Md. Shoaib Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 8209 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2597/2001)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2597/2001)
Petitioner: Md. Shoaib
Respondent: State of Bihar & Ors.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 8209 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2597/2001)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2597/2001)
Judges: R.C. LAHOTI & BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Nov 29, 2001
Head Note:
LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL LAW
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Section 33(2)(b) – Misconduct – Dismissal from service – Additional managing director of government company holding departmental enquiry and dismissing the appellant from service – Order of penalty approved by industrial tribunal – Appellant employee preferring appeal – By the time appeal came to be heard, the additional MD who held the enquiry was appointed as the MD and appeal heard and dismissed by him – High Court up-holding the action – Appeal to Supreme Court – During pendency of appeal, board of directors of the company superseded by administrator. Setting aside the appellate order passed by the MD, Court directing the appeal to be heard and disposed of by the administrator in accordance with law. (Para 5)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant was a driver in the employment of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter ‘the Corporation’, for short). A departmental inquiry was held against him and the additional managing director, the competent authority in this regard, imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on him. This order of penalty was approved by the industrial tribunal under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant preferred an appeal. However, by the time the appeal came to be heard, the additional managing director who had passed the order of penalty, came to be appointed as managing director who was to hear the appeal. He heard the appeal and dismissed the same. Feeling aggrieved by the order of penalty as also by the appellate order, the appellant filed a writ petition which has been dismissed by the learned single judge of the High Court, that order has been maintained in writ appeal.
3. The principal plea raised on behalf of the appellant is that on account of the same additional managing director having assumed the office of the managing director and having heard and decided the appeal, a valuable right of the appellant to have the appeal heard and disposed of by an authority other than the one who had imposed the penalty of dismissal was taken away and this has resulted in violation of the princi-ples of natural justice. The appellate order was sought to be defended on behalf of the corporation by pleading the doctrine of necessity.
4. However, a subsequent event dispenses with the need of adjudicating upon the controversy on merits. It is pointed out that during the pendency of this petition, the board of directors of the corporation has been superseded and an administrator has been appointed in whom vests the powers of managing director. Both the learned counsels agree that they do not object to the appellate order being set aside and the appeal being restored for the purpose of being heard and decided afresh by the administrator.
5. Without expressing any opinion on merits of the pleas raised on behalf of either of the parties, the appellate order dated 3rd January, 1996 passed by the then managing director is set aside. The appeal filed by the appellant against the order of penalty dated 30th August, 1991 shall be deemed to be pending and shall be heard and decided afresh by the administrator. The appellant shall appear before the administrator on 8th January, 2002. The administrator shall either hear the appeal on that day or appoint a day of hear-ing and then decide the appeal in accordance with law after affording both the parties opportunity of hearing. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant was a driver in the employment of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter ‘the Corporation’, for short). A departmental inquiry was held against him and the additional managing director, the competent authority in this regard, imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on him. This order of penalty was approved by the industrial tribunal under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant preferred an appeal. However, by the time the appeal came to be heard, the additional managing director who had passed the order of penalty, came to be appointed as managing director who was to hear the appeal. He heard the appeal and dismissed the same. Feeling aggrieved by the order of penalty as also by the appellate order, the appellant filed a writ petition which has been dismissed by the learned single judge of the High Court, that order has been maintained in writ appeal.
3. The principal plea raised on behalf of the appellant is that on account of the same additional managing director having assumed the office of the managing director and having heard and decided the appeal, a valuable right of the appellant to have the appeal heard and disposed of by an authority other than the one who had imposed the penalty of dismissal was taken away and this has resulted in violation of the princi-ples of natural justice. The appellate order was sought to be defended on behalf of the corporation by pleading the doctrine of necessity.
4. However, a subsequent event dispenses with the need of adjudicating upon the controversy on merits. It is pointed out that during the pendency of this petition, the board of directors of the corporation has been superseded and an administrator has been appointed in whom vests the powers of managing director. Both the learned counsels agree that they do not object to the appellate order being set aside and the appeal being restored for the purpose of being heard and decided afresh by the administrator.
5. Without expressing any opinion on merits of the pleas raised on behalf of either of the parties, the appellate order dated 3rd January, 1996 passed by the then managing director is set aside. The appeal filed by the appellant against the order of penalty dated 30th August, 1991 shall be deemed to be pending and shall be heard and decided afresh by the administrator. The appellant shall appear before the administrator on 8th January, 2002. The administrator shall either hear the appeal on that day or appoint a day of hear-ing and then decide the appeal in accordance with law after affording both the parties opportunity of hearing. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
