Ramgopal and Anr. Vs. Balaji Mandir Trust and Ors.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 1417 of 2003
(From the Judgment and Order dated 8.1.2002 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in C.F.A. No. 51 of 2001)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 8.1.2002 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in C.F.A. No. 51 of 2001)
Petitioner: Ramgopal and Anr.
Respondent: Balaji Mandir Trust and Ors.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 1417 of 2003
(From the Judgment and Order dated 8.1.2002 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in C.F.A. No. 51 of 2001)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 8.1.2002 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in C.F.A. No. 51 of 2001)
Judges: SHIVARAJ V. PATIL & ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Feb 19, 2003
Appearances:
Mr. U.N. Bhachawat, Senior Advocate, Mr. Alok Bhachawat, Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain and Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advocates with him for the Appellants.
Mr. G.L. Sanghi, Senior Advocate, Mr. B.S. Banthia, Mr. T.S. Chaudhary and Mr. Dhirendra Trivedi, Advocates with him for the Respondents.
Head Note:
Sections 3(2) and 12(1) – Tenancy – Eviction of tenant – Exemp-tion from the provisions of the Act in respect of notified educa-tional, religious or charitable institutions – Entitlement to the exemption – Plaintiff, a religious institution filing suit for eviction of the tenant from its premises on several grounds – Defendants (tenants) resisting the suit – Trial court decreeing the suit for eviction – High Court also dismissing the appeal filed by the defendants – Findings of fact not disputed before the High Court – Only ground taken on appeal was that the plain-tiff having failed to plead and prove that it was a religious/charitable institution and was entitled to the benefit of exemption under the notification issued by the government, it was necessary for the plaintiff to have made out a ground under section 12(1) for getting a decree of eviction. Dismissing the appeal held that not having raised any objection as to the main-tainability of the suit on the ground that the exemption notifi-cation did not cover the case and that too in the absence of either admitted or established facts supporting that ground, the dismissal of the appeal of the defendants by the High Court relying on Betibai’s case JT 1999 (3) SC 200 was correct and there-fore called for no interference.
Held:
The appellants did not challenge the finding of facts before the High Court except the legal question. In para 2 of the plaint plaintiff averred that it is a religious institution and is registered under the M.P. Public Trust Act. The defendants, while admitting this averment in the written statement only stated that the suit has not been filed by all the trustees, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. The trial court record-ed a finding that the suit was maintainable. In the written statement the defendants did not raise any plea that the plain-tiffs are not entitled for the benefit of the exemption notifica-tion, extracted above; it was also not pleaded that the rental income from the premises was not utilized for the purpose of the plaintiff trust; so also they did not challenge the validity of the said notification either before the trial court or before the High Court. In this view the High Court rejected the submission made on behalf of the appellants that in the absence of any pleading and the proof tendered by the plaintiff no benefit of the exemption notification in filing the suit and getting the eviction decree could be granted to the plaintiff. (Para 7)
Having not raised any objection as to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the exemption notification did not cover the case and that too in the absence of either admitted or established facts supporting that ground, it is not possible for us to take a different view. We do not find any good or valid reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The appeal has no merits. Consequently the same is dismissed. (Para 11)
Cases Reffered:
1. Betibai and Others v. Nathooram and Others (JT 1999 (3) SC 200) (Para 3)
2. Mangilal v. Shri Chuturbhuja Mandir (JT 1998 (6) SC 491) (Para 8)
3. Boolchand v. Atal Ram Sindhi Dharamshala Trust (1998 (1) MPWN 113) (Para 3)
4. Chintamani Chandra Mohan Agarwal v. State of M.P. (1994 MPLJ 597) (Para 8)
5. S. Kandaswamy Chet-tiar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (1985 (2) SCR 398) (Para 4)
6. State of M.P. v. Kanhaiyalal (1970 MPLJ 973) (Para 4)
2. Mangilal v. Shri Chuturbhuja Mandir (JT 1998 (6) SC 491) (Para 8)
3. Boolchand v. Atal Ram Sindhi Dharamshala Trust (1998 (1) MPWN 113) (Para 3)
4. Chintamani Chandra Mohan Agarwal v. State of M.P. (1994 MPLJ 597) (Para 8)
5. S. Kandaswamy Chet-tiar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (1985 (2) SCR 398) (Para 4)
6. State of M.P. v. Kanhaiyalal (1970 MPLJ 973) (Para 4)
JUDGEMENT:
SHIVARAJ V. PATIL J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants for the eviction from the house and shop given to them on rent. The plaintiff no. 1 is a religious institution registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act. The defendants resisted the suit on various grounds. The trail court decreed the suit. The defend-ants filed an appeal before the High Court challenging the decree passed by the trial court. The division bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal finding no merit in it. Hence, this appeal.
3. Before the High Court, findings of fact were not disputed. The only ground urged was that plaintiff no. 1. has failed to plead and prove that it is a religious/charitable trust and it was not entitled to get the benefit of exemption notification issued under section 3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for Short ‘the Act’); consequently, it was necessary for the plaintiff no. 1 to have made out a ground under section 12(1) of the Act for getting a decree in view of the decision in the case of Boolchand v. Atal Ram Sindhi Dharamshala Trust1. The High Court relying on the decision of this Court in Betibai and Others v. Nathooram and Others2 held that the plaintiffs were entitled for a decree as passed by the trial court.
4. Shri U.N. Bachawat, learned senior counsel for the appellants urged that the High Court committed an error in taking a view that the plaintiffs were entitled for benefit of exemption no-tification issued under section 3(2) of the Act in the light of the decision in the case of Betibai aforementioned. He contended that it was not established that whole of the rental income from the suit accommodation was utilized for the purpose of the trust, neither there was relevant material nor consideration by the government before issuing exemption notification and that such a notification could not be general in nature. He sought to distin-guish the case of Betibai (supra) on the ground that the exemp-tion notification considered in the case of S. Kandaswamy Chet-tiar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.3 was not identical to the one, which is applicable to the present case. He urged that there is a conflict between Betibai’s case (supra) and State of M.P. v. Kanhaiyalal4 case on the question whether the exemption notification can be general or it should be regarding a particular accommodation. As such, the controversy may require consideration by larger bench of this Court.
5. On the other hand, Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that the High Court, having consid-ered all aspects and the submissions made before it, has rightly followed the case of this Court in Betibai case (supra) and no fault can be found with the impugned judgment.
6. In order to appreciate the respective contentions advanced on behalf of the parties it may be useful to look to section 3(2) of the Act and the exemption notification issued thereunder, which read :-
“3(2) The government (Central government) may, by notification, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act any accommodation which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable insti-tution or by any nursing or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for that institution or nursing home or maternity home.”
“NOTIFICATION NO. F-24-(4) – 83 – XXXII-I dated 7th September, 1989, published in M.P. Rajpatra of the same date on p. 2144.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961), the State government hereby exempts all the accommoda-tion owned by –
(i) the wakf, registered under the Wakf Act, 1954 (No. 29 of 1954), or
(ii) the public trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 (No. XXX of 1951) for an educational, religious or charitable purpose,
from all the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961)”.
7. As already noticed above, the appellants did not challenge the finding of facts before the High Court except the legal question. In para 2 of the plaint plaintiff averred that it is a religious institution and is registered under the M.P. Public Trust Act. The defendants, while admitting this averment in the written statement only stated that the suit has not been filed by all the trustees, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. The trial court record-ed a finding that the suit was maintainable. In the written statement the defendants did not raise any plea that the plain-tiffs are not entitled for the benefit of the exemption notifica-tion, extracted above; it was also not pleaded that the rental income from the premises was not utilized for the purpose of the plaintiff trust; so also they did not challenge the validity of the said notification either before the trial court or before the High Court. In this view the High Court rejected the submission made on behalf of the appellants that in the absence of any pleading and the proof tendered by the plaintiff no benefit of the exemption notification in filing the suit and getting the eviction decree could be granted to the plaintiff. In para 11 of the impugned judgment the High Court has held thus: –
“11. In our opinion, therefore, the trial court was perfectly justified in proceeding on the basis that the plaintiff is a religious trust and is entitled to file a suit on the strength of the exemption notification and also claim a decree for eviction of the defendant without taking recourse to section 12 of the Act. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the re-spondent reported in 1998 (1) MPWN (113) is distinguishable on facts. In that case parties joined issue on these facts and hence it had become necessary for the plaintiff to prove the facts. As held supra, such is not the case here.”
8. The case relied on by the appellants in Boolchand case (supra) is also distinguished, as is evident from the paragraph extracted above. The learned counsel for the appellants in support of his submissions also relied on the decisions in (1) State of M.P. v. Kanhaiyalal (supra), (2) Chintamani Chandra Mohan Agarwal v. State of M.P.1 and order dated 19.10.1995 passed in State of M.P. and Another v. Smt. Chintamani Agrawal and Others (Civil Appeal No. — of 1995 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 4360 of 1994)). In our view these decisions do not help the appellants having regard to a direct decision of this Court in Betibai and Others v. Nathooram and Others (supra). Distinguishing the aforesaid decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants in Betibai’s case (supra) in paras 5 to 7 of the said judgment the position is made clear thus :-
“5. Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the notification dated 7.9.1989 has already been held to be bad by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chintamani Chandra Mohan Agarwal v. State of M.P. (supra). He also contended that this Court in Mangilal v. Shri Chuturbhuja Mandir (JT 1998 (6) SC 491) has also held the notification to be bad. It is, in these circum-stances, contended that the suit of the respondents was liable to be dismissed and the appellants cannot be evicted from the prem-ises in question, except by invoking any of the grounds set out in section 12 of the Act. The pleas raised by the counsel for the appellants, in our opinion, have no substance.
6. The decision rendered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chintamani case was challenged in an appeal filed in this Court by the State of Madhya Pradesh which was disposed of by a bench of which one of us, Saghir Ahmad J., was a member and the notifi-cation dated 9.9.1989, by which the properties belonging to public charitable trusts and the wakf were exempted, was upheld. It was in that judgment held, inter alia as under :-
“The State of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (the Act), exempted all buildings owned by the Madhya Pra-desh Wakf Board (Board) from the operation of the Act. The no-tification dated September 7, 1989 granting exemption to the board under the above mentioned provision of the Act was chal-lenged before the High Court. The High Court quashed the notifi-cation on the short ground that there was no material before the State government to reach the satisfaction that it was necessary to issue the impugned notification.
Learned counsel for the State of M.P. has invited our attention to the letter dated March 26, 1976, by the then Prime Minister of India addressed to the Chief Minister of the State of M.P., sug-gesting, for the reasons given in the said letter, to grant exemption of the provisions of the Act to the properties owned by the wakf. Thereafter, the State of M.P. made enquiries from vari-ous other States in this respect. On receipt of the replies, the matter was considered and thereafter, the exemption notification was issued. We are satisfied that there was sufficient material before the State government for issuing the impugned notifica-tion. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. We seek support from the judgment of this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N.”
7. The decision of this Court in Mangilal case upon which re-liance has been placed is distinguishable as the only question pleaded in that case was that since the notification dated 7.9.1989 has been held to be bad by the High Court in respect of wakf properties only, the trust properties would continue to be exempted from the operation of the Act. This plea was not accept-ed and it was held that the notification dated 9.9.1989 was a composite notification which applied not only to the wakf proper-ties but also to other charitable trust properties, and since this notification has been held to be had in respect of the wakf properties, it would be bad for all other properties, including trust properties, which were sought to be exempted from the operation of the Act. The validity of the notification was not questioned in that decision. Moreover, it was not brought to the notice of their lordships, who decided that case, that against the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chintamani case civil appeal no. 9909 of 1995 (arising from SLP (civil) no. 4360 of 1994) was filed in this Court, which was decided on 19.10. 1995 and the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was reserved with a categorical finding that the notification issued by the Madhya Pradesh government exempting the wakf and trust properties from the operation of the Act was valid.”
9. In the case of Kanhaiyalal (supra) the exemption notification issued under section 3(2) of the Act was of 22.5.1963, with which we are not concerned. The notification governing the present case is dated 7.9.1989. Even otherwise that case was rightly distin-guished on facts. We respectfully agree with the decision in Betibai case (supra), since we do not have any good reason to differ. Having regard to all aspects in the present case we are unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant to refer the matter to a larger bench for considera-tion. The learned counsel tried to make a distinction on the basis of language used in the exemption notification, which came up for consideration in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (supra), to which reference is made in para 8 of the judgment in Betibai case, which reads:-
“8. It may be mentioned that similar notifications issued in other States, by which wakf and trust properties were exempted, have already been upheld by this Court. As for example, the notification issued by the State government of Tamil Nadu exempting wakf and trust properties, was upheld by this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N. Even this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned judges who disposed of Mangilal case.”
10. The learned senior counsel for the appellants tried to draw a distinction on the ground that the provision for issuing exemp-tion notification in the case of Tamil Nadu is different inasmuch as the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for that institution is not to be found unlike the provision con-tained in section 3(2) of the Act. This Court in Betibai case, as already noticed above, has rejected the contention. That apart, when the appellants have not challenged the validity of the notification and when they have failed to plead that whole of the rental income derived from the accommodations in question is not utilized for the purpose of the trust, we do not find any merit in this submission of the learned counsel also.
11. Having not raised any objection as to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the exemption notification did not cover the case and that too in the absence of either admitted or established facts supporting that ground, it is not possible for us to take a different view. We do not find any good or valid reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The appeal has no merits. Consequently the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1. Leave granted.
2. The plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants for the eviction from the house and shop given to them on rent. The plaintiff no. 1 is a religious institution registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act. The defendants resisted the suit on various grounds. The trail court decreed the suit. The defend-ants filed an appeal before the High Court challenging the decree passed by the trial court. The division bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal finding no merit in it. Hence, this appeal.
3. Before the High Court, findings of fact were not disputed. The only ground urged was that plaintiff no. 1. has failed to plead and prove that it is a religious/charitable trust and it was not entitled to get the benefit of exemption notification issued under section 3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for Short ‘the Act’); consequently, it was necessary for the plaintiff no. 1 to have made out a ground under section 12(1) of the Act for getting a decree in view of the decision in the case of Boolchand v. Atal Ram Sindhi Dharamshala Trust1. The High Court relying on the decision of this Court in Betibai and Others v. Nathooram and Others2 held that the plaintiffs were entitled for a decree as passed by the trial court.
4. Shri U.N. Bachawat, learned senior counsel for the appellants urged that the High Court committed an error in taking a view that the plaintiffs were entitled for benefit of exemption no-tification issued under section 3(2) of the Act in the light of the decision in the case of Betibai aforementioned. He contended that it was not established that whole of the rental income from the suit accommodation was utilized for the purpose of the trust, neither there was relevant material nor consideration by the government before issuing exemption notification and that such a notification could not be general in nature. He sought to distin-guish the case of Betibai (supra) on the ground that the exemp-tion notification considered in the case of S. Kandaswamy Chet-tiar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.3 was not identical to the one, which is applicable to the present case. He urged that there is a conflict between Betibai’s case (supra) and State of M.P. v. Kanhaiyalal4 case on the question whether the exemption notification can be general or it should be regarding a particular accommodation. As such, the controversy may require consideration by larger bench of this Court.
5. On the other hand, Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that the High Court, having consid-ered all aspects and the submissions made before it, has rightly followed the case of this Court in Betibai case (supra) and no fault can be found with the impugned judgment.
6. In order to appreciate the respective contentions advanced on behalf of the parties it may be useful to look to section 3(2) of the Act and the exemption notification issued thereunder, which read :-
“3(2) The government (Central government) may, by notification, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act any accommodation which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable insti-tution or by any nursing or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for that institution or nursing home or maternity home.”
“NOTIFICATION NO. F-24-(4) – 83 – XXXII-I dated 7th September, 1989, published in M.P. Rajpatra of the same date on p. 2144.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961), the State government hereby exempts all the accommoda-tion owned by –
(i) the wakf, registered under the Wakf Act, 1954 (No. 29 of 1954), or
(ii) the public trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 (No. XXX of 1951) for an educational, religious or charitable purpose,
from all the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961)”.
7. As already noticed above, the appellants did not challenge the finding of facts before the High Court except the legal question. In para 2 of the plaint plaintiff averred that it is a religious institution and is registered under the M.P. Public Trust Act. The defendants, while admitting this averment in the written statement only stated that the suit has not been filed by all the trustees, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. The trial court record-ed a finding that the suit was maintainable. In the written statement the defendants did not raise any plea that the plain-tiffs are not entitled for the benefit of the exemption notifica-tion, extracted above; it was also not pleaded that the rental income from the premises was not utilized for the purpose of the plaintiff trust; so also they did not challenge the validity of the said notification either before the trial court or before the High Court. In this view the High Court rejected the submission made on behalf of the appellants that in the absence of any pleading and the proof tendered by the plaintiff no benefit of the exemption notification in filing the suit and getting the eviction decree could be granted to the plaintiff. In para 11 of the impugned judgment the High Court has held thus: –
“11. In our opinion, therefore, the trial court was perfectly justified in proceeding on the basis that the plaintiff is a religious trust and is entitled to file a suit on the strength of the exemption notification and also claim a decree for eviction of the defendant without taking recourse to section 12 of the Act. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the re-spondent reported in 1998 (1) MPWN (113) is distinguishable on facts. In that case parties joined issue on these facts and hence it had become necessary for the plaintiff to prove the facts. As held supra, such is not the case here.”
8. The case relied on by the appellants in Boolchand case (supra) is also distinguished, as is evident from the paragraph extracted above. The learned counsel for the appellants in support of his submissions also relied on the decisions in (1) State of M.P. v. Kanhaiyalal (supra), (2) Chintamani Chandra Mohan Agarwal v. State of M.P.1 and order dated 19.10.1995 passed in State of M.P. and Another v. Smt. Chintamani Agrawal and Others (Civil Appeal No. — of 1995 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 4360 of 1994)). In our view these decisions do not help the appellants having regard to a direct decision of this Court in Betibai and Others v. Nathooram and Others (supra). Distinguishing the aforesaid decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants in Betibai’s case (supra) in paras 5 to 7 of the said judgment the position is made clear thus :-
“5. Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the notification dated 7.9.1989 has already been held to be bad by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chintamani Chandra Mohan Agarwal v. State of M.P. (supra). He also contended that this Court in Mangilal v. Shri Chuturbhuja Mandir (JT 1998 (6) SC 491) has also held the notification to be bad. It is, in these circum-stances, contended that the suit of the respondents was liable to be dismissed and the appellants cannot be evicted from the prem-ises in question, except by invoking any of the grounds set out in section 12 of the Act. The pleas raised by the counsel for the appellants, in our opinion, have no substance.
6. The decision rendered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chintamani case was challenged in an appeal filed in this Court by the State of Madhya Pradesh which was disposed of by a bench of which one of us, Saghir Ahmad J., was a member and the notifi-cation dated 9.9.1989, by which the properties belonging to public charitable trusts and the wakf were exempted, was upheld. It was in that judgment held, inter alia as under :-
“The State of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (the Act), exempted all buildings owned by the Madhya Pra-desh Wakf Board (Board) from the operation of the Act. The no-tification dated September 7, 1989 granting exemption to the board under the above mentioned provision of the Act was chal-lenged before the High Court. The High Court quashed the notifi-cation on the short ground that there was no material before the State government to reach the satisfaction that it was necessary to issue the impugned notification.
Learned counsel for the State of M.P. has invited our attention to the letter dated March 26, 1976, by the then Prime Minister of India addressed to the Chief Minister of the State of M.P., sug-gesting, for the reasons given in the said letter, to grant exemption of the provisions of the Act to the properties owned by the wakf. Thereafter, the State of M.P. made enquiries from vari-ous other States in this respect. On receipt of the replies, the matter was considered and thereafter, the exemption notification was issued. We are satisfied that there was sufficient material before the State government for issuing the impugned notifica-tion. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. We seek support from the judgment of this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N.”
7. The decision of this Court in Mangilal case upon which re-liance has been placed is distinguishable as the only question pleaded in that case was that since the notification dated 7.9.1989 has been held to be bad by the High Court in respect of wakf properties only, the trust properties would continue to be exempted from the operation of the Act. This plea was not accept-ed and it was held that the notification dated 9.9.1989 was a composite notification which applied not only to the wakf proper-ties but also to other charitable trust properties, and since this notification has been held to be had in respect of the wakf properties, it would be bad for all other properties, including trust properties, which were sought to be exempted from the operation of the Act. The validity of the notification was not questioned in that decision. Moreover, it was not brought to the notice of their lordships, who decided that case, that against the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chintamani case civil appeal no. 9909 of 1995 (arising from SLP (civil) no. 4360 of 1994) was filed in this Court, which was decided on 19.10. 1995 and the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was reserved with a categorical finding that the notification issued by the Madhya Pradesh government exempting the wakf and trust properties from the operation of the Act was valid.”
9. In the case of Kanhaiyalal (supra) the exemption notification issued under section 3(2) of the Act was of 22.5.1963, with which we are not concerned. The notification governing the present case is dated 7.9.1989. Even otherwise that case was rightly distin-guished on facts. We respectfully agree with the decision in Betibai case (supra), since we do not have any good reason to differ. Having regard to all aspects in the present case we are unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant to refer the matter to a larger bench for considera-tion. The learned counsel tried to make a distinction on the basis of language used in the exemption notification, which came up for consideration in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (supra), to which reference is made in para 8 of the judgment in Betibai case, which reads:-
“8. It may be mentioned that similar notifications issued in other States, by which wakf and trust properties were exempted, have already been upheld by this Court. As for example, the notification issued by the State government of Tamil Nadu exempting wakf and trust properties, was upheld by this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N. Even this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned judges who disposed of Mangilal case.”
10. The learned senior counsel for the appellants tried to draw a distinction on the ground that the provision for issuing exemp-tion notification in the case of Tamil Nadu is different inasmuch as the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for that institution is not to be found unlike the provision con-tained in section 3(2) of the Act. This Court in Betibai case, as already noticed above, has rejected the contention. That apart, when the appellants have not challenged the validity of the notification and when they have failed to plead that whole of the rental income derived from the accommodations in question is not utilized for the purpose of the trust, we do not find any merit in this submission of the learned counsel also.
11. Having not raised any objection as to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the exemption notification did not cover the case and that too in the absence of either admitted or established facts supporting that ground, it is not possible for us to take a different view. We do not find any good or valid reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The appeal has no merits. Consequently the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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