Manphul Singh Sharma Vs. Smt. Ahmedi Begum (since deceased) through her alleged legal representative/succ
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 1959 of 1984
Petitioner: Manphul Singh Sharma
Respondent: Smt. Ahmedi Begum (since deceased) through her alleged legal representative/successors (a) Shri M.A. Khan (b) Delhi Wakf Board
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 1959 of 1984
Judges: S. C. AGRAWAL & S. MOHAN, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Sep 08, 1994
Head Note:
RENT LAW
Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952
Repealed by section 57(1) – Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 – Rights of parties governed by section 25, 1952 Act enabling a sub tenant to become a tenant on determination of the tenancy – Sections 17 and 18 of 1955 Act do not apply – and appellant being lawful tenant allowed protection of section 20.
Held:
Only submission of Mr. B.B. Sawhney, learned counsel for the appellant, which in our view merits acceptance, is the rights of the parties are governed by 1952 Act. Under the said Act, Section 25 enables a sub-tenant to become a tenant on determination of the tenancy. It matters very little whether the sub-letting took place before or after the commencement of the 1952 Act. As a matter of fact, the claim of the appellant was only based on this Section. No doubt, pending these proceedings, the 1958 Act came into force but the provisions thereunder, namely, Sections 17 or 18 would not apply. The reason is : no doubt, the 1952 Act has been repealed by Section 57 of the 1958 Act, however, notwithstanding such repeal, the proceedings under the 1952 Act could be continued, as if the 1958 Act had not been enacted. Therefore, the High Court went wrong in holding, consequent to the failure of the appellant to issue notice under Section 17, the benefit of Section 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 would be unavailable. (Para 8)
What is the effect of repeal? When a repeal is accompanied by a fresh legislation on the same subject the provisions of the new Act will have to be looked into to determine whether and how far the new Act projects or keeps alive the old rights and liabilities. The proper enquiry is as laid down by this Court in State of Punjab v Mohar Singh Pratap Singh AIR 1955 SC 84. (Para 13)
Under identical circumstances the scope of Section 57 of 1958 Act came to be considered by this Court in Karam Singh Sobti v. Sri Pratap Chand AIR 1964 SC 1305. (Para 14)
In view of the factual finding rendered by the High Court that the appellant is a lawful sub-tenant he would be entitled to the protection of Section 20 of the 1952 Act. In such a case, Section 17, consequently, Section 18 of the 1958 Act will have no application whatsoever. The result is the appellant being a lawful sub-tenant had become a statutory tenant. Once this conclusion is reached the judgment of the High Court cannot be supported. It is accordingly set aside. The appeal will stand allowed. (Para 16)
Cases Reffered:
1. Karam Singh Sobti v. Sri Pratap Chand, AIR 1964 SC 1305. (Para 14) ( Applied)
2. State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84. (Para 13)
2. State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84. (Para 13)
JUDGEMENT:
MOHAN, J.:
1. The facts leading to the civil appeal are as under:
One Ahmedi Begum was the owner of ‘Dharampur Lodge’ situated near Clock Tower, Sabzi Mandi, Delhi. She leased out the entire property to the S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar. The lease was for a period of 5 years evidenced by registered lease deed dated 12th April, 1948. On expiry of the said lease another lease dated 3rd April, 1953 was executed for a further period of 5 years which was also duly registered.
2. Both these lease deeds empowered the lessee S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar to sub-let the whole or a part of the demise property. S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar sub-let various portions of the property to several sub-tenants. One such sub-letting was in favour of the appellant, Manphul Singh Sharma in April, 1943 and another portion to Yog Raj Goswami in August 1956.
3. On 1st of September, 1956 tenant S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar by a registered lease deed sub-let the entirety of the property in favour of Surinder Kumar Sharma. That, in turn, authorised Surinder Kumar Sharma to sub-let. Thereafter S.Sardul Singh Cavesshar called upon all the sub-tenants to attorn in favour of Surinder Kumar Sharma. The appellant and Yog Raj Goswami started paying rents to Surinder Kumar Sharma.
4. Consequent to the failure of the head tenant S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar to pay the rent, in spite of the notice of payment by the landlady on 23rd of July, 1957, the tenancy in his favour came to be terminated. Ahmedi Begum filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment, after obtaining the necessary permission under the Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act of 1926. That suit ended in a decree in favour of Ahmedi Begum. Those execution proceedings stood transferred to High Court. Surinder Kumar Sharma, the sub-tenant, filed objections to the effect that he was a lawful sub-tenant and became a direct tenant under the decree holder by virtue of Section 20 of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 1952 Act). His claim was negatived both by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court.
5. The appellant and Yog Raj Goswami filed similar objections that the sub-letting in their favour was with the consent of the landlady and Section 20 of the 1952 Act would ensure to their benefit. The objection was overruled by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. He reasoned that the appellant had attorned to Surinder Kumar Sharma under written direction of S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar. This would tantamount to surrender of tenancy under S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar and creation of tenancy in favour of Surinder Kumar Sharma. Therefore, he was not a lawful sub tenant. Similar objection of Yog Raj Goswami was also dismissed. Aggrieved by this, appeals were preferred in EFA(OS) 7 of 1971 and 9 of 1972 by the appellant as well as Yog Raj Goswami.
6. Ahmedi Begum died in February 1980, pending appeal. One M.S. Khan claimed that Ahmedi Begum had created a wakf and he was the Mutawalli.
7. The Delhi Wakf Board further instituted a suit for declaration that M.A.Khan had nothing to do with the property nor was he a Mutawalli. On the contrary, the property stood vested in the Board as wakf. In the appeals filed by the appellant and Yog Raj Goswami both M.A.Khan as well as the Delhi Wakf Board came to be impleaded as legal representatives of Ahmedi Begum. The Appellate Bench held that there was no lawful surrender in favour of Surinder Kumar Sharma. Nothwithstanding this finding, the appeals came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 31st of July, 1981, on the only ground that under Section 17 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 1958 Act), the appellant had not served notice on the owner Ahmedi Begum. That being so, the protection available under Section 18 of the 1958 Act, making a sub-tenant a statutory tenant was unavailable to him. Questioning the correctness of this judgment the present appeal has been preferred.
8. The only submission of Mr. B.B. Sawhney, learned counsel for the appellant, which in our view merits acceptance, is the rights of the parties are governed by 1952 Act. Under the said Act, Section 25 enables a sub-tenant to become a tenant on determination of the tenancy. It matters very little whether the sub-letting took place before or after the commencement of the 1952 Act. As a matter of fact, the claim of the appellant was only based on this Section. No doubt, pending these proceedings, the 1958 Act came into force but the provisions thereunder, namely, Sections 17 or 18 would not apply. The reason is : no doubt, the 1952 Act has been repealed by Section 57 of the 1958 Act, however, notwithstanding such repeal, the proceedings under the 1952 Act could be continued, as if the 1958 Act had not been enacted. Therefore, the High Court went wrong in holding, consequent to the failure of the appellant to issue notice under Section 17, the benefit of Section 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 would be unavailable. Thus, it is prayed, the appeal may be allowed. Besides, it is somewhat strange the High Court should have impleaded both M.A.Khan as well as the Delhi Wakf Board as legal representatives of the deceased Ahmedi Begum.
9. In opposing these arguments, Mr. M.C. Dhingra, learned counsel for the respondent would take the stand, if on the date of the decree, namely, 31st August, 1959, the 1952 Act stood repealed, it is only the provisions of 1958 Act which should apply.
10. After the commencement of the said Act on 9th February, 1959, the tenant was prohibited to sub-let the premises. However, if there had been written consent of the landlord, they would become lawful sub-tenants. In view of Section 17 of the said Act a notice ought to have been served on the landlord regarding the creation of sub-tenancy. Only by reason of such notice the benefit of Section 18(1) of the said Act could be claimed. In the absence of notice the High Court is right in its conclusion.
11. It has already been seen that the decree for ejectment was passed on 31st August, 1959 by valid proceedings taken under the 1952 Act. No doubt, that Act stood repealed on 9.2.1959, when 1958 Act came into force. The question, therefore, to be posed is which one of these two Acts is to govern, whether the 1952 Act or 1958 Act? At this stage, we must pay due regard to Section 57 of the 1958 Act. That says:
“57. Repeal and Saving:
(1) The Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (38 of 1952) in so far as it is applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal all suits and other proceedings under the said Act pending at the commencement of this Act before any court or other authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act had not been passed.
Provided that in any suit or proceeding for the fixation of standard rent or for the eviction of a tenant from any premises to which section 54 does not apply the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of this Act.
Provided further that the provisions for appeal under the said Act shall continue in force in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder.”
12. Under sub-section (1) of 57 of the 1958 Act, the 1952 Act was repealed. However, what is material for our purposes is sub section (2) of Section 57 of the 1958 Act, which says: “notwithstanding such repeal all suits and other proceedings under the 1952 Act should be continued as if the 1958 Act had not been enacted.” Obviously, the first proviso has no application to the facts of this case. This is the purpose and indentment of this sub-section. This follows the pattern as envisaged by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
13. What is the effect of repeal? When a repeal is accompanied by a fresh legislation on the same subject the provisions of the new Act will have to be looked into to determine whether and how far the new Act projects or keeps alive the old rights and liabilities. The proper enquiry is as laid down by this Court in P State of Punjab v Mohar Singh Pratap Singh AIR 1955 SC 84. At page 88 it is stated thus:
“Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention.
The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case.”
14. Under identical circumstances the scope of Section 57 of 1958 Act came to be considered by this Court in Karam Singh Sobti v. Sri Pratap Chand AIR 1964 SC 1305. At pages 1309-10 it was held thus:
” Let us now consider S.57 of the Control Act of 1958 against the background of the scheme of the two Control Acts, as staged above. The first sub-section of S.57 repeals the Control Act of 1952 in so far as it is applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi. If the repeal stood by itself the provisions of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) would have applied with regard to the effect of the repeal and the repeal would not affect the previous operation of any enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. The provisions of the General Clauses Act will not, however, apply where a different intention appears from the repealing enactment. Such an intention is clear from sub-s. (2) of S. 57 which contains the saving clause. It states in express terms that notwithstanding the repeal of the Control Act of 1952, all suits and proceedings under the Control Act of 1952 pending before any court or other authority at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958, shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, as if the Control Act of 1952, had continued in force and the Control Act of 1958 had not been passed. Nothing can be more emphatic in the matter of a saving clause than what is contained in sub-s. (2) of S.57. We had said earlier that had sub-s. (2) of S. 57 stood by itself without the provisos, then the incontestable position would have been that the present case would be governed by the provisions of the Control Act of 1952. The question before us is, does the first proviso to sub-s. (2) make a change in the position and if so, to what extent? The first proviso states inter alia that in the matter of eviction of a tenant from any premises to which S. 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958. Section 54 need not be considered by us as it merely saves operation of certain enactments which do not apply to the premises under our consideration. What is the meaning of the expression “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” (meaning the Control Act of 1958)? Does it mean that the proviso takes away what is given by sub-s. (2), except in the matter of jurisdiction of the civil court to deal with an eviction matter which was pending before the Control Act of 1958 came into force? We are unable to agree that such is the meaning of the first proviso. We think that the first proviso must be read harmonioulsy with the substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and the only way of harmonising the two is to accept the view which the Punjab High Court has accepted, namely, that the words “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” merely mean that “where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, these modifications and clarifications should be applied”. We see no other way of harmonising sub-s. (2) with the first proviso thereto.
15. On this line of reasoning the following conclusion was reached in the above extracted case, at page 1311:
“For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), Sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to S. 13(1) of the Control Act of 1952 and the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 does not stand in his way. He is, therefore, entitled to succeed, as the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by the landlord to the sub letting in question. Therefore, the High Court rightly allowed the petition in revision and restored the decree for possession made by the trial court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.”
B16. In view of the factual finding rendered by the High Court that the appellant is a lawful sub-tenant he would be entitled to the protection of Section 20 of the 1952 Act. In such a case, Section 17, consequently, Section 18 of the 1958 Act will have no application whatsoever. The result is the appellant being a lawful sub-tenant had become a statutory tenant. Once this conclusion is reached the judgment of the High Court cannot be supported. It is accordingly set aside. The appeal will stand allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
1. The facts leading to the civil appeal are as under:
One Ahmedi Begum was the owner of ‘Dharampur Lodge’ situated near Clock Tower, Sabzi Mandi, Delhi. She leased out the entire property to the S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar. The lease was for a period of 5 years evidenced by registered lease deed dated 12th April, 1948. On expiry of the said lease another lease dated 3rd April, 1953 was executed for a further period of 5 years which was also duly registered.
2. Both these lease deeds empowered the lessee S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar to sub-let the whole or a part of the demise property. S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar sub-let various portions of the property to several sub-tenants. One such sub-letting was in favour of the appellant, Manphul Singh Sharma in April, 1943 and another portion to Yog Raj Goswami in August 1956.
3. On 1st of September, 1956 tenant S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar by a registered lease deed sub-let the entirety of the property in favour of Surinder Kumar Sharma. That, in turn, authorised Surinder Kumar Sharma to sub-let. Thereafter S.Sardul Singh Cavesshar called upon all the sub-tenants to attorn in favour of Surinder Kumar Sharma. The appellant and Yog Raj Goswami started paying rents to Surinder Kumar Sharma.
4. Consequent to the failure of the head tenant S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar to pay the rent, in spite of the notice of payment by the landlady on 23rd of July, 1957, the tenancy in his favour came to be terminated. Ahmedi Begum filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment, after obtaining the necessary permission under the Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act of 1926. That suit ended in a decree in favour of Ahmedi Begum. Those execution proceedings stood transferred to High Court. Surinder Kumar Sharma, the sub-tenant, filed objections to the effect that he was a lawful sub-tenant and became a direct tenant under the decree holder by virtue of Section 20 of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 1952 Act). His claim was negatived both by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court.
5. The appellant and Yog Raj Goswami filed similar objections that the sub-letting in their favour was with the consent of the landlady and Section 20 of the 1952 Act would ensure to their benefit. The objection was overruled by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. He reasoned that the appellant had attorned to Surinder Kumar Sharma under written direction of S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar. This would tantamount to surrender of tenancy under S.Sardul Singh Caveeshar and creation of tenancy in favour of Surinder Kumar Sharma. Therefore, he was not a lawful sub tenant. Similar objection of Yog Raj Goswami was also dismissed. Aggrieved by this, appeals were preferred in EFA(OS) 7 of 1971 and 9 of 1972 by the appellant as well as Yog Raj Goswami.
6. Ahmedi Begum died in February 1980, pending appeal. One M.S. Khan claimed that Ahmedi Begum had created a wakf and he was the Mutawalli.
7. The Delhi Wakf Board further instituted a suit for declaration that M.A.Khan had nothing to do with the property nor was he a Mutawalli. On the contrary, the property stood vested in the Board as wakf. In the appeals filed by the appellant and Yog Raj Goswami both M.A.Khan as well as the Delhi Wakf Board came to be impleaded as legal representatives of Ahmedi Begum. The Appellate Bench held that there was no lawful surrender in favour of Surinder Kumar Sharma. Nothwithstanding this finding, the appeals came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 31st of July, 1981, on the only ground that under Section 17 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 1958 Act), the appellant had not served notice on the owner Ahmedi Begum. That being so, the protection available under Section 18 of the 1958 Act, making a sub-tenant a statutory tenant was unavailable to him. Questioning the correctness of this judgment the present appeal has been preferred.
8. The only submission of Mr. B.B. Sawhney, learned counsel for the appellant, which in our view merits acceptance, is the rights of the parties are governed by 1952 Act. Under the said Act, Section 25 enables a sub-tenant to become a tenant on determination of the tenancy. It matters very little whether the sub-letting took place before or after the commencement of the 1952 Act. As a matter of fact, the claim of the appellant was only based on this Section. No doubt, pending these proceedings, the 1958 Act came into force but the provisions thereunder, namely, Sections 17 or 18 would not apply. The reason is : no doubt, the 1952 Act has been repealed by Section 57 of the 1958 Act, however, notwithstanding such repeal, the proceedings under the 1952 Act could be continued, as if the 1958 Act had not been enacted. Therefore, the High Court went wrong in holding, consequent to the failure of the appellant to issue notice under Section 17, the benefit of Section 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 would be unavailable. Thus, it is prayed, the appeal may be allowed. Besides, it is somewhat strange the High Court should have impleaded both M.A.Khan as well as the Delhi Wakf Board as legal representatives of the deceased Ahmedi Begum.
9. In opposing these arguments, Mr. M.C. Dhingra, learned counsel for the respondent would take the stand, if on the date of the decree, namely, 31st August, 1959, the 1952 Act stood repealed, it is only the provisions of 1958 Act which should apply.
10. After the commencement of the said Act on 9th February, 1959, the tenant was prohibited to sub-let the premises. However, if there had been written consent of the landlord, they would become lawful sub-tenants. In view of Section 17 of the said Act a notice ought to have been served on the landlord regarding the creation of sub-tenancy. Only by reason of such notice the benefit of Section 18(1) of the said Act could be claimed. In the absence of notice the High Court is right in its conclusion.
11. It has already been seen that the decree for ejectment was passed on 31st August, 1959 by valid proceedings taken under the 1952 Act. No doubt, that Act stood repealed on 9.2.1959, when 1958 Act came into force. The question, therefore, to be posed is which one of these two Acts is to govern, whether the 1952 Act or 1958 Act? At this stage, we must pay due regard to Section 57 of the 1958 Act. That says:
“57. Repeal and Saving:
(1) The Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (38 of 1952) in so far as it is applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal all suits and other proceedings under the said Act pending at the commencement of this Act before any court or other authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act had not been passed.
Provided that in any suit or proceeding for the fixation of standard rent or for the eviction of a tenant from any premises to which section 54 does not apply the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of this Act.
Provided further that the provisions for appeal under the said Act shall continue in force in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder.”
12. Under sub-section (1) of 57 of the 1958 Act, the 1952 Act was repealed. However, what is material for our purposes is sub section (2) of Section 57 of the 1958 Act, which says: “notwithstanding such repeal all suits and other proceedings under the 1952 Act should be continued as if the 1958 Act had not been enacted.” Obviously, the first proviso has no application to the facts of this case. This is the purpose and indentment of this sub-section. This follows the pattern as envisaged by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
13. What is the effect of repeal? When a repeal is accompanied by a fresh legislation on the same subject the provisions of the new Act will have to be looked into to determine whether and how far the new Act projects or keeps alive the old rights and liabilities. The proper enquiry is as laid down by this Court in P State of Punjab v Mohar Singh Pratap Singh AIR 1955 SC 84. At page 88 it is stated thus:
“Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention.
The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case.”
14. Under identical circumstances the scope of Section 57 of 1958 Act came to be considered by this Court in Karam Singh Sobti v. Sri Pratap Chand AIR 1964 SC 1305. At pages 1309-10 it was held thus:
” Let us now consider S.57 of the Control Act of 1958 against the background of the scheme of the two Control Acts, as staged above. The first sub-section of S.57 repeals the Control Act of 1952 in so far as it is applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi. If the repeal stood by itself the provisions of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) would have applied with regard to the effect of the repeal and the repeal would not affect the previous operation of any enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. The provisions of the General Clauses Act will not, however, apply where a different intention appears from the repealing enactment. Such an intention is clear from sub-s. (2) of S. 57 which contains the saving clause. It states in express terms that notwithstanding the repeal of the Control Act of 1952, all suits and proceedings under the Control Act of 1952 pending before any court or other authority at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958, shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, as if the Control Act of 1952, had continued in force and the Control Act of 1958 had not been passed. Nothing can be more emphatic in the matter of a saving clause than what is contained in sub-s. (2) of S.57. We had said earlier that had sub-s. (2) of S. 57 stood by itself without the provisos, then the incontestable position would have been that the present case would be governed by the provisions of the Control Act of 1952. The question before us is, does the first proviso to sub-s. (2) make a change in the position and if so, to what extent? The first proviso states inter alia that in the matter of eviction of a tenant from any premises to which S. 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958. Section 54 need not be considered by us as it merely saves operation of certain enactments which do not apply to the premises under our consideration. What is the meaning of the expression “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” (meaning the Control Act of 1958)? Does it mean that the proviso takes away what is given by sub-s. (2), except in the matter of jurisdiction of the civil court to deal with an eviction matter which was pending before the Control Act of 1958 came into force? We are unable to agree that such is the meaning of the first proviso. We think that the first proviso must be read harmonioulsy with the substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and the only way of harmonising the two is to accept the view which the Punjab High Court has accepted, namely, that the words “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” merely mean that “where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, these modifications and clarifications should be applied”. We see no other way of harmonising sub-s. (2) with the first proviso thereto.
15. On this line of reasoning the following conclusion was reached in the above extracted case, at page 1311:
“For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), Sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to S. 13(1) of the Control Act of 1952 and the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 does not stand in his way. He is, therefore, entitled to succeed, as the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by the landlord to the sub letting in question. Therefore, the High Court rightly allowed the petition in revision and restored the decree for possession made by the trial court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.”
B16. In view of the factual finding rendered by the High Court that the appellant is a lawful sub-tenant he would be entitled to the protection of Section 20 of the 1952 Act. In such a case, Section 17, consequently, Section 18 of the 1958 Act will have no application whatsoever. The result is the appellant being a lawful sub-tenant had become a statutory tenant. Once this conclusion is reached the judgment of the High Court cannot be supported. It is accordingly set aside. The appeal will stand allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
