Raghbir Singh Vs. Surjit Singh
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No.933 of 1994
(From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.93 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in E.P. No. 6 of 1992)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.93 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in E.P. No. 6 of 1992)
Petitioner: Raghbir Singh
Respondent: Surjit Singh
Apeal: Civil Appeal No.933 of 1994
(From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.93 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in E.P. No. 6 of 1992)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.93 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in E.P. No. 6 of 1992)
Judges: J.S.VERMA & K.S.PARIPOORANAN, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Aug 22, 1994
Appearances:
Mr. R.K. Jain, Senior Advocate and Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, Advocate with him for the Appellant/Petitioner
Mr. K.Madhava Reddy, Mr. M.L. Verma, Senior Advocates Mr. B. S. Jain, Mr. Mahesh Srivastava and Ms. V.D. Khanna, Advocates with them for the Respondents.
Head Note:
ELECTION LAW
Representation of People Act 1951:
Section 8(3) – Petitioner convicted under section 326 read with section 149 I.P.C. and sentenced to three years’ rigorous imprisonment and was in jail for some period –
Held:
Appellant was disqualified to be a candidate for election to Punjab Assembly under section 8(3) as period of disqualification was to continue for six years from the date of release ie 14.11.1989 and not six years from date of conviction 15.11.84 – Appeal dismissed.
Held –
There is no dispute that in accordance with the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “the R.P.Act”), the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held in February 1992 on this ground alone. The High Court has upheld this contention of the respondent-election petitioner and allowed the election petition declaring the appellant’s said election to be void. Hence this appeal under Section 116A of the R.P.Act. There being no controversy that according to the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act, the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held on February 1992. (Paras 2 & 3)
The submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (3) should also be read as six years from the date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to six years from the date of release. In short, the submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 should be identical and there is no rational basis for providing a different period of disqualification in the different sub-sections of Section 8. We are unable to accept this argument. (Para 4)
The legislature itself has classified the offences on the basis of their nature and in the residuary provision contained in sub-section (3), the classification is made only with reference to the period of sentence being not less than two years. (Para 5)
JUDGEMENT:
VERMA, J.:
1. Pursuant to the notification to elect a Member for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to represent the Giddarbha Assembly Constituency, the appellant Raghbir Singh filed his nomination on 1.2.1992 which was found valid in the scrutiny on 2.2.1992, and he contested the election held on 19.2.1992 wherein he was declared only elected on 20.2.1992. Thereafter, the respondent Surjit Singh, voter from that constituency filed an Election Petition for a declaration that the appellants election was void on the ground that he was disqualified to be a candidate at the time of election. The facts on which this ground is based are admitted.
2. The appellant was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 149. I.P.C. and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.100/- in addition to his conviction and sentence also under some other sections of the Indian Penal Code, by the Trial Court on 15.11.1984. The appellants appeal against his conviction and sentence was dismissed by the High Court on 10.4.1987 and the special leave petition against the same was rejected by this Court on 30.11.1987. The appellant was in jail to serve out his sentence from 8.9.1987 to 21.10.1987 and again from 8.2.1988 to 14.11.1989. There is no dispute that in accordance with the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “the R.P.Act”), the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held in February 1992 on this ground alone. The High Court has upheld this contention of the respondent-election petitioner and allowed the election petition declaring the appellant’s said election to be void. Hence this appeal under Section 116A of the R.P.Act.
3. There being no controversy that according to the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act, the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held on February 1992, the appellant has also filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.243 of 1994 along with this appeal challenging the constitutional validity of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act. Unless that provision is held to be unconstitutional, it is obvious that the appeal also must fail . Thus, the only question for consideration by us is the constitutional validity of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act.
4. The submission of Shri R.K.Jain, learned counsel for the appellant is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (1) of Section 8 being only six years from the date of such conviction, the longer period of disqualification prescribed in sub-section (3) thereof extending to six years since his release is discriminatory. The submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (3) should also be read as six years from the date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to six years from the date of release. In short, the submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 should be identical and there is no rational basis for providing a different period of disqualification in the different sub sections of Section 8. We are unable to accept this argument.
5. Section 8 prescribes disqualification on conviction for certain offence, sub-section (1) provides the disqualification for a period of six years from the date of conviction for the offences specified in clauses (a) to (i) thereof. In sub-section (1), the only reference is to conviction for the specified offences irrespective of the sentence awarded on such conviction. Sub-section (2) then prescribes that on conviction for the offences specified therein and sentence to imprisonment for not less than six months, that person shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. Thus, in case of conviction for the offences specified in sub-section (2), the disqualification is attracted only if the sentence is of imprisonment for not less than six months and in that event the disqualification is for a period of not merely six years from the date of such conviction but commencing from the date of such conviction it shall continue for a further period of six years since his release. Sub section (3) then prescribes a similar longer period of disqualification from the date of such conviction to continue for a further period of six years since his release where a person is convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years, other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). The classification is clear. This classification is made with reference to the offences and the sentences awarded on conviction. In sub-section (1) are specified the offences which the considered to be of one category and the period of six years disqualification from the date of conviction is provided for them irrespective of the sentence awarded on such conviction. In sub-section (2) are specified some other offences, the conviction for which is considered significant for disqualification only if the sentence is of imprisonment for not less than six months and in that case a longer period of disqualification has been considered appropriate. Then comes sub-section (3) which is the residuary provision of this kind wherein the disqualification is prescribed only with reference to the period of sentence of imprisonment of not less than two years for which the longer period of disqualification is considered appropriate. The legislature itself has classified the offences on the basis of their nature and in the residuary provision contained in sub section (3), the classification is made only with reference to the period of sentence being not less than two years.
6. In sub-section (3) of Section 8. all persons convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are classified together and the period of disqualification prescribed for all of them is the same. All persons convicted of offences other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and sentence to imprisonment of not lass than two years constitute one class and are governed by sub-section (3) prescribing the same period of disqualification for all of them. The category of persons covered by sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) being different and distinct, the question of comparison inter se between any two of these three distinct classes does not arise, without such a comparison between persons governed by these different sub sections being permissible, the very basis of attack on the ground of discrimination is not available. Prescription of period of disqualification for different classes of persons convicted of different offences is within the domain of legislative discretion and wisdom. Which is not open to judicial scrutiny.
7. Classification of offences for certain purposes on the basis of the period of sentence is a well known method of classification. The First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to Classification of Offences for purposes of cognizance, bail and trial, and the classification of offences against laws other than the Indian Penal Code is made on the basis of the sentence prescribed for the offence. It is, therefore, clear that the mode of classification adopted in the different sub-sections of Section 8 of R.F. Act is a well recognised made of classification of offences. The legislature having wide discretion in the matter of classification and there being no arbitrariness reflected in the classification the matter must end there.
8. There is thus no merit in the challenge to the constitutional validity or sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act. consequently, the writ petition is dismissed which results in dismissal of the civil appeal also. The appellant/petitioner will pay the costs to the respondents. Costs quantified at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only.
1. Pursuant to the notification to elect a Member for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to represent the Giddarbha Assembly Constituency, the appellant Raghbir Singh filed his nomination on 1.2.1992 which was found valid in the scrutiny on 2.2.1992, and he contested the election held on 19.2.1992 wherein he was declared only elected on 20.2.1992. Thereafter, the respondent Surjit Singh, voter from that constituency filed an Election Petition for a declaration that the appellants election was void on the ground that he was disqualified to be a candidate at the time of election. The facts on which this ground is based are admitted.
2. The appellant was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 149. I.P.C. and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.100/- in addition to his conviction and sentence also under some other sections of the Indian Penal Code, by the Trial Court on 15.11.1984. The appellants appeal against his conviction and sentence was dismissed by the High Court on 10.4.1987 and the special leave petition against the same was rejected by this Court on 30.11.1987. The appellant was in jail to serve out his sentence from 8.9.1987 to 21.10.1987 and again from 8.2.1988 to 14.11.1989. There is no dispute that in accordance with the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “the R.P.Act”), the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held in February 1992 on this ground alone. The High Court has upheld this contention of the respondent-election petitioner and allowed the election petition declaring the appellant’s said election to be void. Hence this appeal under Section 116A of the R.P.Act.
3. There being no controversy that according to the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act, the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held on February 1992, the appellant has also filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.243 of 1994 along with this appeal challenging the constitutional validity of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act. Unless that provision is held to be unconstitutional, it is obvious that the appeal also must fail . Thus, the only question for consideration by us is the constitutional validity of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act.
4. The submission of Shri R.K.Jain, learned counsel for the appellant is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (1) of Section 8 being only six years from the date of such conviction, the longer period of disqualification prescribed in sub-section (3) thereof extending to six years since his release is discriminatory. The submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (3) should also be read as six years from the date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to six years from the date of release. In short, the submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 should be identical and there is no rational basis for providing a different period of disqualification in the different sub sections of Section 8. We are unable to accept this argument.
5. Section 8 prescribes disqualification on conviction for certain offence, sub-section (1) provides the disqualification for a period of six years from the date of conviction for the offences specified in clauses (a) to (i) thereof. In sub-section (1), the only reference is to conviction for the specified offences irrespective of the sentence awarded on such conviction. Sub-section (2) then prescribes that on conviction for the offences specified therein and sentence to imprisonment for not less than six months, that person shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. Thus, in case of conviction for the offences specified in sub-section (2), the disqualification is attracted only if the sentence is of imprisonment for not less than six months and in that event the disqualification is for a period of not merely six years from the date of such conviction but commencing from the date of such conviction it shall continue for a further period of six years since his release. Sub section (3) then prescribes a similar longer period of disqualification from the date of such conviction to continue for a further period of six years since his release where a person is convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years, other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). The classification is clear. This classification is made with reference to the offences and the sentences awarded on conviction. In sub-section (1) are specified the offences which the considered to be of one category and the period of six years disqualification from the date of conviction is provided for them irrespective of the sentence awarded on such conviction. In sub-section (2) are specified some other offences, the conviction for which is considered significant for disqualification only if the sentence is of imprisonment for not less than six months and in that case a longer period of disqualification has been considered appropriate. Then comes sub-section (3) which is the residuary provision of this kind wherein the disqualification is prescribed only with reference to the period of sentence of imprisonment of not less than two years for which the longer period of disqualification is considered appropriate. The legislature itself has classified the offences on the basis of their nature and in the residuary provision contained in sub section (3), the classification is made only with reference to the period of sentence being not less than two years.
6. In sub-section (3) of Section 8. all persons convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are classified together and the period of disqualification prescribed for all of them is the same. All persons convicted of offences other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and sentence to imprisonment of not lass than two years constitute one class and are governed by sub-section (3) prescribing the same period of disqualification for all of them. The category of persons covered by sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) being different and distinct, the question of comparison inter se between any two of these three distinct classes does not arise, without such a comparison between persons governed by these different sub sections being permissible, the very basis of attack on the ground of discrimination is not available. Prescription of period of disqualification for different classes of persons convicted of different offences is within the domain of legislative discretion and wisdom. Which is not open to judicial scrutiny.
7. Classification of offences for certain purposes on the basis of the period of sentence is a well known method of classification. The First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to Classification of Offences for purposes of cognizance, bail and trial, and the classification of offences against laws other than the Indian Penal Code is made on the basis of the sentence prescribed for the offence. It is, therefore, clear that the mode of classification adopted in the different sub-sections of Section 8 of R.F. Act is a well recognised made of classification of offences. The legislature having wide discretion in the matter of classification and there being no arbitrariness reflected in the classification the matter must end there.
8. There is thus no merit in the challenge to the constitutional validity or sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P.Act. consequently, the writ petition is dismissed which results in dismissal of the civil appeal also. The appellant/petitioner will pay the costs to the respondents. Costs quantified at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only.
