Dinesh Singh Vs. State of U.P.
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2001
[From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.12.2000 of the High Court of Allahabad in Government Appeal No. 1709 of 1990]
[From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.12.2000 of the High Court of Allahabad in Government Appeal No. 1709 of 1990]
Petitioner: Dinesh Singh
Respondent: State of U.P.
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2001
[From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.12.2000 of the High Court of Allahabad in Government Appeal No. 1709 of 1990]
[From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.12.2000 of the High Court of Allahabad in Government Appeal No. 1709 of 1990]
Judges: Dr. Arijit Pasayat & Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Aug 04, 2008
Appearances:
Mr. R.D. Upadhyay, Advocate for the Appellant.
Mr. M. Yunus Malik, Mr. Fuzail Khan and Mr. Anil Kumar Jha, Advocates for the Respondent.
Mr. M. Yunus Malik, Mr. Fuzail Khan and Mr. Anil Kumar Jha, Advocates for the Respondent.
Head Note:
Criminal Laws
Penal Code, 1860
Sections 302, 96 – Murder – Trial Court acquitting 1 to 10 accused except the appellant – High Court confirming the acquittal of rest of the accused persons and convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part I – Statement by PW.1, that he had seen appellant firing at deceased and he himself sustained injuries – Such statement corroborated by medical evidence and PW2. No person from prosecution was carrying any arms hence there was no apprehension of death. Held High Court was right in rejecting the plea of self-defence.
Falusus in uno falsus in omnibus – Doctrine merely a rule of caution and not mandatory rule of evidence -In such cases testimony may or may not be disregarded. (Para 14)
Penal Code, 1860
Sections 302, 96 – Murder – Trial Court acquitting 1 to 10 accused except the appellant – High Court confirming the acquittal of rest of the accused persons and convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part I – Statement by PW.1, that he had seen appellant firing at deceased and he himself sustained injuries – Such statement corroborated by medical evidence and PW2. No person from prosecution was carrying any arms hence there was no apprehension of death. Held High Court was right in rejecting the plea of self-defence.
Falusus in uno falsus in omnibus – Doctrine merely a rule of caution and not mandatory rule of evidence -In such cases testimony may or may not be disregarded. (Para 14)
Cases Reffered:
1. V. Subramani and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu [JT 2005 (3) SC 82] (Para 12)
2. Rizan and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh [JT 2003 (2) SC 191] (Para 15)
3. Sekar alias Raja Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, T.N. [JT 2002 (8) SC 21] (Para 7)
4. Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa [JT 2002 (8) SC 135] (Para 15)
5. Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. [JT 2002 (4) SC 186] (Para 15)
6. Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab [JT 1995 (8) SC 434] (Para 7)
7. Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab [JT 1991 (5) SC 366] (Para 8)
8. State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr. [AIR 1981 SC 1390] (Para 15)
9. Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [AIR 1979 SC 577] (Para 3)
10. Salim Zia v. State of U.P. [AIR 1979 SC 391] (Para 3)
11. State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan [AIR 1977 SC 2226] (Para 3)
12. Balaka Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab [AIR 1975 SC 1962] (Para 15)
13. State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima [AIR 1975 SC 1478] (Para 3)
14. Biran Singh v. State of Bihar [AIR 1975 SC 87] (Para 7)
15. Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1972 (3) SCC 751] (Para 15)
16. Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P. [AIR 1971 SC 1857] (Para 9)
17. Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration [AIR 1968 SC 702] (Para 3)
18. Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar [AIR 1965 SC 277] (Para 15)
19. Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 612] (Para 6)
20. Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1957 SC 366] (Para 14)
21. Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC 15] (Para 14)
2. Rizan and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh [JT 2003 (2) SC 191] (Para 15)
3. Sekar alias Raja Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, T.N. [JT 2002 (8) SC 21] (Para 7)
4. Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa [JT 2002 (8) SC 135] (Para 15)
5. Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. [JT 2002 (4) SC 186] (Para 15)
6. Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab [JT 1995 (8) SC 434] (Para 7)
7. Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab [JT 1991 (5) SC 366] (Para 8)
8. State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr. [AIR 1981 SC 1390] (Para 15)
9. Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [AIR 1979 SC 577] (Para 3)
10. Salim Zia v. State of U.P. [AIR 1979 SC 391] (Para 3)
11. State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan [AIR 1977 SC 2226] (Para 3)
12. Balaka Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab [AIR 1975 SC 1962] (Para 15)
13. State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima [AIR 1975 SC 1478] (Para 3)
14. Biran Singh v. State of Bihar [AIR 1975 SC 87] (Para 7)
15. Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1972 (3) SCC 751] (Para 15)
16. Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P. [AIR 1971 SC 1857] (Para 9)
17. Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration [AIR 1968 SC 702] (Para 3)
18. Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar [AIR 1965 SC 277] (Para 15)
19. Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 612] (Para 6)
20. Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1957 SC 366] (Para 14)
21. Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC 15] (Para 14)
JUDGEMENT:
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court allowing the Government Appeal. In the said appeal challenge was to the judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karvi, directing acquittal of the respondents-the accused 1 to 10 of the charged offences relatable to Sections 147,148,302, 325, 323 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC’). The High Court while upholding the acquittal of the rest of the accused persons found the evidence cogent and credible so far as the present appellant is concerned and directed conviction for offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court had rightly noticed that the appellant and the co- accused exercised right of private defence and, therefore, the High Court could not have held the appellant guilty. It is also submitted that when the evidence was found inadequate for rest of the accused persons, appellant should not have been convicted.
3. First question which needs to be considered is the alleged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the expression `right of private defence’. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that he acted in self-defence. If the circumstances show that the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the accused has not taken it, if the same is available to be considered from the material on record. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short `the Evidence Act’), the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is not necessarily required to call evidence; he can establish his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a question of assessing the true effect of the prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The burden of establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record. (See Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration [AIR 1968 SC 702], State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima [AIR 1975 SC 1478], State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan [AIR 1977 SC 2226], and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [AIR 1979 SC 577]. Sections 100 to 101 define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of body under Section 97, that right extends under Section 100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of this Court in Salim Zia v. State of U.P. [AIR 1979 SC 391], runs as follows:
‘It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis for that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing defence evidence.’
4. The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea.
5. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 deals with the subject matter of right of private defence. The plea of right comprises the body or property (i) of the person exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and the right may be exercised in the case of any offence against the body, and in the case of offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, and attempts at such offences in relation to property. Section 99 lays down the limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99. To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of death. Sections 100 and 101, IPC define the limit and extent of right of private defence.
6. Sections 102 and 105, IPC deal with commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of body and property respectively. The right commences, as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat, to commit the offence, although the offence may not have been committed but not until there is that reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 612], it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence.
7. In order to find whether right of private defence is available or not, the injuries received by the accused, the imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries caused by the accused and the circumstances whether the accused had time to have recourse to public authorities are all relevant factors to be considered. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Biran Singh v. State of Bihar [AIR 1975 SC 87]. (See: Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab [JT 1995 (8) SC 434 ; 1996 (1) SCC 458], Sekar alias Raja Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, T.N. [JT 2002 (8) SC 21 ; 2002 (8) SCC 354].
8. As noted in Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab [JT 1991 (5) SC 366 ; AIR 1991 SC 1316], a person who is apprehending death or bodily injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of moment and in the heat of circumstances, the number of injuries required to disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In moments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is often difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and use exactly only so much force in retaliation commensurate with the danger apprehended to him where assault is imminent by use of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self-defence and the right of private-defence commences, as soon as the threat becomes so imminent. Such situations have to be pragmatically viewed and not with high-powered spectacles or microscopes to detect slight or even marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper technical approach has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of the moment on the spot and keeping in view normal human reaction and conduct, where self-preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if the fact situation shows that in the guise of self-preservation, what really has been done is to assault the original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable apprehension has disappeared, the plea of right of private-defence can legitimately be negatived. The Court dealing with the plea has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is essentially, as noted above, a finding of fact.
9. The right of self-defence is a very valuable right, serving a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. (See Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P. [AIR 1971 SC 1857]. Situations have to be judged from the subjective point of view of the accused concerned in the surrounding excitement and confusion of the moment, confronted with a situation of peril and not by any microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the question as to whether more force than was necessary was used in the prevailing circumstances on the spot it would be inappropriate, as held by this Court, to adopt tests by detached objectivity which would be so natural in a Court room, or that which would seem absolutely necessary to a perfectly cool bystander. The person facing a reasonable apprehension of threat to himself cannot be expected to modulate his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude of only that much which is required in the thinking of a man in ordinary times or under normal circumstances.
10. In the illuminating words of Russel (Russel on Crime, 11th Edition Volume I at page 49):
‘….a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or surprise to commit a known felony against either his person, habitation or property. In these cases, he is not obliged to retreat, and may not merely resist the attack where he stands but may indeed pursue his adversary until the danger is ended and if in a conflict between them he happens to kill his attacker, such killing is justifiable.’
11. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e. the IPC, available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a right of defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression and not as retaliatory measure. While providing for exercise of the right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide and has not devised a mechanism whereby an attack may be pretence for killing. A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive, particularly when the need to defend no longer survived.
12. The above position was highlighted in V. Subramani and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu [JT 2005 (3) SC 82 ; 2005 (10) SCC 358].
13. So far as the claim of right of private defence is concerned, it is to be noted that the High Court analysed the evidence in great detail and observed that the appellant’s case stood on different footing. He is alleged to have fired upon, Juguntha, who sustained fire-arm injury on his chest and died on the spot. No person on the prosecution side is shown to be armed with any weapon. Therefore, there could not be any reasonable apprehension of death or of grievous hurt at their hands nor the case attract Section 103 IPC. The fact that appellant fired from his gun on Juguntha, is established beyond doubt from the evidence on record. P.W.1, Hari Mohan, who is wholly an independent witness, has categorically stated in his statement before the trial court that it was accused Dinesh Singh who fired upon Juguntha, which struck on his chest and he fell down and died. The incident occurred in broad-day light. Hari Mohan himself sustained injuries and, therefore, his presence at the scene of occurrence cannot be doubted. This witness had no animosity against the appellant nor had any affinity with the complainant party. His statement is also corroborated by medical evidence brought on record. Anurudh, P.W.2 is the other witness to depose that it was the accused-respondent Dinesh Singh who fired from his gun upon Juguntha. This fact is also mentioned in the first information report which was lodged promptly. Dr. M.L. Verma, PW 6 who conducted autopsy on the dead body of Juguntha found only one gutter shaped gunshot wound on the deceased and has stated that injury sustained was the cause of death and the same was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. He also categorically stated that the said injury could not be caused by a hand granade. We have also examined the post-mortem report and have no doubt in our mind that the said injury was a gun shot injury in as much as the pallets entered on the right lateral side of chest and then made exit from medial left side chest fracturing fourth, fifth ribs with sternum into pieces and causing lacerations in both the lungs and heart. The direction of wound was also from right to left. The evidence on record thus leaves no room for doubt that Juguntha died due to a gunshot injury and the same was caused by accused- appellant Dinesh Singh.
14. So far as the effect of acquittal on the self same evidence is concerned, it is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’ has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’ has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called `a mandatory rule of evidence’. (See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1957 SC 366].
15. The doctrine is a dangerous one especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1972 (3) SCC 751] and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar [AIR 1965 SC 277]. An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC 15] and Balaka Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab [AIR 1975 SC 1962]. As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr. [AIR 1981 SC 1390], normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. [JT 2002 (4) SC 186], Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa [JT 2002 (8) SC 135 ; 2002 (7) Supreme 276] and Rizan and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh [JT 2003 (2) SC 191 ; 2003 (2) SCC 661].
16. The High Court has also analysed in detail as to how the case of appellant stood on a different footing and has directed his conviction, though in the case of co-accused, the evidence was found to be inadequate. We find no infirmity in the conclusions arrived at by the High Court to warrant interference. Appeal fails, hence dismissed.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court allowing the Government Appeal. In the said appeal challenge was to the judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karvi, directing acquittal of the respondents-the accused 1 to 10 of the charged offences relatable to Sections 147,148,302, 325, 323 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC’). The High Court while upholding the acquittal of the rest of the accused persons found the evidence cogent and credible so far as the present appellant is concerned and directed conviction for offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court had rightly noticed that the appellant and the co- accused exercised right of private defence and, therefore, the High Court could not have held the appellant guilty. It is also submitted that when the evidence was found inadequate for rest of the accused persons, appellant should not have been convicted.
3. First question which needs to be considered is the alleged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the expression `right of private defence’. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that he acted in self-defence. If the circumstances show that the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the accused has not taken it, if the same is available to be considered from the material on record. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short `the Evidence Act’), the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is not necessarily required to call evidence; he can establish his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a question of assessing the true effect of the prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The burden of establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record. (See Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration [AIR 1968 SC 702], State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima [AIR 1975 SC 1478], State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan [AIR 1977 SC 2226], and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [AIR 1979 SC 577]. Sections 100 to 101 define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of body under Section 97, that right extends under Section 100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of this Court in Salim Zia v. State of U.P. [AIR 1979 SC 391], runs as follows:
‘It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis for that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing defence evidence.’
4. The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea.
5. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 deals with the subject matter of right of private defence. The plea of right comprises the body or property (i) of the person exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and the right may be exercised in the case of any offence against the body, and in the case of offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, and attempts at such offences in relation to property. Section 99 lays down the limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99. To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of death. Sections 100 and 101, IPC define the limit and extent of right of private defence.
6. Sections 102 and 105, IPC deal with commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of body and property respectively. The right commences, as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat, to commit the offence, although the offence may not have been committed but not until there is that reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 612], it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence.
7. In order to find whether right of private defence is available or not, the injuries received by the accused, the imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries caused by the accused and the circumstances whether the accused had time to have recourse to public authorities are all relevant factors to be considered. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Biran Singh v. State of Bihar [AIR 1975 SC 87]. (See: Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab [JT 1995 (8) SC 434 ; 1996 (1) SCC 458], Sekar alias Raja Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, T.N. [JT 2002 (8) SC 21 ; 2002 (8) SCC 354].
8. As noted in Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab [JT 1991 (5) SC 366 ; AIR 1991 SC 1316], a person who is apprehending death or bodily injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of moment and in the heat of circumstances, the number of injuries required to disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In moments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is often difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and use exactly only so much force in retaliation commensurate with the danger apprehended to him where assault is imminent by use of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self-defence and the right of private-defence commences, as soon as the threat becomes so imminent. Such situations have to be pragmatically viewed and not with high-powered spectacles or microscopes to detect slight or even marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper technical approach has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of the moment on the spot and keeping in view normal human reaction and conduct, where self-preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if the fact situation shows that in the guise of self-preservation, what really has been done is to assault the original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable apprehension has disappeared, the plea of right of private-defence can legitimately be negatived. The Court dealing with the plea has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is essentially, as noted above, a finding of fact.
9. The right of self-defence is a very valuable right, serving a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. (See Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P. [AIR 1971 SC 1857]. Situations have to be judged from the subjective point of view of the accused concerned in the surrounding excitement and confusion of the moment, confronted with a situation of peril and not by any microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the question as to whether more force than was necessary was used in the prevailing circumstances on the spot it would be inappropriate, as held by this Court, to adopt tests by detached objectivity which would be so natural in a Court room, or that which would seem absolutely necessary to a perfectly cool bystander. The person facing a reasonable apprehension of threat to himself cannot be expected to modulate his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude of only that much which is required in the thinking of a man in ordinary times or under normal circumstances.
10. In the illuminating words of Russel (Russel on Crime, 11th Edition Volume I at page 49):
‘….a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or surprise to commit a known felony against either his person, habitation or property. In these cases, he is not obliged to retreat, and may not merely resist the attack where he stands but may indeed pursue his adversary until the danger is ended and if in a conflict between them he happens to kill his attacker, such killing is justifiable.’
11. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e. the IPC, available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a right of defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression and not as retaliatory measure. While providing for exercise of the right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide and has not devised a mechanism whereby an attack may be pretence for killing. A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive, particularly when the need to defend no longer survived.
12. The above position was highlighted in V. Subramani and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu [JT 2005 (3) SC 82 ; 2005 (10) SCC 358].
13. So far as the claim of right of private defence is concerned, it is to be noted that the High Court analysed the evidence in great detail and observed that the appellant’s case stood on different footing. He is alleged to have fired upon, Juguntha, who sustained fire-arm injury on his chest and died on the spot. No person on the prosecution side is shown to be armed with any weapon. Therefore, there could not be any reasonable apprehension of death or of grievous hurt at their hands nor the case attract Section 103 IPC. The fact that appellant fired from his gun on Juguntha, is established beyond doubt from the evidence on record. P.W.1, Hari Mohan, who is wholly an independent witness, has categorically stated in his statement before the trial court that it was accused Dinesh Singh who fired upon Juguntha, which struck on his chest and he fell down and died. The incident occurred in broad-day light. Hari Mohan himself sustained injuries and, therefore, his presence at the scene of occurrence cannot be doubted. This witness had no animosity against the appellant nor had any affinity with the complainant party. His statement is also corroborated by medical evidence brought on record. Anurudh, P.W.2 is the other witness to depose that it was the accused-respondent Dinesh Singh who fired from his gun upon Juguntha. This fact is also mentioned in the first information report which was lodged promptly. Dr. M.L. Verma, PW 6 who conducted autopsy on the dead body of Juguntha found only one gutter shaped gunshot wound on the deceased and has stated that injury sustained was the cause of death and the same was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. He also categorically stated that the said injury could not be caused by a hand granade. We have also examined the post-mortem report and have no doubt in our mind that the said injury was a gun shot injury in as much as the pallets entered on the right lateral side of chest and then made exit from medial left side chest fracturing fourth, fifth ribs with sternum into pieces and causing lacerations in both the lungs and heart. The direction of wound was also from right to left. The evidence on record thus leaves no room for doubt that Juguntha died due to a gunshot injury and the same was caused by accused- appellant Dinesh Singh.
14. So far as the effect of acquittal on the self same evidence is concerned, it is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’ has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’ has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called `a mandatory rule of evidence’. (See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1957 SC 366].
15. The doctrine is a dangerous one especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1972 (3) SCC 751] and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar [AIR 1965 SC 277]. An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC 15] and Balaka Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab [AIR 1975 SC 1962]. As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr. [AIR 1981 SC 1390], normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. [JT 2002 (4) SC 186], Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa [JT 2002 (8) SC 135 ; 2002 (7) Supreme 276] and Rizan and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh [JT 2003 (2) SC 191 ; 2003 (2) SCC 661].
16. The High Court has also analysed in detail as to how the case of appellant stood on a different footing and has directed his conviction, though in the case of co-accused, the evidence was found to be inadequate. We find no infirmity in the conclusions arrived at by the High Court to warrant interference. Appeal fails, hence dismissed.
