Krishan Singh Rana Vs. Haryana State Industrial Development
EmailAppeal: (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7610 of 2000)
Petitioner: Krishan Singh Rana
Respondent: Haryana State Industrial Development
Apeal: (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7610 of 2000)
Judges: A.P. MISRA & DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Sep 10, 2000
Head Note:
RENT CONTROL AND EVICTION
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951
Section 29 – Pendency of suit for permanent injunction filed by appellant-tenant – Refusal – Whether Court right in refusing injunction when proceeding pending under Section 29 of the said Act – Whether pendency of suit restricts its right to sell property. Held, no merit in submission of respondent. Appeal allowed and orders of High Court set aside.
Cases Reffered:
1. U.P. Financial Corporation v. GEM Capo (India) Pvt.Ltd. & Ors. (JT 1993 (2) SC 226) (Para 3)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
3. The appellant’s case is, he is a tenant and has been paying rent to the landlord. He has filed the suit for permanent injunc-tion against respondent which is still pending in the trial court. The short point for consideration is, whether in view of proceedings under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, whether the court was right to refuse the injunction to the appellant not to evict in a pending suit. The grievance of the appellant-tenant is, though the suit is still pending, their refusal consequentially confers right on the respondent to evict the appellant, which the respondent has no jurisdiction while exercising powers under Section 29. The only right claimed by the respondent is under Section 29 of the said Act. The respondent’s case is, under this Section he has power to recover dues includ-ing by selling the property but in view of this proceedings, it is not able to sell this property. Learned Counsel for respondent relies on U.P. Financial Corporation v. GEM Capo (India) Pvt.Ltd. & Ors. (JT 1993 (2) SC 226 = 1993 (2) SCC 299), wherein this Court held that in proceedings under Section 29, the court should not interfere. This decision has no relevance or applicability to the controversy raised in the present case.
4. In the present case question is, respondent while proceeding under Section 29, could it dispossess a tenant. The field of Section 29 is between Corporation and the owner. Respondent-Corporation can do all that is permissible to it under Section 29 as against owner, but as against tenant or person claiming such right, could only be evicted in accordance with law by the owner now or owner who may subsequently come in. But under Section 29, respondent cannot evict the appellant.
5. The submission for the respondent that the pendency of this suit is coming in its way to sell this property, is misconceived. We do not find anything either in law or fact, which has been pointed out by the respondent which restricts its right under Section 29 to sell the property. We do not find any merit in this submission.
6. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders passed by the High Court as well as by the two courts below. However, any observation made by us is without prejudice to the rights of the parties in the suit which is pending before the trial court.
7. In view of what we have held, this appeal is allowed. Costs on the parties.
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
3. The appellant’s case is, he is a tenant and has been paying rent to the landlord. He has filed the suit for permanent injunc-tion against respondent which is still pending in the trial court. The short point for consideration is, whether in view of proceedings under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, whether the court was right to refuse the injunction to the appellant not to evict in a pending suit. The grievance of the appellant-tenant is, though the suit is still pending, their refusal consequentially confers right on the respondent to evict the appellant, which the respondent has no jurisdiction while exercising powers under Section 29. The only right claimed by the respondent is under Section 29 of the said Act. The respondent’s case is, under this Section he has power to recover dues includ-ing by selling the property but in view of this proceedings, it is not able to sell this property. Learned Counsel for respondent relies on U.P. Financial Corporation v. GEM Capo (India) Pvt.Ltd. & Ors. (JT 1993 (2) SC 226 = 1993 (2) SCC 299), wherein this Court held that in proceedings under Section 29, the court should not interfere. This decision has no relevance or applicability to the controversy raised in the present case.
4. In the present case question is, respondent while proceeding under Section 29, could it dispossess a tenant. The field of Section 29 is between Corporation and the owner. Respondent-Corporation can do all that is permissible to it under Section 29 as against owner, but as against tenant or person claiming such right, could only be evicted in accordance with law by the owner now or owner who may subsequently come in. But under Section 29, respondent cannot evict the appellant.
5. The submission for the respondent that the pendency of this suit is coming in its way to sell this property, is misconceived. We do not find anything either in law or fact, which has been pointed out by the respondent which restricts its right under Section 29 to sell the property. We do not find any merit in this submission.
6. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders passed by the High Court as well as by the two courts below. However, any observation made by us is without prejudice to the rights of the parties in the suit which is pending before the trial court.
7. In view of what we have held, this appeal is allowed. Costs on the parties.
