Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. Vs. The Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat & Anr.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 698 of 1980
Petitioner: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.
Respondent: The Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat & Anr.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 698 of 1980
Judges: K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY & R.M.SAHAI,JJ.
Date of Judgment: Apr 06, 1990
Appearances:
1. Mr. M.M.Abdul Khader, Senior Advocate, Mr.Darshan Singh and Mr. Parveen Kumar Advocates with him for the Appellant.
Head Note:
THE KERALA PRIVATE FOREST (VESTING AND ASSIGNMENT) ACT, 1971
Section 2(f)(1) – ‘private forest’ – Eucalyptus plantation – Whether the Vesting Act excludes the same – Held no – Only fruit bearing trees and not other species are excluded – Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 (as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, section 2(47).
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Definitions – Words defined in one statute does not afford a guide to construction of the same words in another statute. (Para 9)
Held:
It is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen attentatively to what the legislature does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with those of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3 sub-section (1), private forests vest in Government. Sub-clause (2) however, excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits applicable to an owner if they are under his personal cultivation. Cultivation for this purpose “includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species”. The explanation to sub-section (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of tree, fruit-bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2) the trees of every variety. But while providing for exclusion under sub clause (C), the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered only fruit bearing trees and not of other species. If the intention was otherwise, the sub-clause (C) would have been in a different language. In our view as a matter of pure construction untrammelled by authority, the words used in the latter part of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees. (Paras 13 and 14)
Cases Reffered:
1. State of Kerala v. K.C. Moosa Haji & Ors. AIR 1984 Kerala 149 – Approved
2. State of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd. AIR 1981 Kerala 1 – Approved.
3. State of Kerala v. Anglo American D.T.T. Co. 1980 Ker.L.T.215.
4. State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1974 (1) SCR 671.
5. Malankara Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of Kerala & Ors. 1973 (1) SCR 399.
6. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, 1958 SCR 101.
2. State of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd. AIR 1981 Kerala 1 – Approved.
3. State of Kerala v. Anglo American D.T.T. Co. 1980 Ker.L.T.215.
4. State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1974 (1) SCR 671.
5. Malankara Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of Kerala & Ors. 1973 (1) SCR 399.
6. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, 1958 SCR 101.
JUDGEMENT:
K.JAGANNATHA SHETTY,J.:
1. This appeal by leave from a Full judgment of the Kerala High Court raises a short question of construction of the plain words of a term ‘private forest’ as defined in a statutory enactment called “The Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and assignment) Act, 1971 (called shortly “The Vesting Act”). The High Court has decided the question in favour of the State and against the appellant. The judgment of the High Court has since been reported in AIR 1980 Kerala 137. The view expressed by the High Court has been subsequently affirmed by another Full Bench in State of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd. (AIR 1984 Kerala 149).
2. Losing the construction argument, the appellant has appealed to this Court.
3. The facts of the case are immaterial for the purpose of this judgment, save to state in the barest outline that the appellant is the Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh. One of its industrial undertakings is located in Bilakootam, Mavoor in Kozhikode District, Kerala State. This establishment produces rayon Grade Pulp, using Bamboo Eucalyptus and other species of wood as basic raw material. It has a large eucalyptus plantation covering thousands of acres, maintained as captive raw material for use in the factory. The State says that as a consequence of the Vesting Act the eucalyptus plantation being a private forest and not excluded therefrom is vested in the State with no right, title and interest subsisting with the company. The claim of the company, however, is that the term ‘private forest’ as defined under the Vesting Act, excludes the eucalyptus plantation.
4. Private forest’ has been defined in the Vesting Act as well as under the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1964) as amended by Amendment Act 35 of 1969 (“The KLR Act”) Since counsel for the appellant largely depends upon the judicial construction of the definition of ‘private forest’ in the KLR Act, it is necessary that we should set out hereunder both the definitions placed alongside with each other:
THE KERALA PRIVATE FORESTS THE KERALA LAND REFORMS ACT(ACT 1
(VESTING AND ASSIGNMENT) ACT, 1971 OF 1964) AS AMENDED BY THE
KERALA LAND REFORMS (AMENDMENT) ACT
(ACT 26 OF 1971) 35/1969)
(AS AMENDED BY ACT 5 OF 1978) 2. Definitions:- In this Act
unless the context otherwise
2. Definitions:- In this Act requires – unless the context otherwise requires – (47) ‘Private forests’ means a
forest which is not owned by the
(f) ‘private forest’ means Government, but does not include –
(1) In relation to the Malabar (i) areas which are waste and district referred to in sub- are not enclaves within wooded section (2) of Section 5 of the areas; States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Central (ii) areas which are gardens orAct 37 of 1956) nilams;
(i) any land to which the Madras (iii) areas which are planted withPreservation of Forests Act, 1949 tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber,(Madras Act XXVIII of 1949) applied cardamom;and immediately before the appointed day excluding – (iv) other areas which are
cultivated with pepper, are-canut
(A) Land which are gardens or coconut, cashew or other friut-nilams as defined in the trees or bearing are cultivated with anyKerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of other agricultural crop;..” 1964)
(B) Land which are used principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom, or cinnamon and lands used for any purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market.
Explanation – Lands used for the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories, quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and playgrounds shall be deemed to be lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops;
(C) lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees or are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop;
(D) sites of buildings and lands appurtenant to and necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of, such buildings;
(ii) any forest not owned by the Government, to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 did not apply, including waste lands which are enclaves within wooded areas.
(2) in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala, any forest not owned by the Government, including waste lands which are enclaves with wooded areas.
Explanation: For the purposes of the clause, a land shall be deemed to be a waste land notwithstanding the existence thereon of scattered trees or shrubs,”
5. We may first examine the scope of the definition of ‘private forest’ under Section 2(47) of the KLR Act. It means a forest which is not owned by the Government, excluding thereby four kinds of areas specified under sub-clause (i) to (iv). The latter part of sub-clause (iv) contains the words “….other areas cultivated with any other agricultural crop”. The terms ‘agriculture’ and ‘agricultural crop’ have wider as well as narrower connotation. The wider concept covers both the primary or basic as well as the subsequent operations. It takes within its fold among other things, the products of the land which have some utility either for consumption or for trade and commerce including forest products such as timber, sal and piyasal trees, casuarina plantations, tendu leaves, horranuts etc. (See: Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy (1958 SCR 101 at 156). Of course, there must be present all throughout the basic idea that there must be cultivation of land in the sense of tilling of the lands, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar work done in the land. The forest growth or spontaneous growth of any product, plants or trees, however, would be outside the characteristic of agricultural products or operations.
6. In Malankara Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1973 (1) SCR 399), this Court while examining the scheme of KLR Act with particular reference to Chapter III therein observed that ‘lands under eucalyptus or teak which are the result of agricultural operations normally would be agricultural lands, but not lands which are covered by eucalyptus or teak growing spontaneously as in a jungle or a forest.’ This is the wider concept of agricultural crop, perhaps attributed to the letter part of sub-clause (iv) of the definition under Section 2(47) of the KLR Act.
7. The latter part of sub-clause (iv) of Section 2 (47) of the KLR Act, counsel for the appellant contended, is practically the same as the second limb of sub-clause (C) of Section 2(f)(1)(i) of the Vesting Act. It was claimed that since eucalyptus plantation is covered by the expression ‘any other agricultural crop’ in Section 2(47) sub-clause (v) of the KLR Act, section 2(f)(1)(i) sub-clause (C) of the Vesting Act constitute a Code of agrarian reform and they are cognate legislations with the Vesting Act as supplementary to the KLR Act. The expression ‘any other agricultural crop’ used in both the enactments while defining ‘private forest’ must therefore, receive the same meaning as otherwise, it would lead to anomalies. This is the line of argument for the appellant.
8. This whole line of argument with respect, is hard to accept. As Felix Frankfurter, J.said: “Legislation is a form of literary composition. But construction is not an abstract process equally valid for every composition, not even for every composition whose meaning must be judicially ascertained. The nature of the composition demands awareness of certain presuppositions…..And so, the significance of an enactment, its antecedents as well as its later history, its relation to other anactments, all may be relevant to the construction of words for one purpose and in one setting but not for another. Some words are confined to their history; some are starting points for history. Words are intellectual and moral currency. They come from the legislative mint with some intrinsic meaning. Sometimes it remains unchanged. LIke currency, words sometimes appreciate or depreciate in value”. The learned Judge further stated: “Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what the Judge must seek and effectuate.” (See: Courts, Judges and Politics by Walter F. Muphy; ‘Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes’ by Felix Frankfurter).
9. Judicial interpretation given to the words defined in one statute does not afford a guide to construction of the same words in another statute unless the Statutes are pari materia legislations. In the present case, the aim and object of the two legislations are not similar in the fist place. Secondly, the definition of ‘private forest’ in the KLR Act is not just the same as the definition of ‘private forest’ in the Vesting Act was to provide for the Vesting in the Government of private forest in the State of Kerala for the assignment thereof to the agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation. The preamble of the Act provides that such agricultural lands should be so utilised as to increase the agricultural production in the State and to promote the welfare of the agricultural population in the State. Two separate definitions have been provided in the Vesting Act; the first is applicable to the Malabar district where the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 (‘The MPPF Act’) applied immediately before the appointed day; the second concerned is in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala. The definition of ‘private forest’ as is applicable to the Malabar district is not general in terms but limited to the areas and lands to which the MPPF Act applied and exempts therefrom lands described under sub-clauses (A) to (D). This significant reference to MPPF Act in the definition of ‘private forest’ in the Vesting Act makes all the difference in the case. The MPPF Act was a special enactment. It was enacted by the erstwhile Madras State to preserve the private forests in the district of Malabar and erstwhile South Kannara District. The Scheme of that Act has been explained by several decisions of the Kerala High Court and that scheme appears to be that if the land is shown to be private forest on the date on which the MPPF Act came into force, it would continue to be a forest, even if there was subsequent replantation. (See: State of Kerala v. Anglo American D.T.T. Co. (1980 Ker. L.T. 215) and State of Kerala v. K.C. Moosa Haji (supra) (FB) AIR 1984 Ker. 149 at 154-55).
10. It is not in dispute that the lands involved in this appeal were all forests as defined in the MPPF Act, 1949 and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force in 1971. In malankara case (supra), this Court was not concerned with the lands covered by the MPPF Act, and denuded thereafter of forest growth and cultivated with fresh replantation. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to transplant the meaning according to ‘private forest’ from the KLR Act to the Vesting Act. That wide concept cannot fit into the new legal source.
12. In State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. (1974 (1) SCR 671), this Court while upholding the constitutional validity of the Vesting Act has observed that the Forest Lands in the State of Kerala has attained a peculiar character owing to the geography and climate and the evidence available showed that the vast areas of these forests are still capable of supporting a large agricultural plantations. That much is clear from the following observations (at 683):
“It is therefore, manifest that when the legislature stated in the preamble that the private forests are agricultural lands, they merely wanted to convey that they are lands which by and large could by prudently and profitably exploited for agricultural purposes.”
12. There is thus a judicial recognition of the distinction between private forest in Travancore-Cochin area in Kerala State and the private forest in Malabar district. This distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the anomalies suggested by counsel for the appellant.
13. Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act. ‘Garden’ means lands used principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same. ‘Nilam’ means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultivation of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C). It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to only the fruit bearing trees. It next refers to ‘lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term ‘agricultural crop’ in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit-bearing or otherwise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It may be significant to note that the Legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have “associations, echoes and overtones”. While construing such words, judges must, as Felix Frankfurter, J., said “retain the associations, hear the echoes and capture the overtones” (Supra p. 414). When so examined and construed, we do not discover any indication that the words in sub-clause (C) “any other agricultural crop” are quite wide enough to comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptus plantations.
14. It is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen attentively to what the legislature does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with those of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3 sub-section (1), private forests vest in Government. Sub-clause(2) however, excludes from such vesting lands with the ceiling limits applicable to an owner if they are under his personal cultivation. Cultivation for this purpose “includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species”. The explanation to sub-section (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of tree, fruit-bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2) the trees of every variety. But while providing for exclusion under sub-clause (C), the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the intention was otherwise, the sub-clause (C) would have been in a different language.
15. In our view as a matter of pure construction untrammelled by authority, the words used in the latter part of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees.
16. This is also the conclusion of the High Court not only in the impugned judgment under appeal but also in the subsequent two decisions; Malayalam Plantation Limited and K.C. Moosa Haji cases (supra).
17. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
1. This appeal by leave from a Full judgment of the Kerala High Court raises a short question of construction of the plain words of a term ‘private forest’ as defined in a statutory enactment called “The Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and assignment) Act, 1971 (called shortly “The Vesting Act”). The High Court has decided the question in favour of the State and against the appellant. The judgment of the High Court has since been reported in AIR 1980 Kerala 137. The view expressed by the High Court has been subsequently affirmed by another Full Bench in State of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd. (AIR 1984 Kerala 149).
2. Losing the construction argument, the appellant has appealed to this Court.
3. The facts of the case are immaterial for the purpose of this judgment, save to state in the barest outline that the appellant is the Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh. One of its industrial undertakings is located in Bilakootam, Mavoor in Kozhikode District, Kerala State. This establishment produces rayon Grade Pulp, using Bamboo Eucalyptus and other species of wood as basic raw material. It has a large eucalyptus plantation covering thousands of acres, maintained as captive raw material for use in the factory. The State says that as a consequence of the Vesting Act the eucalyptus plantation being a private forest and not excluded therefrom is vested in the State with no right, title and interest subsisting with the company. The claim of the company, however, is that the term ‘private forest’ as defined under the Vesting Act, excludes the eucalyptus plantation.
4. Private forest’ has been defined in the Vesting Act as well as under the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1964) as amended by Amendment Act 35 of 1969 (“The KLR Act”) Since counsel for the appellant largely depends upon the judicial construction of the definition of ‘private forest’ in the KLR Act, it is necessary that we should set out hereunder both the definitions placed alongside with each other:
THE KERALA PRIVATE FORESTS THE KERALA LAND REFORMS ACT(ACT 1
(VESTING AND ASSIGNMENT) ACT, 1971 OF 1964) AS AMENDED BY THE
KERALA LAND REFORMS (AMENDMENT) ACT
(ACT 26 OF 1971) 35/1969)
(AS AMENDED BY ACT 5 OF 1978) 2. Definitions:- In this Act
unless the context otherwise
2. Definitions:- In this Act requires – unless the context otherwise requires – (47) ‘Private forests’ means a
forest which is not owned by the
(f) ‘private forest’ means Government, but does not include –
(1) In relation to the Malabar (i) areas which are waste and district referred to in sub- are not enclaves within wooded section (2) of Section 5 of the areas; States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Central (ii) areas which are gardens orAct 37 of 1956) nilams;
(i) any land to which the Madras (iii) areas which are planted withPreservation of Forests Act, 1949 tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber,(Madras Act XXVIII of 1949) applied cardamom;and immediately before the appointed day excluding – (iv) other areas which are
cultivated with pepper, are-canut
(A) Land which are gardens or coconut, cashew or other friut-nilams as defined in the trees or bearing are cultivated with anyKerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of other agricultural crop;..” 1964)
(B) Land which are used principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom, or cinnamon and lands used for any purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market.
Explanation – Lands used for the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories, quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and playgrounds shall be deemed to be lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops;
(C) lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees or are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop;
(D) sites of buildings and lands appurtenant to and necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of, such buildings;
(ii) any forest not owned by the Government, to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 did not apply, including waste lands which are enclaves within wooded areas.
(2) in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala, any forest not owned by the Government, including waste lands which are enclaves with wooded areas.
Explanation: For the purposes of the clause, a land shall be deemed to be a waste land notwithstanding the existence thereon of scattered trees or shrubs,”
5. We may first examine the scope of the definition of ‘private forest’ under Section 2(47) of the KLR Act. It means a forest which is not owned by the Government, excluding thereby four kinds of areas specified under sub-clause (i) to (iv). The latter part of sub-clause (iv) contains the words “….other areas cultivated with any other agricultural crop”. The terms ‘agriculture’ and ‘agricultural crop’ have wider as well as narrower connotation. The wider concept covers both the primary or basic as well as the subsequent operations. It takes within its fold among other things, the products of the land which have some utility either for consumption or for trade and commerce including forest products such as timber, sal and piyasal trees, casuarina plantations, tendu leaves, horranuts etc. (See: Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy (1958 SCR 101 at 156). Of course, there must be present all throughout the basic idea that there must be cultivation of land in the sense of tilling of the lands, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar work done in the land. The forest growth or spontaneous growth of any product, plants or trees, however, would be outside the characteristic of agricultural products or operations.
6. In Malankara Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1973 (1) SCR 399), this Court while examining the scheme of KLR Act with particular reference to Chapter III therein observed that ‘lands under eucalyptus or teak which are the result of agricultural operations normally would be agricultural lands, but not lands which are covered by eucalyptus or teak growing spontaneously as in a jungle or a forest.’ This is the wider concept of agricultural crop, perhaps attributed to the letter part of sub-clause (iv) of the definition under Section 2(47) of the KLR Act.
7. The latter part of sub-clause (iv) of Section 2 (47) of the KLR Act, counsel for the appellant contended, is practically the same as the second limb of sub-clause (C) of Section 2(f)(1)(i) of the Vesting Act. It was claimed that since eucalyptus plantation is covered by the expression ‘any other agricultural crop’ in Section 2(47) sub-clause (v) of the KLR Act, section 2(f)(1)(i) sub-clause (C) of the Vesting Act constitute a Code of agrarian reform and they are cognate legislations with the Vesting Act as supplementary to the KLR Act. The expression ‘any other agricultural crop’ used in both the enactments while defining ‘private forest’ must therefore, receive the same meaning as otherwise, it would lead to anomalies. This is the line of argument for the appellant.
8. This whole line of argument with respect, is hard to accept. As Felix Frankfurter, J.said: “Legislation is a form of literary composition. But construction is not an abstract process equally valid for every composition, not even for every composition whose meaning must be judicially ascertained. The nature of the composition demands awareness of certain presuppositions…..And so, the significance of an enactment, its antecedents as well as its later history, its relation to other anactments, all may be relevant to the construction of words for one purpose and in one setting but not for another. Some words are confined to their history; some are starting points for history. Words are intellectual and moral currency. They come from the legislative mint with some intrinsic meaning. Sometimes it remains unchanged. LIke currency, words sometimes appreciate or depreciate in value”. The learned Judge further stated: “Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what the Judge must seek and effectuate.” (See: Courts, Judges and Politics by Walter F. Muphy; ‘Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes’ by Felix Frankfurter).
9. Judicial interpretation given to the words defined in one statute does not afford a guide to construction of the same words in another statute unless the Statutes are pari materia legislations. In the present case, the aim and object of the two legislations are not similar in the fist place. Secondly, the definition of ‘private forest’ in the KLR Act is not just the same as the definition of ‘private forest’ in the Vesting Act was to provide for the Vesting in the Government of private forest in the State of Kerala for the assignment thereof to the agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation. The preamble of the Act provides that such agricultural lands should be so utilised as to increase the agricultural production in the State and to promote the welfare of the agricultural population in the State. Two separate definitions have been provided in the Vesting Act; the first is applicable to the Malabar district where the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 (‘The MPPF Act’) applied immediately before the appointed day; the second concerned is in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala. The definition of ‘private forest’ as is applicable to the Malabar district is not general in terms but limited to the areas and lands to which the MPPF Act applied and exempts therefrom lands described under sub-clauses (A) to (D). This significant reference to MPPF Act in the definition of ‘private forest’ in the Vesting Act makes all the difference in the case. The MPPF Act was a special enactment. It was enacted by the erstwhile Madras State to preserve the private forests in the district of Malabar and erstwhile South Kannara District. The Scheme of that Act has been explained by several decisions of the Kerala High Court and that scheme appears to be that if the land is shown to be private forest on the date on which the MPPF Act came into force, it would continue to be a forest, even if there was subsequent replantation. (See: State of Kerala v. Anglo American D.T.T. Co. (1980 Ker. L.T. 215) and State of Kerala v. K.C. Moosa Haji (supra) (FB) AIR 1984 Ker. 149 at 154-55).
10. It is not in dispute that the lands involved in this appeal were all forests as defined in the MPPF Act, 1949 and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force in 1971. In malankara case (supra), this Court was not concerned with the lands covered by the MPPF Act, and denuded thereafter of forest growth and cultivated with fresh replantation. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to transplant the meaning according to ‘private forest’ from the KLR Act to the Vesting Act. That wide concept cannot fit into the new legal source.
12. In State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. (1974 (1) SCR 671), this Court while upholding the constitutional validity of the Vesting Act has observed that the Forest Lands in the State of Kerala has attained a peculiar character owing to the geography and climate and the evidence available showed that the vast areas of these forests are still capable of supporting a large agricultural plantations. That much is clear from the following observations (at 683):
“It is therefore, manifest that when the legislature stated in the preamble that the private forests are agricultural lands, they merely wanted to convey that they are lands which by and large could by prudently and profitably exploited for agricultural purposes.”
12. There is thus a judicial recognition of the distinction between private forest in Travancore-Cochin area in Kerala State and the private forest in Malabar district. This distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the anomalies suggested by counsel for the appellant.
13. Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act. ‘Garden’ means lands used principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same. ‘Nilam’ means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultivation of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C). It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to only the fruit bearing trees. It next refers to ‘lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term ‘agricultural crop’ in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit-bearing or otherwise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It may be significant to note that the Legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have “associations, echoes and overtones”. While construing such words, judges must, as Felix Frankfurter, J., said “retain the associations, hear the echoes and capture the overtones” (Supra p. 414). When so examined and construed, we do not discover any indication that the words in sub-clause (C) “any other agricultural crop” are quite wide enough to comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptus plantations.
14. It is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen attentively to what the legislature does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with those of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3 sub-section (1), private forests vest in Government. Sub-clause(2) however, excludes from such vesting lands with the ceiling limits applicable to an owner if they are under his personal cultivation. Cultivation for this purpose “includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species”. The explanation to sub-section (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of tree, fruit-bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2) the trees of every variety. But while providing for exclusion under sub-clause (C), the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the intention was otherwise, the sub-clause (C) would have been in a different language.
15. In our view as a matter of pure construction untrammelled by authority, the words used in the latter part of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees.
16. This is also the conclusion of the High Court not only in the impugned judgment under appeal but also in the subsequent two decisions; Malayalam Plantation Limited and K.C. Moosa Haji cases (supra).
17. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
