani and Anr [JT 2004 (8) SC 171] (Para 17)
6. State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [JT 2004 (10) SC 303] (Para 16)
7. K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and Anr. [JT 2002 (7) SC 30] (Para 10)
8. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. [JT 1997 (8) SC 705] (Para 11)
9. State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [JT 1990 (4) SC 650] (Para 11)
1. Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Anr. [JT 2008 (8) SC 621] (Para 17)
2. Dr. Monica Kumar and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. [JT 2008 (7) SC 5994] (Para 20)
3. Minu Kumari and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [JT 2006 (4) SC 569] (Para 11)
4. Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr. [JT 2005 (3) SC 195] (Para 10)
5. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. N.R. Vairamani and Anr [JT 2004 (8) SC 171] (Para 17)
6. State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [JT 2004 (10) SC 303] (Para 16)
7. K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and Anr. [JT 2002 (7) SC 30] (Para 10)
8. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. [JT 1997 (8) SC 705] (Para 11)
9. State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [JT 1990 (4) SC 650] (Para 11)
JUDGEMENT:
Markandey Katju, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been filed against the common judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court (at Goa) dated 3.8.2007 in Criminal Writ Petition Nos.7/2007 and 8/2007.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in both these appeals are husband and wife, being Ranjit Satardekar and his wife Vijaya Satardekar. An FIR dated 25.2.2002 was filed against these respondents by one Rukmini Narvekar (the appellant herein) under various provisions of the IPC including Sections 409, 420, 423, etc. A true copy of this FIR is annexed as P6 in this appeal. The gist of this FIR is that the complainant is an illiterate person and so was her husband Raghunath Narvekar. It is alleged that the respondent Ranjit Satardekar, who is an advocate, fraudulently and dishonestly induced the complainant and her deceased husband to place their signatures and thumb impression on some papers in the office of the Executive Magistrate at Sawantwadi without explaining the contents thereof, and falsely misrepresenting that the same was necessary to give him necessary authority to represent them in the court in Goa in Inventory Proceedings on the death of Andre Andrade which were going on pertaining to the estate left by him. It may be mentioned that Andre Andrade had several children including one daughter who was married to Raghunath Narvekar but their marriage was dissolved on 16.2.1973 and thereafter Raghunath Narvekar married the complainant. Under the Goa law, Raghunath Narvekar and the complainant inherited 10% share in the estate left by the deceased Andre Andrade and the remaining 10% went to Vijaya Andrade who had been married to Raghunath Narvekar and was being represented by Ranjit Satardekar, advocate, in the Inventory Proceedings.
5. The allegation in the FIR was that Ranjit Satardekar had falsely misrepresented to the complainant and her husband that the document which was being executed by them was for enabling Ranjit to represent them in the Inventory Proceedings in progress on the death of Andre Andrade, although what was actually executed by them was a Power of Attorney. This Power of Attorney was used by the accused for executing a sale deed in favour of his wife Vijaya Satardekar and Sadiq Sheikh in the year 1991, but the said sale deed was presented for registration only in the year 2001. It is alleged that the complainant came to know only in August 2001 for the first time about the execution of the sale deed in 1991. Thus it is alleged that the property of the complainant was purported to have been sold away by Ranjit Satardekar, advocate by deceit and misrepresentation for which he deserved to be punished under Sections 409, 420 and other provisions of the IPC.
6. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, the police investigated the case and filed a charge-sheet against both Ranjit Satardekar and Smt.Vijaya Satardekar as well as two others. Thereafter, cognizance was taken of the offence alleged in the charge-sheet and process was issued by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panaji under Sections 468/471/420/120-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
7. Against the order taking cognizance and issuing process against the accused, they filed a Criminal Revision before the Sessions Judge, Panaji, which was dismissed by his judgment dated 19.6.2007. Against that order a writ petition was filed which was allowed by the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 3.8.2007. Hence this appeal.
8. We have heard detailed arguments on both sides and we are of the opinion that judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained so far as it has quashed the complaint and proceedings against Ranjit Satardekar, but it has to be sustained so far as it relates to Vijaya Satardekar.
9. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge of the High Court largely relied on the evidence proceedings in Civil Suit (No.97 of 2004, New No.101 of 2004). The complainant was the plaintiff No.1 in the said Civil Suit which has been decreed on 30.12.2006. Shri Rohatgi has submitted that the High Court should not have relied on the evidence in the aforesaid Civil Suit for the purpose of quashing the criminal case. On the other hand Shri U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the respondent has submitted that the said evidence could have been relied upon on the facts of this case for quashing the criminal proceedings.
10. Before dealing with these submissions we may point out that while there were certain rulings of two-Judge Benches of this Court, which had held that the findings in a Civil Suit are binding in a criminal case on the same facts but not vice versa, this view appears to have been watered down somewhat in the subsequent decisions of the larger Benches of this Court e.g. the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr. [JT 2005 (3) SC 195 ; 2005 (4) SCC 370] as well as the decision of the three-Judge Bench in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and Anr. [JT 2002 (7) SC 30 ; 2002 (8) SCC 87] .
11. The law as to when criminal proceedings can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution has been laid down by this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [JT 1990 (4) SC 650 ; 1992 (Supp.1) SCC 335]. This decision has been followed subsequently by a series of decisions e.g. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. 1998(5) SCC 749 [JT 1997 (8) SC 705], Minu Kumari and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [JT 2006 (4) SC 569 ; 2006 (4) SCC 359], etc.
12. Shri Rohatgi submitted that on a perusal of the FIR in this case it cannot be said that treating the allegations therein to be correct no prima facie offence is made out against Ranjit Satardekar. We have carefully perused the FIR and we agree with the submission of Shri Rohatgi. The allegations in the FIR if treated to be correct prima facie make out an offence against the respondent, Ranjit Satardekar. Shri Lalit, learned counsel for Ranjit Satardekar, however, submitted that in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) itself the seventh ground given therein in para 102 of the said decision applies to the facts of this case. The seventh ground which entitles the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings is stated in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) as follows :
‘Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.’
13. Shri Lalit submitted that the proceedings against Ranjit Satardekar were mala fide as is evident from the evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar in the Civil Suit where he has stated that he has received some money from Ranjit Satardekar. According to Shri Lalit this proves that the sale deed of 1991 was in the knowledge of the complainant throughout.
14. We have perused the evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar in the Civil Suit and we have also perused the judgment in the Civil Suit, against which we are informed an appeal is pending. The evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar is a very detailed one and some contradictory statements appear to have been given by him e.g. that the amount was paid by Ranjit Satardekar as a loan, and this contradicts the version that the money was paid as a sale consideration. In the judgment of the Civil Court it has been held that undue influence cannot be ruled out. In these circumstances it cannot be said that at this stage the proceedings in the criminal case were totally mala fide and with ulterior motive.
15. It may be mentioned that the pleas which the respondent Ranjit Satardekar took before the High Court could be taken by him at the time of the trial, and it would not be proper to pre-empt the criminal proceeding at this stage. Serious allegations have been made against him in the FIR. The relation of a lawyer and his client is like a fiduciary relationship, and the lawyer has to act in the interest of his client. However, it is alleged in the FIR that Ranjit Satardekar deceived the complainant and her husband in the manner aforesaid. These are matters which the trial court in the criminal case should look into, and we are not expressing any opinion either way on this question. However, we are of the opinion that this was not a fit case for quashing of the criminal proceedings Ranjit Satardekar in exercise of the powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution.
16. Shri Mukul Rohatgi submitted that at the time of the framing of the charges only the material produced by the prosecution side can be looked into by the Court but the material produced by the defence cannot be looked into. He has placed reliance on several decisions of this Court in this connection e.g. State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [JT 2004 (10) SC 303 ; 2005(1) SCC 568].
17. We have carefully perused the decision of this Court in the State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra). Though the observations in paragraph 16 of the said decision seems to support the view canvassed by Shri Rohatgi, it may be also pointed out that in paragraph 29 of the same decision it has been observed that the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra). Thus we have to reconcile paragraphs 16 and 23 of the decision in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra). We should also keep in mind that it is well settled that a judgment of the Court has not to be treated as a Euclid formula vide Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Anr. [JT 2008 (8) SC 621]. As observed by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. N.R. Vairamani and Anr [JT 2004 (8) SC 171 ; AIR 2004 SC 4778] observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s formula nor as provisions of the statute. Thus in our opinion while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the Court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi’s case (supra), there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance.
18. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the Court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases, i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. We agree with Shri Lalit that in some very rare cases the Court is justified in looking into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, if such material convincingly establishes that the whole prosecution version is totally absurd, preposterous or concocted.
19. However, in this case it cannot be said that the evidence in the Civil Suit which was produced by the defence before the trial court established convincingly that the prosecution case is totally absurd or preposterous. In our opinion this is a matter which has to be looked into by the trial Court.
20. In Dr. Monica Kumar and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. [JT 2008 (7) SC 5994] this Court referred to various decisions on the point of quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused. In this decision this Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused, though on the allegations in the FIR prima facie an offence was made out. Thus quashing of the criminal case was done considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt, in this decision the Court has relied on Article 142 of the Constitution, but in our opinion the result would have been the same irrespective of Article 142.
21. Thus we allow the criminal appeal in which Ranjit Satardekar is the respondent and we set aside the judgment of the High Court in respect of Ranjit Satardekar and direct that the criminal proceedings against him will go on in the trial Court. However, the trial Court will not be influenced by any observations made in this judgment.
22. As regards the other criminal appeal in which Smt. Vijaya Satardekar, wife of Ranjit Satardekar, is the respondent, we are of the opinion that there is no material whatsoever either mentioned in the FIR or produced by the prosecution to show that Vijaya Satardekar was in any way involved in the alleged criminal offence committed by her husband Ranjit Satardekar. The only allegation against her is that the sale deed was in her favour. In our opinion this does not prima facie make out any offence. In our opinion, therefore, the criminal proceeding against Vijaya Satardekar was rightly quashed by the High Court and the criminal appeal in which Vijaya Satardekar is respondent is dismissed.
23. There shall be no order as to costs.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been filed against the common judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court (at Goa) dated 3.8.2007 in Criminal Writ Petition Nos.7/2007 and 8/2007.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in both these appeals are husband and wife, being Ranjit Satardekar and his wife Vijaya Satardekar. An FIR dated 25.2.2002 was filed against these respondents by one Rukmini Narvekar (the appellant herein) under various provisions of the IPC including Sections 409, 420, 423, etc. A true copy of this FIR is annexed as P6 in this appeal. The gist of this FIR is that the complainant is an illiterate person and so was her husband Raghunath Narvekar. It is alleged that the respondent Ranjit Satardekar, who is an advocate, fraudulently and dishonestly induced the complainant and her deceased husband to place their signatures and thumb impression on some papers in the office of the Executive Magistrate at Sawantwadi without explaining the contents thereof, and falsely misrepresenting that the same was necessary to give him necessary authority to represent them in the court in Goa in Inventory Proceedings on the death of Andre Andrade which were going on pertaining to the estate left by him. It may be mentioned that Andre Andrade had several children including one daughter who was married to Raghunath Narvekar but their marriage was dissolved on 16.2.1973 and thereafter Raghunath Narvekar married the complainant. Under the Goa law, Raghunath Narvekar and the complainant inherited 10% share in the estate left by the deceased Andre Andrade and the remaining 10% went to Vijaya Andrade who had been married to Raghunath Narvekar and was being represented by Ranjit Satardekar, advocate, in the Inventory Proceedings.
5. The allegation in the FIR was that Ranjit Satardekar had falsely misrepresented to the complainant and her husband that the document which was being executed by them was for enabling Ranjit to represent them in the Inventory Proceedings in progress on the death of Andre Andrade, although what was actually executed by them was a Power of Attorney. This Power of Attorney was used by the accused for executing a sale deed in favour of his wife Vijaya Satardekar and Sadiq Sheikh in the year 1991, but the said sale deed was presented for registration only in the year 2001. It is alleged that the complainant came to know only in August 2001 for the first time about the execution of the sale deed in 1991. Thus it is alleged that the property of the complainant was purported to have been sold away by Ranjit Satardekar, advocate by deceit and misrepresentation for which he deserved to be punished under Sections 409, 420 and other provisions of the IPC.
6. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, the police investigated the case and filed a charge-sheet against both Ranjit Satardekar and Smt.Vijaya Satardekar as well as two others. Thereafter, cognizance was taken of the offence alleged in the charge-sheet and process was issued by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panaji under Sections 468/471/420/120-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
7. Against the order taking cognizance and issuing process against the accused, they filed a Criminal Revision before the Sessions Judge, Panaji, which was dismissed by his judgment dated 19.6.2007. Against that order a writ petition was filed which was allowed by the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 3.8.2007. Hence this appeal.
8. We have heard detailed arguments on both sides and we are of the opinion that judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained so far as it has quashed the complaint and proceedings against Ranjit Satardekar, but it has to be sustained so far as it relates to Vijaya Satardekar.
9. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge of the High Court largely relied on the evidence proceedings in Civil Suit (No.97 of 2004, New No.101 of 2004). The complainant was the plaintiff No.1 in the said Civil Suit which has been decreed on 30.12.2006. Shri Rohatgi has submitted that the High Court should not have relied on the evidence in the aforesaid Civil Suit for the purpose of quashing the criminal case. On the other hand Shri U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the respondent has submitted that the said evidence could have been relied upon on the facts of this case for quashing the criminal proceedings.
10. Before dealing with these submissions we may point out that while there were certain rulings of two-Judge Benches of this Court, which had held that the findings in a Civil Suit are binding in a criminal case on the same facts but not vice versa, this view appears to have been watered down somewhat in the subsequent decisions of the larger Benches of this Court e.g. the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr. [JT 2005 (3) SC 195 ; 2005 (4) SCC 370] as well as the decision of the three-Judge Bench in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and Anr. [JT 2002 (7) SC 30 ; 2002 (8) SCC 87] .
11. The law as to when criminal proceedings can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution has been laid down by this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [JT 1990 (4) SC 650 ; 1992 (Supp.1) SCC 335]. This decision has been followed subsequently by a series of decisions e.g. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. 1998(5) SCC 749 [JT 1997 (8) SC 705], Minu Kumari and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [JT 2006 (4) SC 569 ; 2006 (4) SCC 359], etc.
12. Shri Rohatgi submitted that on a perusal of the FIR in this case it cannot be said that treating the allegations therein to be correct no prima facie offence is made out against Ranjit Satardekar. We have carefully perused the FIR and we agree with the submission of Shri Rohatgi. The allegations in the FIR if treated to be correct prima facie make out an offence against the respondent, Ranjit Satardekar. Shri Lalit, learned counsel for Ranjit Satardekar, however, submitted that in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) itself the seventh ground given therein in para 102 of the said decision applies to the facts of this case. The seventh ground which entitles the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings is stated in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) as follows :
‘Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.’
13. Shri Lalit submitted that the proceedings against Ranjit Satardekar were mala fide as is evident from the evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar in the Civil Suit where he has stated that he has received some money from Ranjit Satardekar. According to Shri Lalit this proves that the sale deed of 1991 was in the knowledge of the complainant throughout.
14. We have perused the evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar in the Civil Suit and we have also perused the judgment in the Civil Suit, against which we are informed an appeal is pending. The evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar is a very detailed one and some contradictory statements appear to have been given by him e.g. that the amount was paid by Ranjit Satardekar as a loan, and this contradicts the version that the money was paid as a sale consideration. In the judgment of the Civil Court it has been held that undue influence cannot be ruled out. In these circumstances it cannot be said that at this stage the proceedings in the criminal case were totally mala fide and with ulterior motive.
15. It may be mentioned that the pleas which the respondent Ranjit Satardekar took before the High Court could be taken by him at the time of the trial, and it would not be proper to pre-empt the criminal proceeding at this stage. Serious allegations have been made against him in the FIR. The relation of a lawyer and his client is like a fiduciary relationship, and the lawyer has to act in the interest of his client. However, it is alleged in the FIR that Ranjit Satardekar deceived the complainant and her husband in the manner aforesaid. These are matters which the trial court in the criminal case should look into, and we are not expressing any opinion either way on this question. However, we are of the opinion that this was not a fit case for quashing of the criminal proceedings Ranjit Satardekar in exercise of the powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution.
16. Shri Mukul Rohatgi submitted that at the time of the framing of the charges only the material produced by the prosecution side can be looked into by the Court but the material produced by the defence cannot be looked into. He has placed reliance on several decisions of this Court in this connection e.g. State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [JT 2004 (10) SC 303 ; 2005(1) SCC 568].
17. We have carefully perused the decision of this Court in the State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra). Though the observations in paragraph 16 of the said decision seems to support the view canvassed by Shri Rohatgi, it may be also pointed out that in paragraph 29 of the same decision it has been observed that the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra). Thus we have to reconcile paragraphs 16 and 23 of the decision in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra). We should also keep in mind that it is well settled that a judgment of the Court has not to be treated as a Euclid formula vide Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Anr. [JT 2008 (8) SC 621]. As observed by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. N.R. Vairamani and Anr [JT 2004 (8) SC 171 ; AIR 2004 SC 4778] observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s formula nor as provisions of the statute. Thus in our opinion while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the Court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi’s case (supra), there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance.
18. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the Court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases, i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. We agree with Shri Lalit that in some very rare cases the Court is justified in looking into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, if such material convincingly establishes that the whole prosecution version is totally absurd, preposterous or concocted.
19. However, in this case it cannot be said that the evidence in the Civil Suit which was produced by the defence before the trial court established convincingly that the prosecution case is totally absurd or preposterous. In our opinion this is a matter which has to be looked into by the trial Court.
20. In Dr. Monica Kumar and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. [JT 2008 (7) SC 5994] this Court referred to various decisions on the point of quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused. In this decision this Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused, though on the allegations in the FIR prima facie an offence was made out. Thus quashing of the criminal case was done considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt, in this decision the Court has relied on Article 142 of the Constitution, but in our opinion the result would have been the same irrespective of Article 142.
21. Thus we allow the criminal appeal in which Ranjit Satardekar is the respondent and we set aside the judgment of the High Court in respect of Ranjit Satardekar and direct that the criminal proceedings against him will go on in the trial Court. However, the trial Court will not be influenced by any observations made in this judgment.
22. As regards the other criminal appeal in which Smt. Vijaya Satardekar, wife of Ranjit Satardekar, is the respondent, we are of the opinion that there is no material whatsoever either mentioned in the FIR or produced by the prosecution to show that Vijaya Satardekar was in any way involved in the alleged criminal offence committed by her husband Ranjit Satardekar. The only allegation against her is that the sale deed was in her favour. In our opinion this does not prima facie make out any offence. In our opinion, therefore, the criminal proceeding against Vijaya Satardekar was rightly quashed by the High Court and the criminal appeal in which Vijaya Satardekar is respondent is dismissed.
23. There shall be no order as to costs.
