Rameshwar Dass & Ors. Vs. Settlement Chief Commissioner
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 3402 of 1983
Petitioner: Rameshwar Dass & Ors.
Respondent: Settlement Chief Commissioner
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 3402 of 1983
Judges: K.JAGANNATHA SHETTY & R.M. SAHAI
Date of Judgment: Feb 03, 1990
Head Note:
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY
Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Section 41 – Bonafide purchases – Lease and sanad granted under the Displaced Persons Act, 1955 – Allotee selling the same under various saledeeds – Question of bonafide purchases raised in appeal before chief settlement commissioner – Writ against his order allowed, but Division Bench seting aside the order of single Judge on the grand that it was question of fact, which cannot be gone into under Article 226 Justification -Held that Division Bench was not justified in setting aside the order of Single Judge, particularly when question of fact had been gone into matter remanded to Division Bench for decision on merits.
Held:
It is not as if the High Court was called upon for the first time to determine the question relating to the plea put forward by the question relating to the plea put forward by the appellants under Section 41 of T.P. Act. That question was considered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in his appellate jurisdiction and there-after by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. In the Circumstances, it would not be proper to drive the parties to another litigation.(Para 6)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Certain land was given to Labh Singh firstly by lease and later by Sanad with proprietary rights under Displace persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1955. The lease was given in 1956 and sanad was granted in 1958. During the period 1960-64 Lab Singh divided that land and alienated in favour of the ap-pellants under different sale-deeds in their favour. They were also put into possession of the different parcels of land pur-chased.
2. In 1966, Ranbir Singh and others Claiming that the said land ought to have been granted to them filed an appeal under Section 22 of the said Act before the Settlement Commissioner who by order dated January 17, 1966 rejected their claim. They , then appealed to the Chief settlement Commissioner under Section 24 who however, allowed their appeal setting aside the Sanand of Labh Singh.
3. Before, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, it was urged on behalf of the purchasers that they were entitled to the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act being bonafide purchasers for consideration. That contention was not accepted by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. He held that there was no proper enquiry made by the purchasers regarding the title to the property. The purchasers then moved the High Court by way of Writ Petition came for hearing was of the opinion that the purchasers should be regarded as bonafide purchasers and entitled to get the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. So stat-ing, he accepted the writ petition and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Thereupon, there was an appeal before the Division Bench by Ranbir Singh and others. Learned Judges of the Division Bench did not examine the validity of the finding on the merits. They however, observed that the applica-bility of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act depends upon the investigation of disputed get the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. So stating, he accepted the writ petition and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commis-sioner. Thereupon, there was an appeal before the Division Bench by Ranbir Singh and others. Learned Judges of the Division Bench did not examine the validity of the finding on the merits. They however, observed that the applicability of Section 41 of the Transfer of property Act depends upon the investigation of dis-puted questions of fact which cannot be determined in the exer-cise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. They allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge.
4. The present appeal has been preferred by obtaining leave against the order of the High Court.
5. We have carefully perused the judgment impugned in this appeal in the light of counsel on both sides. We have also perused the other material record.
6. It seems to us that the Division Bench of the High Court was in error in stating that the case involves a lot of disputed questions of fact. It is not as if the High Court was called upon for the first time to determine the question relating to the plea put forward by the question relating to the plea put forward by the appellants under Section 41 of T.P. Act. That question was considered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in his appellate jurisdiction and thereafter by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. In the Circumstances, it would not be proper to drive the parties to another litigation. If the material on record are not sufficient to come to a proper conclusion on the plea raised by the appellants, it would be open for the High Court to direct the statutory authority t deal with such question with opportuni-ty the other parties to lead evidence . We don not think in the circumstances of the case, the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in simply setting aside the learned Single Judge order without going into the merits of the case.
7. We therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Division Bench with a request to restore the appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law. All the contentions of both the parties are left open.
8. In the circumstances of the case, we however, make no order as to costs.
1. Certain land was given to Labh Singh firstly by lease and later by Sanad with proprietary rights under Displace persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1955. The lease was given in 1956 and sanad was granted in 1958. During the period 1960-64 Lab Singh divided that land and alienated in favour of the ap-pellants under different sale-deeds in their favour. They were also put into possession of the different parcels of land pur-chased.
2. In 1966, Ranbir Singh and others Claiming that the said land ought to have been granted to them filed an appeal under Section 22 of the said Act before the Settlement Commissioner who by order dated January 17, 1966 rejected their claim. They , then appealed to the Chief settlement Commissioner under Section 24 who however, allowed their appeal setting aside the Sanand of Labh Singh.
3. Before, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, it was urged on behalf of the purchasers that they were entitled to the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act being bonafide purchasers for consideration. That contention was not accepted by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. He held that there was no proper enquiry made by the purchasers regarding the title to the property. The purchasers then moved the High Court by way of Writ Petition came for hearing was of the opinion that the purchasers should be regarded as bonafide purchasers and entitled to get the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. So stat-ing, he accepted the writ petition and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Thereupon, there was an appeal before the Division Bench by Ranbir Singh and others. Learned Judges of the Division Bench did not examine the validity of the finding on the merits. They however, observed that the applica-bility of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act depends upon the investigation of disputed get the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. So stating, he accepted the writ petition and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commis-sioner. Thereupon, there was an appeal before the Division Bench by Ranbir Singh and others. Learned Judges of the Division Bench did not examine the validity of the finding on the merits. They however, observed that the applicability of Section 41 of the Transfer of property Act depends upon the investigation of dis-puted questions of fact which cannot be determined in the exer-cise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. They allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge.
4. The present appeal has been preferred by obtaining leave against the order of the High Court.
5. We have carefully perused the judgment impugned in this appeal in the light of counsel on both sides. We have also perused the other material record.
6. It seems to us that the Division Bench of the High Court was in error in stating that the case involves a lot of disputed questions of fact. It is not as if the High Court was called upon for the first time to determine the question relating to the plea put forward by the question relating to the plea put forward by the appellants under Section 41 of T.P. Act. That question was considered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in his appellate jurisdiction and thereafter by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. In the Circumstances, it would not be proper to drive the parties to another litigation. If the material on record are not sufficient to come to a proper conclusion on the plea raised by the appellants, it would be open for the High Court to direct the statutory authority t deal with such question with opportuni-ty the other parties to lead evidence . We don not think in the circumstances of the case, the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in simply setting aside the learned Single Judge order without going into the merits of the case.
7. We therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Division Bench with a request to restore the appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law. All the contentions of both the parties are left open.
8. In the circumstances of the case, we however, make no order as to costs.
