Property Owners’ Association & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
EmailAppeal: Special Leave Petition (C) No. 5302 of 1992
(From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.91 of the Bombay High Court in W.P.No. 2673 of 1986)
WITH
SLP (C) Nos. 5777, 5204, 8797, 7950 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 934 of 1992 and 16 of 1996, SLP (C) Nos. 6744 of 1993, 2303 and 13467 of 1995, 4367 and 6191-6192 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 342 of 1999, 469 and 672 of 2000, 660 of 1998, I.A.Nos. 2-3 in C.A. Nos. 2797-2798 of 1992 and SLP (C) No. 4129 of 1992
(From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.91 of the Bombay High Court in W.P.No. 2673 of 1986)
WITH
SLP (C) Nos. 5777, 5204, 8797, 7950 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 934 of 1992 and 16 of 1996, SLP (C) Nos. 6744 of 1993, 2303 and 13467 of 1995, 4367 and 6191-6192 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 342 of 1999, 469 and 672 of 2000, 660 of 1998, I.A.Nos. 2-3 in C.A. Nos. 2797-2798 of 1992 and SLP (C) No. 4129 of 1992
Petitioner: Property Owners’ Association & Ors.
Respondent: State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Apeal: Special Leave Petition (C) No. 5302 of 1992
(From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.91 of the Bombay High Court in W.P.No. 2673 of 1986)
WITH
SLP (C) Nos. 5777, 5204, 8797, 7950 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 934 of 1992 and 16 of 1996, SLP (C) Nos. 6744 of 1993, 2303 and 13467 of 1995, 4367 and 6191-6192 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 342 of 1999, 469 and 672 of 2000, 660 of 1998, I.A.Nos. 2-3 in C.A. Nos. 2797-2798 of 1992 and SLP (C) No. 4129 of 1992
(From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.91 of the Bombay High Court in W.P.No. 2673 of 1986)
WITH
SLP (C) Nos. 5777, 5204, 8797, 7950 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 934 of 1992 and 16 of 1996, SLP (C) Nos. 6744 of 1993, 2303 and 13467 of 1995, 4367 and 6191-6192 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 342 of 1999, 469 and 672 of 2000, 660 of 1998, I.A.Nos. 2-3 in C.A. Nos. 2797-2798 of 1992 and SLP (C) No. 4129 of 1992
Judges: B.N. KIRPAL, S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, M.B. SHAH, RUMA PAL & K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Mar 21, 2001
Appearances:
Mr. Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, Mr. F.S. Nariman, Mr. G.L. Sanghi, Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Mr. Ashok H.Desai, Mr. Bhimrao N. Naik, Mr. Rajiv Dutta, Mr. Anil B. Divan, Senior Advocates, Mr. Mulraj Shah, Mr. P.H. Parekh, Mr. S.K. Sethna, Mr. E.R. Kumar, Mr. Subhash Sharma, Mr. Sameer, Mr. Devrajan, Ms. Dhun Chhapgar, Mr. Rohit Mammen Alex, Ms. Ruchi Khurana, Mr. U.A. Rana, Ms. Shalini Mittal, Mr. Arvind Kumar, Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Mr. P. Narasimhan, Mr. T.C. Tolat, Mr. S.R. Setia, Mr. Vijay K. Jain, Mr. P.N. Gupta, Mr. Alok Mahajan, Mr. O.P. Poplai, Ms. J.S. Wad, Mr. Preetesh Kapoor, Ms. Aparajita Singh, Mr. Siddharth Goswami, Mr. Siddharth Chaudhry, Mr. S.V. Deshpande, Mr. Milind Sathe, Mr. Pallav Sisodia, Mr. Sanjay Hegde, Mr. Harsh Desai, Mr. Anand S. Bhatt, Mr. Ameet B. Naik, Mr. Ashish A. Ahuja, Mr. M.N. Shroff, Mr. Vipin Sanghi, Mr. Pramod B. Agarwala, Ms. Praveena Gautam, Mr. Mahesh Agrawala, Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Mr. G.B. Sathe, Mr. K.V. Sreekumar, Ms. Manik Kar-anjawala, Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, Mr. Manoj Swarup, Ms. Lalita Kohli, Ms. Maulina Swarup, Mr. T.V. Ratnam, Mr. C. Mukund, Mr. Gaurav K. Singh, Mr. A.S. Bhasme, Mr. Manoj Kumar Mishra, Mr. Keerit Shah, Mr. Rishi Agrawal, Mr. Vivek Yadav, Ms. Indu Malho-tra, Mr. Sushil Karanjakar, Mr. A. Venkateshwar Rao, Mr. Vishwa-jit Singh, Mr. P.N. Gupta, Mr. Harish Ganatra, Ms. Minaz Mer-chant, Mr. Kapil Sharma, Mr. R. Nedumaran, Mr. S.M. Jadhav, Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Mr. Prasant Kumar, Mr. Anip Sachthey, Mr. Prashant Chaudhary, Mr. M.C. Dhingra, Mr. Praveen Swarup, Mr. S.K. Verma, Ms. Bela Maheshwari, Ms. Geetanjali Mohan, Mr. Shrish Kumar Misra, Mr. Uday Umesh Lalit, Advocates with them for the appearing parties.
Head Note:
CONSTITUTION
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1986
Chapter VIIIA, Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 14,19,31C and 39(b) – State actions for sub-serving common good – Maharash-tra Act of 1986 through Chapter VIIIA providing for acquisition of property by State Government on payment of compensation – Provisions challenged as offending the constitutional provisions – Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court desiring the matter to be decided by a five Judge Bench. Held, the matter involved inter-pretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution and since the views expressed by the Apex Court in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd relying on the interpretation of the said Article by Krishna Iyer J. in Ranganatha Reddy’s case required reconsideration as the interpretation was not specifi-cally assented to by the majority Judges therein, matter be referred to a still larger Bench of not less than seven Judges. (Paras 5,6, and 7)
Cases Reffered:
1. Property Owner’s Association and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (JT 1996 (6) SC 23) (Para 3)
2. State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan and Ors. ((1986) 2 SCC 516) (Para 5)
3. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Anr. (1983) 1 SCR 1000) (Para 5)
4. State of Karnataka and Anr. Etc. v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy and Anr. Etc. (1978 (1) SCR 641) (Para 4)
5. Keshava-nanda Bharati’s case (1973 (4) SCC 225) (Para 2)
2. State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan and Ors. ((1986) 2 SCC 516) (Para 5)
3. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Anr. (1983) 1 SCR 1000) (Para 5)
4. State of Karnataka and Anr. Etc. v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy and Anr. Etc. (1978 (1) SCR 641) (Para 4)
5. Keshava-nanda Bharati’s case (1973 (4) SCC 225) (Para 2)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. In these cases the main challenge is to the constitutional validity of Chapter – VIIIA which was inserted in 1986 in the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 which, inter alia, provided for the acquisition of certain properties on payment of hundred times the monthly rent for the premises. By the said amendment, Section – 1A was also inserted in that Act and it contains a declaration that the Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles speci-fied in Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. In view of Article 31C of the Constitution, the contention of the State was that the validity of any part of the statute on the ground that it violated Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution, was not permissible.
2. The case was heard by a Bench of three Judges. At that time on behalf of the appellants, a contention was sought to be raised, inter alia, to the effect that Article 31C did not sur-vive because of the events subsequent to the decision in Keshava-nanda Bharati’s case (1973 (4) SCC 225). It was also submitted before that Bench that the doctrine of revival, as it applied to ordinary statutes, did not apply to the Constitutional amendment and when a part of the Forty-second Amendment, which amended Article 31C, had been held to be invalid it did not result in the automatic revival of the unamended Article 31C.
3. In view of the aforesaid contention which was raised, by order dated 1st May, 1996 reported in Property Owner’s Association and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (JT 1996 (6) SC 23 = (1996) 4 SCC 49), the matter was referred to “a larger Bench of not less than five Judges for hearing and deciding these matters”.
4. We heard the Counsel at length on various issues which arise in these cases. One of the points which arises for consideration relates to the interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitu-tion. In State of Karnataka and Anr. Etc. v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy and Anr. Etc. (1978 (1) SCR 641) validity of Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 was challenged and the question which arose was whether the State Government could acquire and then transfer counter-signed portions of inter-State permits to Road Transport Corporation. Two judgments were deliv-ered in that case. Krishna Iyer, J. for himself and two other learned Judges, while concurring with the decision of Untwalia, J. (with whom three other Judges agreed), interpreted Article 39(b) of the Constitution and then came to the conclusion that the Act had direct nexus with Article 39(b) and by virtue of Article 31C its validity could not be challenged on the ground of its being violative of Article 14 or 19 (1) (f) of the Consti-tution. Untwalia, J. in his judgment observed that “we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion with reference to Article 31C read with Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. Our learned brother Krishna Iyer, J. has prepared a separate judgment specially dealing with this point. We must not be understood to agree with all that he has said in his judgment in this regard”.
5. The need to interpret Article 39(b) again arose in the case of Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Anr. (1983 1 SCR 1000). While upholding the validity of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and the two other connect-ed enactments the Constitution Bench adopted the interpretation of Article 39(b) as enunciated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy’s case (surpa). This interpretation has also been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan and Ors. ((1986) 2 SCC 516).
6. The interpretation put on Article 39(b) by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy’s case was not specifically assented to in the majority decision but in Sanjeev Coke’s case (supra) it is the observations in the judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. which have been followed.
7. Having heard the Counsel at length, we are of the opinion that the views expressed in Sanjeev Coke’s case require reconsidera-tion. Keeping in view the importance of the point in issue, namely, the interpretation of Article 39(b) it will be appro-priate if these cases are heard by a larger Bench of not less than seven Judges.
8. The papers be laid before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appro-priate orders.
1. In these cases the main challenge is to the constitutional validity of Chapter – VIIIA which was inserted in 1986 in the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 which, inter alia, provided for the acquisition of certain properties on payment of hundred times the monthly rent for the premises. By the said amendment, Section – 1A was also inserted in that Act and it contains a declaration that the Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles speci-fied in Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. In view of Article 31C of the Constitution, the contention of the State was that the validity of any part of the statute on the ground that it violated Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution, was not permissible.
2. The case was heard by a Bench of three Judges. At that time on behalf of the appellants, a contention was sought to be raised, inter alia, to the effect that Article 31C did not sur-vive because of the events subsequent to the decision in Keshava-nanda Bharati’s case (1973 (4) SCC 225). It was also submitted before that Bench that the doctrine of revival, as it applied to ordinary statutes, did not apply to the Constitutional amendment and when a part of the Forty-second Amendment, which amended Article 31C, had been held to be invalid it did not result in the automatic revival of the unamended Article 31C.
3. In view of the aforesaid contention which was raised, by order dated 1st May, 1996 reported in Property Owner’s Association and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (JT 1996 (6) SC 23 = (1996) 4 SCC 49), the matter was referred to “a larger Bench of not less than five Judges for hearing and deciding these matters”.
4. We heard the Counsel at length on various issues which arise in these cases. One of the points which arises for consideration relates to the interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitu-tion. In State of Karnataka and Anr. Etc. v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy and Anr. Etc. (1978 (1) SCR 641) validity of Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 was challenged and the question which arose was whether the State Government could acquire and then transfer counter-signed portions of inter-State permits to Road Transport Corporation. Two judgments were deliv-ered in that case. Krishna Iyer, J. for himself and two other learned Judges, while concurring with the decision of Untwalia, J. (with whom three other Judges agreed), interpreted Article 39(b) of the Constitution and then came to the conclusion that the Act had direct nexus with Article 39(b) and by virtue of Article 31C its validity could not be challenged on the ground of its being violative of Article 14 or 19 (1) (f) of the Consti-tution. Untwalia, J. in his judgment observed that “we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion with reference to Article 31C read with Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. Our learned brother Krishna Iyer, J. has prepared a separate judgment specially dealing with this point. We must not be understood to agree with all that he has said in his judgment in this regard”.
5. The need to interpret Article 39(b) again arose in the case of Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Anr. (1983 1 SCR 1000). While upholding the validity of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and the two other connect-ed enactments the Constitution Bench adopted the interpretation of Article 39(b) as enunciated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy’s case (surpa). This interpretation has also been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan and Ors. ((1986) 2 SCC 516).
6. The interpretation put on Article 39(b) by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy’s case was not specifically assented to in the majority decision but in Sanjeev Coke’s case (supra) it is the observations in the judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. which have been followed.
7. Having heard the Counsel at length, we are of the opinion that the views expressed in Sanjeev Coke’s case require reconsidera-tion. Keeping in view the importance of the point in issue, namely, the interpretation of Article 39(b) it will be appro-priate if these cases are heard by a larger Bench of not less than seven Judges.
8. The papers be laid before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appro-priate orders.
