Rakesh Ranjan Gupta Vs. State of U.P. and Another
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 703 of 1998
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1759 of 1997)
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1759 of 1997)
Petitioner: Rakesh Ranjan Gupta
Respondent: State of U.P. and Another
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 703 of 1998
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1759 of 1997)
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1759 of 1997)
Judges: M.M. Punchhi, C.J.I., K.T. Thomas & S. Rajendra Babu, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Jul 24, 1998
Head Note:
CRIMINAL LAWS
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 304-A – Death caused by rash and negligent act – When an offence under Section 304-A could be made out – Medical practitioner charge sheeted on the ground that the patient died because the doctor did not attend immediately. Held as the allegations did not disclose prima facie a case of rash or negligent act no offence could be made out against the doctor. If there was delay on the part of the doctor in attending to the patient at best only a civil negligence could be attributed and not criminal negligence. Charge sheet ordered to be quashed. (Para 3)
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 304-A – Death caused by rash and negligent act – When an offence under Section 304-A could be made out – Medical practitioner charge sheeted on the ground that the patient died because the doctor did not attend immediately. Held as the allegations did not disclose prima facie a case of rash or negligent act no offence could be made out against the doctor. If there was delay on the part of the doctor in attending to the patient at best only a civil negligence could be attributed and not criminal negligence. Charge sheet ordered to be quashed. (Para 3)
JUDGEMENT:
order
1. Leave granted. Heard both sides.
2. The appellant in this case is a medical practitioner. He stand charge-sheeted for offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of a complaint made by the second respondent. At the FIR stage the appellant moved the High Court for quashing the FIR on the premise that the offence under Section 304-A has not been disclosed in the allegations but the High Court instead of quashing the proceedings permitted the appellant to raise this question before the trial Court. In the meanwhile, the appellant was charge-sheeted. The allegations of the second respondent are that when her husband was in a serious condition, he was taken to the hospital wherein the appellant Doctor was working as a medical practitioner and that the appellant did not attend to the patient immediately. On being insisted by her, the appellant became angry and there was exchange of words between them. The gravamen of the case is that the appellant administered an injection to patient and the patient was taken to another hospital where he was pronounced dead.
3. The above allegations do not disclose, prima facie, a case of rash or negligent act, on the part of the appellant so as to attract the penal provision under Section 304-A, I.P.C. If there was delay on the part of the Doctor to attend on the patient that may at the worst be a case of civil negligence and not one of culpable negligence falling under the above Section. That apart, the cause of death has now been disclosed, from the report of the Chemical Examiner, as one of consuming poison. The viscera examined in the chemical laboratory showed that result. It is nobody’s case that the appellant has administered poison to the patient. It is now apparently clear that death was not on account of anything which the appellant did to the patient. It was primarily due to the poison being consumed by the deceased. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, can it be said that death of the deceased was caused by any act done by the appellant.
4. Admitted facts being thus, this is not a case to proceed against the appellant in criminal Court for offence under Section 304-A, I.P.C. The charge-sheet is liable to be quashed or else the appellant is likely to be subjected to unnecessary harassment for facing the criminal prosecution. We quash it without prejudice to the right of the legal representatives of the deceased to resort to any other action permissible under
law.
5. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Appeal allowed.
1. Leave granted. Heard both sides.
2. The appellant in this case is a medical practitioner. He stand charge-sheeted for offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of a complaint made by the second respondent. At the FIR stage the appellant moved the High Court for quashing the FIR on the premise that the offence under Section 304-A has not been disclosed in the allegations but the High Court instead of quashing the proceedings permitted the appellant to raise this question before the trial Court. In the meanwhile, the appellant was charge-sheeted. The allegations of the second respondent are that when her husband was in a serious condition, he was taken to the hospital wherein the appellant Doctor was working as a medical practitioner and that the appellant did not attend to the patient immediately. On being insisted by her, the appellant became angry and there was exchange of words between them. The gravamen of the case is that the appellant administered an injection to patient and the patient was taken to another hospital where he was pronounced dead.
3. The above allegations do not disclose, prima facie, a case of rash or negligent act, on the part of the appellant so as to attract the penal provision under Section 304-A, I.P.C. If there was delay on the part of the Doctor to attend on the patient that may at the worst be a case of civil negligence and not one of culpable negligence falling under the above Section. That apart, the cause of death has now been disclosed, from the report of the Chemical Examiner, as one of consuming poison. The viscera examined in the chemical laboratory showed that result. It is nobody’s case that the appellant has administered poison to the patient. It is now apparently clear that death was not on account of anything which the appellant did to the patient. It was primarily due to the poison being consumed by the deceased. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, can it be said that death of the deceased was caused by any act done by the appellant.
4. Admitted facts being thus, this is not a case to proceed against the appellant in criminal Court for offence under Section 304-A, I.P.C. The charge-sheet is liable to be quashed or else the appellant is likely to be subjected to unnecessary harassment for facing the criminal prosecution. We quash it without prejudice to the right of the legal representatives of the deceased to resort to any other action permissible under
law.
5. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Appeal allowed.
