Rajinder Singh. Vs. State (Delhi Admn.)
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 278 of 1984.
Petitioner: Rajinder Singh.
Respondent: State (Delhi Admn.)
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 278 of 1984.
Judges: RANGANATH MISRA & MURARI MOHON DUTT, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Dec 15, 1987
Head Note:
CRIMINAL LAW:
Punjab Excise Act, section 61 – Arms Act, section 27 – Seizure of charas and Pistol from the appellant – Later it was found that seized article was not charas but Aggarbatis – Prosecution for the excise case was contemporaneous while FIR relating to recovery of arms filed 36 days after – Reversal of acquittal by the High Court – Two offences committed at the same time – No explanation as to why two prosecutions separately launched and why FIR relating to Arms Act filed late – High Court was wrong in condoning the lapses of prosecution and convicting the appellant.
JUDGEMENT:
O R D E R
1. This appeal is by special leave and is directed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellant under section 27 of the Arms Act. In th night of 8th/9th December, 1977, the appellant was found to be in possession of 18 1/2 kilograms of charas and a loaded pistol and was prosecuted for offences under section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act and section 27 of the Arms Act. The charas and the fire arm which were said to have been recovered from his possession were seized. The trial court acquitted the appellant of both the charges when it found that the seized article was not charas but turned out to be Aggarbatis. It also found that though the offences under the Excise Act and the Arms Act were alleged to have taken place at one point of time, the prosecution for the excise case was contemporaneous while the First Information Report relating to the recovery of fire arm was lodged 36 days after and there was no explanation as to why initiation of the two prosecutions was bifurcated in the manner indicated above. The respondent carried an appeal against the acquittal in relation to the offence under the Arms Act but did not challenge the acquittal under the Punjab Excise Act. The High Court looked into the two grounds referred to above but so far as the question of delay in lunching the prosecution was concerned, it was satisfied by recording a finding that the delayed First Informatiion Report was not vitiated by mala-fides. So far as the other question is concerned, it came to hold that the prosecution had satisfactorily established its case regarding the recovery of the fire arm and acqittal in the excise offence did not affect the rest of the prosecution case. On reversing the judgment of the acquittal as already said the appellant was convicted under section 27 of the Arms Act.
2 Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has reiterated the two contentions. We find it difficult to accept the basis for reversing the acquittal. It is not disputed that the two offences were committed at the same time when during the night of 8th/9th December,1977, the seizure was made. There is absolutely no explanation as to why and under what circumstances the two prosecution were separately launched. Ordinarily since it was one occurrence giving rise to two offences, there would have been a common First Information Report. There is no explanation as to why the two offences are bifurcated and even if for some reason not known existed for bifuracation, there is no explanation as to why First Information Report relating to Arms Act offence was made 36 days after. The defence version was that nothing of the type alleged happened and when the appellant had objected to an instance of pollice excess, he was implicated in these false charges. In view of the fact that the prosecutor had chosen not to challenge the acquittal in regard to the offence under the Excise Act offence (in a situation which is full of suspicion because while charas is alleged to have been seized and stored, aggarbatis have been found), we find it difficult to accept the conduct of the prosecution. The High Court obviously overlooked these aspects and the consequences to which these aspects should reasonably lead while reversing the acquirral. Ordinarily, all the doubts that arose in the case should have been resolved in fovour of the accused and the High Court appears to have condoned the lapses of the prosecution and convicted the appellant after reversing the acquittal. The appels is allowed. The conviction and sentence are set aside and the bail bounds are cancelled.
Appeal allowed.
1. This appeal is by special leave and is directed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellant under section 27 of the Arms Act. In th night of 8th/9th December, 1977, the appellant was found to be in possession of 18 1/2 kilograms of charas and a loaded pistol and was prosecuted for offences under section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act and section 27 of the Arms Act. The charas and the fire arm which were said to have been recovered from his possession were seized. The trial court acquitted the appellant of both the charges when it found that the seized article was not charas but turned out to be Aggarbatis. It also found that though the offences under the Excise Act and the Arms Act were alleged to have taken place at one point of time, the prosecution for the excise case was contemporaneous while the First Information Report relating to the recovery of fire arm was lodged 36 days after and there was no explanation as to why initiation of the two prosecutions was bifurcated in the manner indicated above. The respondent carried an appeal against the acquittal in relation to the offence under the Arms Act but did not challenge the acquittal under the Punjab Excise Act. The High Court looked into the two grounds referred to above but so far as the question of delay in lunching the prosecution was concerned, it was satisfied by recording a finding that the delayed First Informatiion Report was not vitiated by mala-fides. So far as the other question is concerned, it came to hold that the prosecution had satisfactorily established its case regarding the recovery of the fire arm and acqittal in the excise offence did not affect the rest of the prosecution case. On reversing the judgment of the acquittal as already said the appellant was convicted under section 27 of the Arms Act.
2 Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has reiterated the two contentions. We find it difficult to accept the basis for reversing the acquittal. It is not disputed that the two offences were committed at the same time when during the night of 8th/9th December,1977, the seizure was made. There is absolutely no explanation as to why and under what circumstances the two prosecution were separately launched. Ordinarily since it was one occurrence giving rise to two offences, there would have been a common First Information Report. There is no explanation as to why the two offences are bifurcated and even if for some reason not known existed for bifuracation, there is no explanation as to why First Information Report relating to Arms Act offence was made 36 days after. The defence version was that nothing of the type alleged happened and when the appellant had objected to an instance of pollice excess, he was implicated in these false charges. In view of the fact that the prosecutor had chosen not to challenge the acquittal in regard to the offence under the Excise Act offence (in a situation which is full of suspicion because while charas is alleged to have been seized and stored, aggarbatis have been found), we find it difficult to accept the conduct of the prosecution. The High Court obviously overlooked these aspects and the consequences to which these aspects should reasonably lead while reversing the acquirral. Ordinarily, all the doubts that arose in the case should have been resolved in fovour of the accused and the High Court appears to have condoned the lapses of the prosecution and convicted the appellant after reversing the acquittal. The appels is allowed. The conviction and sentence are set aside and the bail bounds are cancelled.
Appeal allowed.
