Laxman Vs. State of Haryana
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Sections 34, 302, 304, 325, 323 – Common intention – Deceased and accused party introduced for first time in marriage – Deceased returning in evening when accused ‘R’, ‘S’ and ‘L’ coming from back and abusing deceased and his companions for misbehaviour at the marriage – Accused R thrusting broken bottle in neck of deceased – Accused ‘L’ inflicting iron rod blow on companion of deceased below eye and on right hand of another companion. Held that accused ‘L’ cannot be stated to have shored common intention of causing death of deceased. He is guilty of his individual act of causing grievous and simple injuries. (Paras 2, 5)
1. The appellant along with Ram Parshad and Sarup Chand was tried for the offences punishable under sections 302, 325 and 323 read with section 34 of the I.P.C. by the additional sessions judge, Gurgaon. Accused Sarup Chand was given the benefit of doubt and the appellant along with Ram Parshad was convicted for the commission of offence punishable under sections 302, 325 and 323 read with section 34 of the IPC. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment for the main offence. In appeal, the conviction of the appellant and Ram Parshad under section 302 was altered holding them guilty for the offence punishable under section 304 part-I besides offences under sections 325, 323 read with section 34 IPC. The appellant and Ram Parshad were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for the main offence. Their conviction and sentence for offences under sections 325 and 323 read with 34 IPC, as awarded by the sessions court, was upheld. S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2082/1992 filed by Ram Parshad was dismissed by this Court on 21st September, 1992.
2. The facts of the case, as noticed by the trial court, are that on 10th February, 1989, Umesh, complainant along with his brother Naresh, deceased, Ram Bhagat and Ram Phal had come to village Jacubpura, Gurgaon in the marriage party of Bhim Singh’s son. At the time of marriage ceremony of Bhim Singh’s son, the deceased party and the accused party were introduced for the first time. At about 5.45 p.m., when the deceased was returning home and had reached in front of Dharamshala, Ram Parshad with a broken bottle in his hand, appellant with an iron rod and Sarup Chand came suddenly from back side and started abusing the deceased, his brother and Ram Bhagat accused them of having created nuisance at the marriage party by resorting to eve-teasing. Ram Parshad-accused thrust the broken bottle on the neck of Naresh Kumar. Appellant inflicted blow with iron rod below left eye of Umesh Kumar and another iron rod blow on the right hand of Ram Bhagat. Sarup Chand is alleged to have given blow with iron pipe to Ram Bhagat. On hearing noise of the victims, many people came on the spot and thereupon the accused fled away.
3. The High Court, on appreciation of evidence, came to the conclusion that there was no enmity between the parties and the occurrence had suddenly taken place without any provocation. The appellant and the Ram Parshad were held entitled to the benefit of exception 4 to section 300 of IPC and accordingly convicted under section 304 part-I and sentenced as noted above.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has not disputed the occurrence or infliction of injuries on the person of the deceased and other witnesses. The only argument addressed on behalf of the appellant is that the prosecution did not prove the existence of common intention. Such intention could not be gathered even from the circumstances of the case. It is submitted that as only one injury is shown to have been caused to the deceased in heat of passion and on sudden provocation, the appellant could not be held to be sharing any intention with the co-accused to cause such an injury.
5. After perusing the statements of PW-5 and PW-6, we find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant and are of the opinion that prosecution failed to prove the existence of common intention between the accused Ram Parshad and the appellant without which the appellant could not be convicted for the main offence punishable under section 304 part-I. He is, however, liable to be convicted for his individual acts which are punishable under sections 325 and 323 of the IPC.
6. Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 304 part-I read with section 34 of the IPC. His conviction under sections 325, 323 is, however, upheld. It is stated on the bar that the appellant has already undergone the aforesaid sentence. As the appellant is already on bail, his bail bonds shall stand discharged.