IV. Sudhanwa Sadashiv Talwadekar (A-113) Vs. State of Maharashtra
EmailAppeal:
Petitioner: IV. Sudhanwa Sadashiv Talwadekar (A-113)
Respondent: State of Maharashtra
Apeal:
Judges: P. Sathasivam & Dr. B.S. Chauhan, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Mar 21, 2013
Head Note:
Section 3(3) – Bombay Blast case – A-113, officer of Custom Department, facilitating smuggling of arms, ammunition and explosives by Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon (AA) and their associates – Had knowledge that smuggling was done for terrorist attacks – Took illegal gratification for it – Sentenced to 8 years RI under Section 3(3) alongwith fine of Rs. 2 lacs – Case akin to that of A82. Held, conviction under Section 3(3) justified. A113 not found guilty of larger conspiracy.
JUDGEMENT:
462. He has been charged, in addition to the first charge, for knowingly facilitating the smuggling of arms, ammunition and explosives by Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon (AA) and their associates, for the purpose of committing terrorist activities by way of their non-interference in lieu of payment of illegal gratification made to them, despite the fact that he was in possession of specific information and had knowledge of the fact that arms, ammunition and explosives were likely to be smuggled into the country for facilitating terrorist activities. He has been convicted under Section 3(3) TADA and was awarded the punishment of imprisonment for 8 years RI, alongwith a fine of Rs. 2 lakhs, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo RI for 3 years.
463. The learned Special Judge after appreciating the entire evidence on record came to the conclusion that:
Thus considering material in the confession of A- 113 and aforesaid co-accused the same leads to the conclusion of A -113 also being involved in Shekadi landing operation as denoted by said material and as such having committed offence u/s. 3(3) of TADA for which he is charged at head 2nd ly clause b. Since case of A-113 is more so over akin regarding his liability to Shekhadi landing with that of A-82 as both of them were at Shekhadi coast instead of again repeating said discussion it can be safely said that for same reason of which A-82 has been found guilty for commission of offence under Section 3(3) of TADA Act A-113 will be required to be held guilty. Needless to add that for same reason as stated in said discussion evidence pertaining to receipt of bribe amount and/or recovery of same during course of investigation and as tabulated about is not threadbare discussed. Thus on basis of all material surfaced at trial A-113 will be required to be held guilty for commission of offence under section 3(3) of TADA Act. Needless to add that similarly as that of A-82 or even A-102 he can not be held guilty for offence of conspiracy for which he is charged with.
(Emphasis added)
464. This accused (A-113) has already served 6 years and has deposited the fine. Being at par with the other co-accused, in this present appeal, no further interference is required.
465. We are fully aware of our limitation to interfere with an order against acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Courts acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide: State of Rajasthan v. Darshan Singh @ Darshan Lal, [JT 2012 (5) SC 229].
465.1 In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the order of the Designated Court so far as the acquittal of the respondents on a particular charge is concerned. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
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463. The learned Special Judge after appreciating the entire evidence on record came to the conclusion that:
Thus considering material in the confession of A- 113 and aforesaid co-accused the same leads to the conclusion of A -113 also being involved in Shekadi landing operation as denoted by said material and as such having committed offence u/s. 3(3) of TADA for which he is charged at head 2nd ly clause b. Since case of A-113 is more so over akin regarding his liability to Shekhadi landing with that of A-82 as both of them were at Shekhadi coast instead of again repeating said discussion it can be safely said that for same reason of which A-82 has been found guilty for commission of offence under Section 3(3) of TADA Act A-113 will be required to be held guilty. Needless to add that for same reason as stated in said discussion evidence pertaining to receipt of bribe amount and/or recovery of same during course of investigation and as tabulated about is not threadbare discussed. Thus on basis of all material surfaced at trial A-113 will be required to be held guilty for commission of offence under section 3(3) of TADA Act. Needless to add that similarly as that of A-82 or even A-102 he can not be held guilty for offence of conspiracy for which he is charged with.
(Emphasis added)
464. This accused (A-113) has already served 6 years and has deposited the fine. Being at par with the other co-accused, in this present appeal, no further interference is required.
465. We are fully aware of our limitation to interfere with an order against acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Courts acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide: State of Rajasthan v. Darshan Singh @ Darshan Lal, [JT 2012 (5) SC 229].
465.1 In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the order of the Designated Court so far as the acquittal of the respondents on a particular charge is concerned. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
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