Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors.

Appeal: Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos.197-198 of 2004
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

Petitioner: Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ and Anr.

Respondent: Union of India and Ors.

Apeal: Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos.197-198 of 2004
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

Judges: K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN & S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.

Date of Judgment: Aug 21, 2006

Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, Mr. Kailash Vasudev, Senior Advocates, Mr. Gopal Singh and Mr. Saurarb Kirpal, Advocates with them for the Appellants.
Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, S.G., Mr. Mohan Parasaran, A.S.G., Mr. Ram Jethmalani, Senior Advocates, Mr. P.H. Parekh, Mr. E.R. Kumar, Mrs. Shakun Sharma, Ms. P.R. Mala, Mr. Michale Peter, Mr. Chitranjan (for M/s. P.H. Parekh and Co.), Mr. B.V. Balaram Das, Ms. Sandhya Goswami, Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, Mr. Devatt Kamat, Mr. Chinmoy Sharma, Ms. Suruchi Suri (for Mr. P. Parmeswaran), Advocates with them for the Respondents.

CONSTITUTION / CRIMINAL LAWS
Criminal proceedings – Public interest litigation – Maintainability of petition under Article 32 – Bihar fodder scam case – Criminal proceedings against the former Chief Ministers of the State of Bihar – Two Members of Parliament filing petition under Article 32 styled as PIL challenging the appointment of new Special Judge to deal with the case, re-engaging the same public prosecutor and for cancellation of the bail granted to the accused persons. Dismissing the petition held that petitioners being absolute strangers to the criminal proceedings, no case made out for any interference as such interference may cause damage to the prosecution case.

INCOME-TAX
Income-tax Act, 1961
Section 260A – Appeals – Appeal against decision of the Tribunal – Public interest litigation seeking direction to Revenue to appeal to High Court – Maintainability – Income-tax cases relating to respondents 4 and 5 who were former Chief Ministers of the State of Bihar – Department making addition of undisclosed income – Tribunal deleting the additions and casting aspersions about the officials of the Department for making indiscriminate additions – Revenue not appealing against the decision of the Tribunal after obtaining the opinion of the CBDT, Finance Ministry and the Law Ministry to the effect that no substantial question of law arose from the decision of the Tribunal – Petitioners, being members of Parliament filing petition under Article 32 styled as public interest litigation seeking direction to the Revenue to appeal – Petition making allegations that the respondents 4 and 5 used their influence in transferring the Member of the ITAT who was hearing their case and posting another person who decided the cases within fortnight in their favour. Dismissing the petition by a two to one majority held that no illegality was committed by the Tribunal in the disposal of the cases of respondents 4 and 5. Revenue having obtained opinion from the CBDT, Finance and Law Ministries that there was no substantial question of law, no illegality could be found in not appealing to High Court. Petitioners had failed to point out any irregularity or show that decisions were taken at the behest of respondents 4 and 5. Allegations made in the petition being false no mandamus could be issued to the Revenue to appeal to High Court against the decision of the Tribunal.

Bihar Fodder Scam case – CBI cases against the former Chief Ministers of the State of Bihar (respondents 4 and 5 – Two members of Parliament filing PIL seeking cancellation of the bail granted to respondents 4 and 5. Dismissing the petition held that the petitioners having failed to prove anything that the respondents 4 and 5 have interfered with the course of justice and misused their privilege of bail or that they would flee from justice, no case made out for cancellation of the bail.

Bihar Fodder Scam case – CBI cases against the former Chief Ministers of the State of Bihar (respondents 4 and 5)- Two Members of Parliament filing a PIL under Article 32 challenging the removal of the Public Prosecutor who was dealing with the cases alleging that the change was under the pressure exerted by respondents 4 and 5. Dismissing the petition held that the petitioner had failed to produce any documents to show that the allegations made in the petitions were true. Trial proceedings having reached the final stage and recording of prosecution evidence having been completed, if the petitioners had any grievance regarding the removal of the public prosecutor they should approach the Special Judge dealing with the case or the High Court. Earlier prosecutor having been deployed in some other case there was no necessity for any direction re-engaging the same prosecutor.

CRIMINAL LAWS
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Section 13(1)(e) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 109 – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 235 – Bihar fodder scam case – CBI cases against former Chief Ministers of the State of Bihar – Sudden promotion and transfer of the Special Judge dealing with the cases and appointment of another Special Judge to deal with the cases – PIL filed by two members of Parliament seeking stay of the transfer of the Special Judge – Allegations of poor performance of the new Special Judge. Dismissing the petition by a two to one majority held that the earlier Special Judge having been elevated as principal judge and transferred and there being no material to show any illegality or serious infraction of any procedure in the appointment of the new judge, the appointment cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings and the court cannot go into the question of appointment of a Special Judge which is exclusively within the domain of the High Court. If the petitioners had any grievance regarding the appointment of the Special Judge they ought to have approached the High Court.

per K.G. Balakrishnan, J.
In the instant case, the petitioners have approached this case by filing this public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution at the time when the recording of the prosecution evidence was almost over and the trial of the case reached a final stage. If at all, the petitioners had any grievance regarding the removal of the public prosecutor, they should have submitted their grievance before the Special Judge or before the High Court. It is already noticed that the petitioners had no direct connection with this case. They were absolutely strangers as regards the criminal cases against respondent nos. 4 and 5 which was pending before the Special Judge. This unnecessary interference in the criminal case may cause, sometimes, damage to the prosecution case and at times may cause serious prejudice to the accused also. In any view of the matter, this sort of interference in the criminal prosecution would only deny a fair trial to the accused. (Para 25)
per Dr. Lakshmanan, J. (Agreeing)
In our opinion, public interest litigation meant for the benefit of the lost and lonely and it is meant for the benefit of those whose social backwardness is the reason for no access to the Court. We also say that PILs are not meant to advance the political gain and also settle their scores under the guise of a public interest litigation and to fight a legal battle. In our opinion, the liberty of an accused cannot be taken away except in accordance with the established procedure of law under the Constitution, criminal procedure and other cognate statutes. We are also of the opinion that PIL is totally foreign to pending criminal proceedings. The records placed before us would only go to show that respondent no.4 had no hand in any of these matters whether in the appointment of judges or in the change of the prosecutor or on the decision not to file an appeal in the income tax cases. (Para 67)
per S.H. Kapadia, J. (Dissenting)
The present petitions are filed on the alleged acts of misfeasance. The test which one has to apply to decide the maintainability of the PIL concerns sufficiency of the petitioner’s interest. Under this test it is necessary to consider the subject matter to which the PIL relates. It is wrong in law for the court to judge the applicant’s interest without looking at the subject matter of his complaint. If the petitioner shows failure of public duty, the court would be in error in dismissing his PIL. (Para 86)

per K.G. Balakrishnan, J.
The entire allegations made by the petitioners are denied. The President of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal submitted a report regarding the manner in which income tax cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 were disposed of by the Tribunal. The President has stated that he took over as the President of ITAT on 31.10.2003 and at that time a petition filed by respondent no. 5 for transfer of cases from Patna to Delhi was pending. The Department after considering the legal aspects declined to transfer the cases of respondent no. 5 to Delhi. It was suggested and noted on the files ‘it may perhaps be worthwhile to consider constituting a Special Bench for early disposal of these appeals’. Shri D.K. Tyagi sent a representation on 12.1.2004 praying that he may be transferred to Delhi as his mother was 80 years old and with deteriorating health and that he was anxious to arrange marriage of his daughter and his son was studying at Delhi. There were some other developments also as Shri D.K. Tyagi had left India without permission and a show-cause notice was issued to him. He filed an explanation and came over to Delhi to personally explain the things and he was allowed to remain at Delhi for some period and the President of the ITAT, with a view to inculcate judicial discipline, decorum and proper behaviour from the Bench, made Shri Tyagi to sit in Delhi Bench of the ITAT alongwith the seniormost Accountant Member. There were also other circumstances whereby Shri. Tyagi wanted his transfer from Patna to avoid recurrence of another incident in view of the repeated confrontations with the Bar. It was under these circumstances Shri Mohanarajan was directed to camp at Patna in June, 2004. Another Member Shri Aggarwal also expressed his inability to camp at Patna. Shri P. Mohanarajan alongwith Shri M.K. Sarkar who was a senior member of the Tribunal, dealt with the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5. The President has also refuted an allegation that Shri Sarkar was selected to camp at Delhi only for a short period to dispose of this case. He has brought to our notice that the Bench disposed of 11 appeals of respondent no. 5 and several other cases and that 136 cases were disposed of during that period and the list of such cases and details are given at Annexure I. (Para 12)
As regards non-filing of the appeals against the order passed by ITAT, the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax-VIII in New Delhi had filed affidavit wherein it is stated that the question was referred to the Central Board of Direct Taxes for consideration and he had sought opinion from the Ministry of Law. The Central Board of Direct Taxes and the Ministry of Finance obtained the opinion of the Ministry of Law to the effect that no substantial questions of law arose out of the judgments of the ITAT in the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 for filing appeals before the High Court and thus instructions were issued not to appeal against these cases. (Para 13)
The allegations made by the petitioners that there were serious irregularities in disposing of the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 are not factually correct. The very foundation of the allegation is that Shri Tyagi, member of the Appellate Tribunal was transferred from Patna to Delhi at a time when he was hearing appeals is factually incorrect. It is also not correct to say that appeals were disposed of by the member of the Tribunal who was on the verge of retirement. The petitioners could not point out any procedural irregularity in the manner in which these appeals were disposed of. After going through the affidavits and reports and various other papers, we are satisfied that the allegations made by the petitioners are not true. The petitioners have prayed that this Court should direct the authorities to file appeal against the orders passed by ITAT in the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5. In a collateral proceedings like this, the petitioner cannot seek any remedy of writ of mandamus directing the authorities to file appeals against such orders. An appeal is a statutory remedy available to the Department and the third party like writ petitioner cannot seek such remedies in collateral proceedings like this. Moreover, the petitioners could not point out anything to show that there were serious procedural irregularities on the part of the Department in not filing the appeal. The Department had taken opinion of the Central Board of Direct Taxes as well as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Finance had sought the opinion of the Ministry of Law. The petitioners have not made any specific allegation that these decisions were taken at the behest of respondent nos. 4 and 5 or any undue influence was exerted to take such decisions. The allegations made by the petitioners are vague and indefinite. Therefore, the prayer for writ of mandamus to direct the respondent nos. 1 to 3 to file an appeal against the ITAT orders cannot be allowed and is liable to be rejected. (Para 14)
per Dr. Lakshmanan, J. (Agreeing)
In regard to the prayer of the petitioner to direct the Government of India to file the appeal in the income-tax matters, we are of the opinion that the said prayer also cannot at all be countenanced. In this regard, Section 260 A(1) and (2)(a) may be referred to which reads as under:
‘260A. Appeal to High Court (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) The Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner or an assessee aggrieved by any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and such appeal under the sub-section shall be
(a) filed within one hundred and twenty days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the assessee or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner;
(b) ******
(c) ******’ (Para 62)
In this regard, counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance may be usefully referred to. It is stated in the said counter affidavit that the matter has been fully considered and legal opinion was sought by BCIT investigation, Patna and that the opinion of the learned ASG was received stating that there is no substantial question of law for filing an appeal and that the consideration of this aspect had been done properly and independently and there have been no extraneous consideration. (Para 63)
It is thus seen that the Government of India has taken into consideration the views of the Ministry of Law, Ministry of Finance to the effect that no substantial questions of law arise out of the judgments of the ITAT in the case of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 for filing appeals before the High Court and instructions were issued that appeals would not be filed in respect of those cases. (Para 65)
per S.H. Kapadia, J. (Dissenting)
By the impugned judgment the appeals filed by the assessee were allowed by the Tribunal. While allowing the appeal of the assessee the Tribunal held that the case involved highly intricate issues; that, these issues were extremely difficult to understand; that, but for the assistance of the learned advocates on both sides it was difficult to adjudicate such disputes. At the same time the Tribunal without any basis castigated the officers of the Department including the Commissioner (Appeals) saying that rampant additions were made to destroy the case of the assessees and to destroy the political career of respondent no.5 (See: para 40 of the judgment of the Tribunal). Similarly, the Tribunal has castigated the higher officers of the Department saying that they were biased and that they had acted at the behest of the Centre in clubbing the income of respondent no.4 with that of respondent no.5 who was going through political crisis (See: para 54 of the said judgment). (Para 91)
There is no basis given in the impugned decision of the Tribunal for making such strong observations against the officers of the Revenue. Although the High Court under Section 260A of the I.T. Act would not have enquired into the sufficiency of materials or substituted its judgment for that of the Tribunal in regard to facts, nevertheless, if the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal is without any basis or based on irrelevant considerations then the High Court was required to interfere under Section 260A. (Para 92)
PIL is not maintainable to probe or enquire into the returns of another taxpayer except in special circumstances. It is the ratio of the decision of House of Lords in the case of National Federation of Self-employed (supra). However, when scams take place, accusation of disproportionate assets are required to be looked into. (Para 93)
The judgment of the jurisdictional Tribunal on the scope and interpretation of the above sections which the Tribunal itself says involve complex legal issues, is binding on assessing officers and the appellate authority within that jurisdiction. If so, one fails to understand why the Department has not moved in appeal under Section 260A of the I.T. Act. In the circumstances of this case, Union of India should apply its mind afresh and take its decision keeping in mind the factors referred to hereinabove. (Para 94)
Union of India is directed to reconsider approaching the High Court against the decision of the Tribunal dated 2.7.2004 under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in the light of what is stated above. (Para 110)

per K.G. Balakrishnan, J.
The petitioners could not prove anything that these respondents have interfered in the course of justice and they misused the privilege of bail extended to them. The petitioners have also no case that they are likely to flee from justice. The petitioners have not made out any case for cancellation of their bail. (Para 28)

per K.G. Balakrishnan, J.
From the averments made in the counter-affidavit, it is clear that the earlier prosecutor Shri Ansari had completed the cases and examined all the witnesses for the prosecution as well as for the defence and he had also submitted his entire arguments to the Special Judge. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the prosecutor was purposely changed to give benefit to respondent nos. 4 and 5 is not correct. There is no allegation to prove that respondent nos. 4 and 5 had in any way interfered with the appointment of the Public Prosecutor. The petitioners could not produce any documents to show that the allegations made in the original petitions were true. (Para 20)
In the instant case, the petitioners have approached this case by filing this public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution at the time when the recording of the prosecution evidence was almost over and the trial of the case reached a final stage. If at all, the petitioners had any grievance regarding the removal of the public prosecutor, they should have submitted their grievance before the Special Judge or before the High Court. It is already noticed that the petitioners had no direct connection with this case. They were absolutely strangers as regards the criminal cases against respondent nos. 4 and 5 which was pending before the Special Judge. This unnecessary interference in the criminal case may cause, sometimes, damage to the prosecution case and at times may cause serious prejudice to the accused also. In any view of the matter, this sort of interference in the criminal prosecution would only deny a fair trial to the accused. (Para 25)
The petitioners in the writ petitions have prayed to re-engage the same prosecutor who was handling the case in the trial court from the very beginning of the trial. The earlier prosecutor had already been deployed to conduct some other case and we do not think that there is any necessity to give any direction to the CBI. However, the CBI would be at liberty to make use of the services of the earlier Prosecutor Shri Ansari. The second prayer of the petitioners that the present Special Judge is to be replaced by another Judicial Officer also cannot be granted as the appointment of the Judge has been validly made by the High Court. In the petition, there was no allegation against the present Judicial Officer warranting his removal from the post. (Para 26)
per Dr. Lakshmanan, J. (Agreeing)
Article 233 of the Constitution of India deals with subordinate courts. The appointment of persons, posting and promotion of District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Likewise, under Article 235 the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of and the grant of leave to persons belonging to judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court. (Para 58)
The appointment of lawyers is the prerogative of the Government and the prosecuting agency. The petitioners are trying to find fault with every attempt with every steps taken. In cases like this the delay is inevitable. (Para 59)
It is also settled law that appointment of advocates, public prosecutors etc. is the prerogative of the government in power and court has no role to play. (Para 60)
In the above case, the Standing Committee has taken a decision to appoint Munni Lal Paswan and other officers after scrutinizing the records, ACRs etc. in accordance with Article 233 and 235 of the Constitution of India which is the prerogative right of the Standing Committee and the High Court and when a decision is taken it is not for this Court to scrutinize the correctness of the decision that too at the instance of third parties. (Para 61)

per K.G. Balakrishnan, J.
Though the petitioners have not made any allegations in the writ petitions, at the time of argument, the learned senior counsel stated that Shri Muni Lal Paswan was having poor record and he was not senior to be appointed as a Special Judge. We have perused the confidential register of Shri Muni Lal Paswan which was made available to us. Of course, the confidential register of this Officer was available only upto 2003. For some period, he was working on deputation and the inspecting judge had not recorded the confidential registers for that period, though the confidential registers of other officers were available to the Standing Committee. The confidential reports of Shri Muni Lal Paswan from 1981 to 2003 have been produced in court. We have perused the confidential register of this Officer and it has been repeatedly recorded that this Officer has maintained honesty and integrity during the period under report. About his conduct and integrity, nothing adverse is reported against him. Of course, in some of the years, this Officer has been graded as ‘Category B’ with regard to his judicial performance. These are all matters considered by the Standing Committee which consists of senior judges of the High Court. The appointment of this Officer is not challenged by the petitioners and no pleadings also made in the main writ petition. By filing a criminal miscellaneous application, the petitioners have made series of allegations which are not borne out by any records. If at all, the petitioners had any grievance regarding the appointment of any particular Officer, the proper remedy was to approach the High Court and to bring this fact to the notice of the Chief Justice. Under the above circumstances, we do not find any material on record to show that there was any illegality or serious infraction of any procedure in the appointment of the present CBI (Special Judge), Patna and the appointment as such cannot be challenged in a collateral proceedings and this Court cannot go into the question of appointment of a Special Judge which is exclusively within the domain of the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution. Therefore, the oral appeal of the petitioners for the change of the Officer of the Special Judge cannot be granted. (Para 17)
per Dr. Lakshmanan, J. (Agreeing)
The Standing Committee has taken a decision to appoint Munni Lal Paswan and other officers after scrutinizing the records, ACRs etc. in accordance with Article 233 and 235 of the Constitution of India which is the prerogative right of the Standing Committee and the High Court and when a decision is taken it is not for this Court to scrutinize the correctness of the decision that too at the instance of third parties. (Para 61)
per S.H. Kapadia, J. (Dissenting)
Mr. Munni Lal Paswan was promoted to the post of ADJ on 17th June, 2003. Therefore, when Mr. Paswan was promoted as A.D.J. there was no categorization available. (Para 99)
In the report submitted by the Registrar General to this Court on 18.12.2005 pursuant to our order dated 26.10.2005, the Registrar General has forwarded the consolidated statement showing the out-turn of the work done by Mr. Paswan during the period 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 (partly). This statement refers to various parameters like disposal, remarks of P.O., remark of D.J. etc. as approved by the court. At this stage, I do not wish to comment about the remarks mentioned therein. These remarks have been approved by the District Judge and by the courts. These remarks are heavily weighted against Mr. Paswan. It is not clear whether these remarks were ever noticed by the Committee and if not they need to be re-looked by the High Court. (Para 100)
The object of Inspection is to assess the work performed, capability, competency besides integrity of the candidate. Those gradations/categorisations given by Inspecting Judges are required to be placed before the full court. In the present case, that exercise is done for two out of three judicial officers when they were posted. However, it appears from the affidavit of the Registrar General that no gradation/categorisation has been done after 1990 by the Inspecting Judge vis-a-vis the judgments of Mr. Munni Lal Paswan. (Para 106)
It is important to bear in mind that in the matter of economic scams be it security transactions or fodder scams or Taj corridor it is the economic interest of the country which is at stake. These cases are highly complicated in which complicated questions are involved and, therefore, posting plays a vital role. (Para 107)
In the circumstances, it seems that the procedure followed by the High Court in the meeting on 22.06.05 has lost sight of the above criteria. In the circumstances, a request is being made to the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to convene an urgent meeting of Administrative Judges and complete the exercise of giving appropriate gradation/categorisation after looking at the judgments and orders delivered by the concerned judge, Mr. Paswan. I may make it clear that this is just a request to the High Court and not a direction so that the evaluation standards are commonly applied to all the three candidates. (Para 108)
The Chief Justice of the Patna High Court is requested to convene a meeting of Administrative Judges and have a fresh look at the evaluation in the case of posting of Sri Paswan as Special Judge for C.B.I. (Fodder Scam Cases) at Patna, vide Minutes of Meeting dated 22.06.2005. (Para 110)

1. T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (98) v. Union of India and Others (JT 2006 (4) SC 553) (Paras 37, 84)
2. Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Others (JT 2004 (10) SC 561) (Paras 40, 81)
3. Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab and Others (JT 2005 (5) SC 389) (Para 82)
4. Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. (JT 2003 (9) SC 140) (Paras 23, 41)
5. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others (Taj Trapezium Matter) (JT 2003 (Supp-1) SC 391) (Para 94)
6. Registrar General v. Ishwar Chand Jain and Another (JT 1999 (3) SC 266) (Para 105)
7. Union of India and Others v. Sushil Kumar Modi and Others (1998 (8) SCC 661) (Paras 24, 44, 73, 80)
8. State of Bihar and Another v. Ranchi Zila Samta Party and Another (JT 1996 (3) SC 751) (Para 72)
9. Janata Dal v. H.S. Chaudhary and Others (JT 1992 (5) SC 213) (Paras 22, 39, 78)
10. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and Another (1981 (Supp) SCC 87) (Para 42)
11. A.R. Antulay v. Ramadas Sriniwas Nayak and another ((1984) 2 SCC 500) (Para 78)
12. Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self-employed and Small Business Ltd. (1982 Appeal Cases 617) (Para 87)

K.G. Balakrishnan, J.
1. These writ petitions are filed as public interest litigation by the two petitioners herein who were Members of the Parliament at the time of filing the petitions. Respondent nos. 4 and 5 were formerly Chief Ministers of the State of Bihar. It is alleged by the petitioners that they filed writ petitions before the High Court of Patna alleging large-scale defalcation of public funds and falsification of accounts involving hundreds of crores of rupees in the Department of Animal Husbandry in the State of Bihar and pursuant to these allegations, several cases were registered by the police and investigation of these cases was later handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation. In an earlier petition filed before this Court on 19.3.1996, this Court directed that the investigation shall be monitored by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court and in that Order, it was indicated that the CBI Officers entrusted with the investigation shall inform the Chief Justice of Patna High Court from time to time of the progress made in the investigation and if they needed any directions in the matter of conducting the investigation, obtain them from him and it was also said that the learned Chief Justice may either post the matter for directions before a Bench presided over by him or constitute any other appropriate Bench. It was also directed that the State Government shall co-operate in assigning adequate number of special judges to deal with the cases expeditiously so that no evidence may be lost.
2. The petitioners allege that consequent upon change of the Government in the Centre, attempts have been made to delay and interfere with the judicial process. It is alleged that the public prosecutors who were handling the cases were removed and to protect the interests of respondent nos. 4 and 5, convenient prosecutor was appointed.
3. The respondent no. 5 is an accused in a case registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The case is filed pursuant to the FIR registered as no. R.C. 5(A) 498/AHD-Pat dated 19.8.1998. The allegation in that case is that respondent no. 5 as Chief Minister of Bihar between 1990 to 1996 had acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. Chargesheet was filed in the court of the Special Judge, CBI, Patna on 4.4.2000 under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1988. Respondent no. 4 also was charge sheeted in the same case for abetment under Section 109 of the IPC read with Section 13(2) and Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This case has been re-numbered as Special Case No. 5/1998 and is pending trial in the court of the Special Judge, CBI, Patna. The petitioners allege that certain income tax cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 were pending before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) and one Mr. D.K. Tyagi who was a member of the ITAT had been hearing those cases and that respondent nos. 4 and 5 found it difficult to pursue the hearings before the said ITAT member and hence at their influence Mr. Tyagi was sent on deputation and he was replaced by one Mr. Mohanarajan who was on the verge of retirement. It is further alleged that the new member alongwith another member heard these cases within two weeks and orders were pronounced in favour of respondent nos. 4 and 5. It is also alleged that respondent no. 3, namely, the Central Board of Direct Taxes did not prefer appeal in these cases though the decision went against the revenue. This, according to the petitioners, was to help respondent nos. 4 and 5 in the cases filed against them based on the allegation that they acquired assets disproportionate to their known sources of income.
4. The petitioners have also alleged that the Special Case No. 5/1998 pending before the Special Judge, CBI was at the final stage of hearing and that the Director, CBI, presumably under pressure from the accused changed the prosecutor and appointed one Shri Oma Shankar Singh who was only a retired Deputy Superintendent of Delhi Police and had no experience of conducting the prosecution. According to the prosecution, this was done at the fag end of the prosecution case to help the accused. The petitioners have made allegations against respondents 1 to 3 also that they were acting arbitrarily and interfering in the judicial process to benefit the respondent nos. 4 and 5. The petitioners have alleged that respondent nos. 4 and 5 obtained stay of proceedings of the case pending before the Special Judge from this Court suppressing some material facts. It is alleged that the respondent nos. 4 and 5 still wield influence and power and, therefore, this Court should monitor the trial of the case pending before the Special Judge, CBI, at Patna.
5. In these writ petitions, the petitioners have prayed mainly four reliefs. The first relief prayed is to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction monitoring the conduct of the trials relating to fodder scam cases proceedings against respondent nos. 4 and 5 in the States of Bihar and State of Jharkhand. The second prayer is to appoint the very same prosecutor who had been conducting prosecution earlier and to direct the High Court to see that no prosecutor or CBI Officer attached with the investigation and trial of the case should be removed, harassed or victimized for discharging their duties. The petitioners have also prayed that at least one inspector be provided for each fodder case. The petitioners have also prayed for cancellation of bail granted to respondent nos. 4 and 5. Petitioners have further prayed for a direction to respondents 1 to 3 to file an appeal against the orders passed by the ITAT.
6. During the pendency of these writ petitions, the counsel for the petitioners alleged that the Special Judge who was trying the case involving respondent nos. 4 and 5, was being replaced by another Special Judge. The allegation was that one Shri Yogender Prasad was the CBI Special Judge and he was being replaced by one Shri Muni Lal Paswan and this according to the petitioners was deliberately done to help the respondent nos. 4 and 5. In view of the allegations made by the petitioners, this Court on 1.8.2005 directed the Registrar General of the Patna High Court to send details and files as to when Judge Shri Yogender Prasad was promoted as a District Judge and all papers regarding posting of the subsequent officer Shri Muni Lal Paswan. As regards the posting of Shri Muni Lal Paswan as a Special Judge, this Court again passed an order on 26.10.2005 and the Registrar of the High Court was directed to give further clarification in the matter. The Registrar General of the High Court of Patna appeared in person before us and filed an affidavit giving out the details leading to the decision of the Standing Committee of the High Court to post Shri Muni Lal Paswan as a Special Judge, CBI case Patna.
7. In view of the allegations made by the petitioners in respect of the cases pending before the ITAT, the President of the ITAT was directed to send all papers pertaining to the constitution of the Bench of Shri P. Mohanarajan and Shri M.K. Sarkar which disposed of the various appeals pending before the ITAT. The President of the ITAT has submitted a report and also produced relevant papers before us.
8. In view of the allegation made by the petitioners regarding the appointment of a new prosecutor in place of earlier prosecutor, this Court directed the 3rd respondent to produce the entire files including the notations pertaining to the appointment of Shri Oma Shankar Sharma as Prosecutor.
9. Refuting the allegations contained in the writ petition, detailed counter-affidavits have been filed by the respondents. In the joint counter-affidavit of respondent nos. 4 and 5, they have alleged that the writ petitions contain vague and indefinite allegations and they are made with political motive to satisfy their personal grudge and that this is an abuse of the process of the court. The respondents have alleged that the Public Interest Litigation shall not be used for private or political motives or for other consideration. It is also alleged that Special Case No. 5/98 pending before the Special Judge is a case registered under Sections 13(2) and 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and it has nothing to do with the ‘fodder scam’ case. The various allegations made in the writ petitions have been denied specifically.
10. We heard the learned senior counsel Shri Mukul Rohtagi for the petitioner and solicitor general appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and also the learned counsel for respondent nos. 4 and 5. At the time of the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners in the present facts and circumstances of the case only pray for appointment of an appropriate prosecutor to conduct the case pending before the Special Judge and that the bail of the respondent nos. 4 and 5 be cancelled and respondent no. 3 be directed to file appeals against the orders passed by the ITAT. The petitioners also submitted arguments to the effect that the appointment of the present Special Judge was not done properly. No specific prayer was made by the petitioners to change the Presiding Officer. They, however, submitted a request that High Court may be directed to reconsider the appointment and posting of Shri Muni Lal Paswan as a Special Judge.
11. We shall first consider the prayer of the petitioners as to whether any irregularities have been committed in the matter of disposal of cases against respondent nos. 4 and 5 by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna. The petitioners have alleged that Shri D.K. Tyagi, who had been hearing the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 and proving to be difficult during the course of the hearing, was curiously sent on deputation and was replaced by Shri Mohanarajan, who was on the verge of the retirement, to head the Tribunal. It is further alleged that Shri Mohanarajan picked up only two cases pertaining to respondent nos. 4 and 5 even though the matter had been heard fully by another bench, and within two weeks, the cases were heard and allowed in favour of the assessees namely respondent nos. 4 and 5, and that he had no background of the case and had not disposed of any other matter. The petitioners alleged that after the disposal of these cases by the Tribunal, steps were not taken to file appeal against these orders and that was done at the instance of respondent nos. 4 and 5.
12. The entire allegations made by the petitioners are denied. The President of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal submitted a report regarding the manner in which income tax cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 were disposed of by the Tribunal. The President has stated that he took over as the President of ITAT on 31.10.2003 and at that time a petition filed by respondent no. 5 for transfer of cases from Patna to Delhi was pending. The Department after considering the legal aspects declined to transfer the cases of respondent no. 5 to Delhi. It was suggested and noted on the files ‘it may perhaps be worthwhile to consider constituting a Special Bench for early disposal of these appeals’. Shri D.K. Tyagi sent a representation on 12.1.2004 praying that he may be transferred to Delhi as his mother was 80 years old and with deteriorating health and that he was anxious to arrange marriage of his daughter and his son was studying at Delhi. There were some other developments also as Shri D.K. Tyagi had left India without permission and a show-cause notice was issued to him. He filed an explanation and came over to Delhi to personally explain the things and he was allowed to remain at Delhi for some period and the President of the ITAT, with a view to inculcate judicial discipline, decorum and proper behaviour from the Bench, made Shri Tyagi to sit in Delhi Bench of the ITAT alongwith the seniormost Accountant Member. There were also other circumstances whereby Shri. Tyagi wanted his transfer from Patna to avoid recurrence of another incident in view of the repeated confrontations with the Bar. It was under these circumstances Shri Mohanarajan was directed to camp at Patna in June, 2004. Another Member Shri Aggarwal also expressed his inability to camp at Patna. Shri P. Mohanarajan alongwith Shri M.K. Sarkar who was a senior member of the Tribunal, dealt with the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5. The President has also refuted an allegation that Shri Sarkar was selected to camp at Delhi only for a short period to dispose of this case. He has brought to our notice that the Bench disposed of 11 appeals of respondent no. 5 and several other cases and that 136 cases were disposed of during that period and the list of such cases and details are given at Annexure I.
13. As regards non-filing of the appeals against the order passed by ITAT, the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax-VIII in New Delhi had filed affidavit wherein it is stated that the question was referred to the Central Board of Direct Taxes for consideration and he had sought opinion from the Ministry of Law. The Central Board of Direct Taxes and the Ministry of Finance obtained the opinion of the Ministry of Law to the effect that no substantial questions of law arose out of the judgments of the ITAT in the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 for filing appeals before the High Court and thus instructions were issued not to appeal against these cases.
14. The allegations made by the petitioners that there were serious irregularities in disposing of the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5 are not factually correct. The very foundation of the allegation is that Shri Tyagi, member of the Appellate Tribunal was transferred from Patna to Delhi at a time when he was hearing appeals is factually incorrect. It is also not correct to say that appeals were disposed of by the member of the Tribunal who was on the verge of retirement. The petitioners could not point out any procedural irregularity in the manner in which these appeals were disposed of. After going through the affidavits and reports and various other papers, we are satisfied that the allegations made by the petitioners are not true. The petitioners have prayed that this Court should direct the authorities to file appeal against the orders passed by ITAT in the cases of respondent nos. 4 and 5. In a collateral proceedings like this, the petitioner cannot seek any remedy of writ of mandamus directing the authorities to file appeals against such orders. An appeal is a statutory remedy available to the Department and the third party like writ petitioner cannot seek such remedies in collateral proceedings like this. Moreover, the petitioners could not point out anything to show that there were serious procedural irregularities on the part of the Department in not filing the appeal. The Department had taken opinion of the Central Board of Direct Taxes as well as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Finance had sought the opinion of the Ministry of Law. The petitioners have not made any specific allegation that these decisions were taken at the behest of respondent nos. 4 and 5 or any undue influence was exerted to take such decisions. The allegations made by the petitioners are vague and indefinite. Therefore, the prayer for writ of mandamus to direct the respondent nos. 1 to 3 to file an appeal against the ITAT orders cannot be allowed and is liable to be rejected.
15. The next prayer of the petitioners is that the Special Judge who is dealing with the CBI cases at Patna was not properly appointed by the High Court of Patna and another Judge who was dealing with this case was suddenly transferred to help respondent nos. 4 and 5. It may be noticed, at the outset, that no such allegations have been made in the original writ petition. The petitioners filed IA as Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 6589-6590 of 2005 wherein certain allegations have been made. Subsequent to this filing of these interim petitions, the original writ petition was not amended and no prayer was incorporated in the relief portion as to whether the present Special Judge is to be removed or not. In the interlocutory application as Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 6589-6590 of 2005, the petitioners alleged that taking undue advantage of the ongoing summer vacations, in an attempt to over reach the orders passed by this Hon’ble Court which was already seized of the matter in its entirety, the Patna High Court on the administrative side, has directed the transfer of the Special Judge (AHD), Patna. Such act according to the petitioners amounts to contempt of this Hon’ble Court and the petitioners reserved their right to initiate appropriate proceedings for contempt against the persons responsible for the same. The petitioners sought for stay of the transfer of the then Special Judge Shri Yogender Prasad. This Court on 1.8.2005 passed the following order:
‘At the request of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the petitions are fixed for hearing on 20th September, 2005.
In the meantime, the prosecution arguments may continue but thereafter the trial to remain stayed and defence argument not to start without further orders of this Court.
The Registrar General of the Patna High Court to send the details and files when Judge Yogender Prasad was promoted as a District Judge and all papers regarding posting of the present incumbent Shri Muni Lal Paswan.’
16. This Court declined to grant stay of transfer of Special Judge Shri Yogender Prasad as he was promoted to the post of Principal Sessions Judge. This Court also passed an order on 26.12.2005 wherein the details regarding the appointment of the present incumbent Shri Muni Lal Paswan were sought from the High Court. The entire records relating to the appointment of Shri Muni Lal Paswan as a Special Judge CBI, Patna have been produced in this case including the Confidential Registers of the various officers. On perusal of these records, we find that the Standing Committee of the High Court took a decision to post Shri Muni Lal Paswan as the CBI Special Judge, Patna. Six senior most judges of the High Court of Patna constituted the Standing Committee of the High Court and the decision was taken in the meeting of the Committee held on 22nd June, 2005. The decision of the Standing Committee is recorded as follows:-
‘Having considered the relevant service records of the officers concerned as also taking into consideration the fact that no allegation petition has been received against Sri Muni Lal Paswan, Additional District Judge, Sahara, it is resolved that let him (Sri Muni Lal Paswan) be posted as Special Judge for C.B.I. (Fodder Scam Cases) at Patna. It is further resolved upon consideration of the relevant service records of the officers concerned that Shri J.P. Ratnesh, Additional District Judge, Patna, be posted as Special Judge, C.B.I. (South Bihar) and Sri Ram Niwas Prasad, Additional District Judge, Patna, as Special Judge for Vigilance Case (Court No. 1).
In view of the urgency of the matter, the officer Is directed to take necessary steps for issue of notification immediately.’
17. Though the petitioners have not made any allegations in the writ petitions, at the time of argument, the learned senior counsel stated that Shri Muni Lal Paswan was having poor record and he was not senior to be appointed as a Special Judge. We have perused the confidential register of Shri Muni Lal Paswan which was made available to us. Of course, the confidential register of this Officer was available only upto 2003. For some period, he was working on deputation and the inspecting judge had not recorded the confidential registers for that period, though the confidential registers of other officers were available to the Standing Committee. The confidential reports of Shri Muni Lal Paswan from 1981 to 2003 have been produced in court. We have perused the confidential register of this Officer and it has been repeatedly recorded that this Officer has maintained honesty and integrity during the period under report. About his conduct and integrity, nothing adverse is reported against him. Of course, in some of the years, this Officer has been graded as ‘Category B’ with regard to his judicial performance. These are all matters considered by the Standing Committee which consists of senior judges of the High Court. The appointment of this Officer is not challenged by the petitioners and no pleadings also made in the main writ petition. By filing a criminal miscellaneous application, the petitioners have made series of allegations which are not borne out by any records. If at all, the petitioners had any grievance regarding the appointment of any particular Officer, the proper remedy was to approach the High Court and to bring this fact to the notice of the Chief Justice. Under the above circumstances, we do not find any material on record to show that there was any illegality or serious infraction of any procedure in the appointment of the present CBI (Special Judge), Patna and the appointment as such cannot be challenged in a collateral proceedings and this Court cannot go into the question of appointment of a Special Judge which is exclusively within the domain of the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution. Therefore, the oral appeal of the petitioners for the change of the Officer of the Special Judge cannot be granted.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioners also alleged that the public prosecutor who was conducting the case no. 5/98 against the respondent nos. 4 and 5 was removed by the Director of the CBI presumably under pressure from the accused and one Uma Shankar Singh was appointed and he was a Deputy Superintendent of Delhi Police and had commenced his law practice only recently. The petitioners alleged that the respondent nos. 4 and 5 were unnecessarily interfering in the course of justice and managed to change the public prosecutor who was diligently discharging his duties.
19. In the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners, the petitioners reiterated their allegation and stated that Shri L.R. Ansari who had been conducting the disproportionate assets case, had examined 225 witnesses, was sent elsewhere and some other public prosecutor was appointed. Refuting all these allegations, a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent no. 2 CBI. In the counter-affidavit, it is stated that disproportionate assets case against respondent nos. 4 and 5 was being conducted by Shri L.R. Ansari, right from the beginning. He had examined 132 witnesses from the prosecution and the defence had also examined 93 witnesses. Arguments on behalf of the petitioners were completed on 14.7.2004 and the arguments on behalf of the defence started on 19.7.2004 and as the case was practically over, it was decided to avail Shri Ansari’s service in other Animal Husbandry cases. It is also stated that if found necessary, Mr. Ansari would be called to give any reply at the end of the case. As regards Shri Oma Shankar Sharma, it is submitted that he had started his practice as an advocate on 23.2.1968 and he was appointed as a Prosecutor in 2.1.1973 in Delhi and conducted several cases before criminal courts in New Delhi. He was promoted as Senior-cum-Additional Public Prosecutor on 16.10.1992 and conducted several important cases including TADA cases. He was appointed as a Legal Adviser to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi and continued upto 31.8.2003.
20. From the averments made in the counter-affidavit, it is clear that the earlier prosecutor Shri Ansari had completed the cases and examined all the witnesses for the prosecution as well as for the defence and he had also submitted his entire arguments to the Special Judge. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the prosecutor was purposely changed to give benefit to respondent nos. 4 and 5 is not correct. There is no allegation to prove that respondent nos. 4 and 5 had in any way interfered with the appointment of the Public Prosecutor. The petitioners could not produce any documents to show that the allegations made in the original petitions were true.
21. The learned counsel for the respondent nos. 4 and 5 submitted that the original petition is a politically motivated move to malign respondent nos. 4 and 5 and this sort of public interest litigation should not be entertained by the Court and placed reliance on the series of decisions passed by this Court. It may be noticed that the case nos. 5/98 has been filed against the respondent nos. 4 and 5 alleging that they had amassed wealth disproportionate to their known sources of income while holding the post of Chief Minister of the State of Bihar. Both the petitioners are not in any way connected with this case. They are not de-facto complainant in this case. It is for the prosecution to prove its case and the respondent nos. 4 and 5 to deny that the allegations are not true and they did not have the disproportionate income as alleged by the prosecution. It is a criminal litigation exclusively between respondent nos. 4 and 5 and the State. It is also important to note that in a case of this nature, nobody else has got any right to interfere especially by way of public interest litigation or else such public interest litigation would only hamper the course of justice and may cause prejudice to the accused by denying a fair trial. In this case, as early as 2004, 132 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution and 93 witnesses were examined on the defence side. Arguments of the prosecution were over as early as in 14.7.2004 and the defence arguments continued upto 19.7.2004. Because of the present public interest litigation, the trial could not be conducted. It is equally important to note that though the petitioners have alleged series of irregularities, but they are not supported by basic facts having solid foundation.
22. This Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chaudhary and Others1 held that in a criminal case, a person who has no interest shall not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court by intervening in the proceedings and a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding alone has locus standi to file a public interest litigation and a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive, or any oblique consideration has no such right to file public interest litigation.
23. The respondent nos. 4 and 5 relied on Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B.2. That is a case where petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution purportedly in public interest but the prayer was to the effect that the death sentence imposed on one ‘D’ by the Sessions Court, affirmed by the Calcutta High Court and the Supreme Court, needed to be converted to a life sentence because there had been no execution of the death sentence for a long time. Therein, this Court said that a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding alone can initiate public interest litigation and that the court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations.
24. In Union of India and Others v. Sushil Kumar Modi and Others3, a three Judge bench of this Court held that once a charge-sheet is filed in the competent court after completion of the investigation, the process of monitoring by the monitoring Court for the purpose of making the CBI and other investigative agencies concerned perform their function of investigating into the offences concerned comes to an end; and thereafter it is only the court in which the charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all matters relating to the trial of the accused, including matters falling within the scope of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
25. In the instant case, the petitioners have approached this case by filing this public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution at the time when the recording of the prosecution evidence was almost over and the trial of the case reached a final stage. If at all, the petitioners had any grievance regarding the removal of the public prosecutor, they should have submitted their grievance before the Special Judge or before the High Court. It is already noticed that the petitioners had no direct connection with this case. They were absolutely strangers as regards the criminal cases against respondent nos. 4 and 5 which was pending before the Special Judge. This unnecessary interference in the criminal case may cause, sometimes, damage to the prosecution case and at times may cause serious prejudice to the accused also. In any view of the matter, this sort of interference in the criminal prosecution would only deny a fair trial to the accused.
26. The petitioners in the writ petitions have prayed to re-engage the same prosecutor who was handling the case in the trial court from the very beginning of the trial. The earlier prosecutor had already been deployed to conduct some other case and we do not think that there is any necessity to give any direction to the CBI. However, the CBI would be at liberty to make use of the services of the earlier Prosecutor Shri Ansari. The second prayer of the petitioners that the present Special Judge is to be replaced by another Judicial Officer also cannot be granted as the appointment of the Judge has been validly made by the High Court. In the petition, there was no allegation against the present Judicial Officer warranting his removal from the post.
27. The petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent nos. 1 to 3 to file appeal against the orders passed by the ITAT. The petitioners have not made out any case for issuing any such writ of mandamus. The respondent nos. 1 to 3, after following the due procedure, have decided not to file an appeal against the order passed by ITAT and we do not find any reason to give any direction to file appeal.
28. The last prayer of the petitioners is that the bail granted to respondent nos. 4 and 5 is liable to be set aside. The petitioners could not prove anything that these respondents have interfered in the course of justice and they misused the privilege of bail extended to them. The petitioners have also no case that they are likely to flee from justice. The petitioners have not made out any case for cancellation of their bail.
29. The prayers sought for in the writ petitions cannot be allowed and the writ petitions being without any merits are liable to be and dismissed accordingly. All interim orders passed in the writ petitions are vacated.
Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J. (Agreeing)
30. I had the privilege of perusing the judgment proposed by my learned Brother – Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan. While respectfully concurring with the conclusion arrived by the learned Judge, I would like to add the following few paragraphs:-
31. The first petitioner is a Member of Parliament and the second petitioner is the Deputy Chief Minister of Bihar. The above writ petition, ostensibly in public interest, has been filed by them for the following relief:
a. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction monitoring the conduct of the trials relating to the fodder scam case proceeding against respondent nos. 4 and 5 in the State of Bihar and State of Jharkhand;
b. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Director, CBI to reinstate the prosecutors who were handling the cases in the trial court and the High Court and directing that no prosecutor or any CBI officer attached with the investigation and the trial of these scam cases should be removed, harassed or victimized for discharging their duties, without specific orders from this Hon’ble Court;
c. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Director, CBI to provide the logistics and ensure that it is represented by at least one Inspector in each of the 7 courts by Special Judge, CBI in the State of Jharkhand which is trying the fodder scam cases so that no adjournments are sought and granted;
d. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction cancelling the bail granted to respondent nos.4 and 5
e. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent no.1 and/or 3 to file an appeal against the order passed by the Hon’ble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal’
32. On our direction, the Registrar General of the Patna High Court was present in Court on 26.07.2006. He filed an affidavit and also explained the procedure followed in the appointment of Shri Munni Lal Paswan as a special Judge to try the disproportionate assets cases with reference to the records.
33. We heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Kailas Vasudev learned senior counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. P.H.Parekh and Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, learned solicitor general and Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned ASG for the respondents.
34. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned senior counsel made elaborate submissions on the question of maintainability of the writ petitions and also submitted that Mr. Munni Lal Paswan was promoted recently and posted at Patna for disposing off the case filed against respondent nos. 4 and 5 and that the said Munni Lal Paswan is not a desirable person to be posted in the said post to conduct the case. He also requested that the Public Prosecutors who were proving to be inconvenient to respondent nos. 4 and 5 are being supplanted with chosen ones. Like that, Member (Judicial) in the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal – Mr. R.K. Tyagi who had been hearing the appeal of respondent nos. 4 and 5 was curiously sent on deputation and was replaced by Mr. Mohanarajan, a person who was on the verge of retirement to head the Tribunal. Within 2 weeks, the matter was heard and allowed in favour of the assesses. He also submitted that the case relating to disproportionate assets before the Special Judge, CBI is at the final stage of hearing. The Director, CBI has started changing the prosecutors mid-way when the case was nearing completion and that the public prosecutor who was conducting the cases from the very beginning has been replaced by Shri Om Shankar Singh, a retired Deputy Superintendent of Delhi Police who has commenced law practice recently. It is also submitted that respondent nos. 4 and 5 are deliberately protracting the trial by taking unnecessary adjournments which, by itself, would be a ground for cancellation of bail. He further submitted that by virtue of the new political equations between the party in power in the State of Bihar and at the Centre, respondent no.5 one of the main accused in the fodder scam now has substantial administrative control and political say in the functioning of the Government of India and that the CBI and the Central Board of Direct Taxes, respondent nos. 2 and 3 have become a party in an effort to shield respondent nos. 4 and 5. He continued to submit that this Court shall monitor the case since the accused are using State machinery to block the judicial process and subvert the trial and dilatory tactics being adopted by the accused to delay the trial on one pretext or the other. He also submitted that the prosecutors or investigators connected with the fodder scam matters in the State of Bihar who have till date been discharging their functions in the trial court should not be disturbed, replaced or sidelined.
35. Mr. Rohatgi, in support of his contentions, invited our attention to the various documents, annexures, income-tax records and the paperbooks.
36. Appearing for respondent nos. 4 and 5, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel argued that the petition had been filed only to achieve personal or political gain, no case had been made out for the cancellation of bail to Mr. Lalu Prasad Yadav and his wife and this Court should not monitor the trial as it would send wrong signals. He also cited many decisions with regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions at the instance of practicing politicians. He sought dismissal of the writ petitions with exemplary costs.
37. Appearing for the CBI, learned solicitor general G.E. Vahanwati denied point by point the allegations of the petitioners made in their pleadings with reference to various documents and records and proved to our satisfaction that the statements made by the petitioners are not true and correct and have been made with an ulterior motive. Learned solicitor general further submitted that there had been no interference by Mr. Lalu Prasad Yadav or his wife in any of the matters whether in the appointment of Judges or in the change of the prosecutor or on the decision not to file an appeal in the income-tax cases. The learned solicitor general cited T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (98) v. Union of India and Others1, (Hon. Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J., Arijit Pasayat and S.H. Kapadia, JJ.) and submitted that howsoever genuine a case brought before the Court by a public interest litigant may be, the Court has to decline its examination at the behest of a person who, in fact, is not a public interest litigant and whose bonafides and credentials are in doubt and that no trust can be placed by the Court on a mala fide applicant in public interest litigation. Learned solicitor general submitted now it is time to give a severe warning and sound alert since these are basic issues which are required to be satisfied by every public interest litigant. He also cited paras 25 and 26 in support of the contention that the writ petition is not maintainable at the instance of the political rivals.
38. Mr. Ram Jethmalani in regard to the maintainability of the writ petition cited the following decisions:
39. Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Others, (supra) (2 Judges).
‘It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold.’
40. Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Others1, (Hon. Arijit Pasayat and Hon. S.H. Kapadia, JJ) and invited our attention to para 4,5,9,10,12 and 14.
41. Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., (supra):
’12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or a member of the public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases, with exemplary costs.’
42. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and Another2, (7 Judges)
’24. But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the Court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. Andre Rabie has warned that ‘political pressure groups who could not achieve their aims through the administrative process’ and we might add, through the political process, ‘may try to use the courts to further their aims’. These are some of the dangers in public interest litigation which the court has to be careful to avoid. It is also necessary for the court to bear in mind that there is a vital distinction between locus standi and justiciability and it is not every default on the part of the State or a public authority that is justiciable. The court must take care to see that it does not overstep the limits of its judicial function and trespass into areas which are reserved to the Executive and the Legislature by the Constitution. It is a fascinating exercise for the court to deal with public interest litigation because it is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving, a jurisprudence which demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability. The frontiers of public law are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the complexion of the law and which were so far as embedded in the womb of the future, are beginning to be born.’
43. Mr. Rohatgi submitted that this Court should monitor the conduct of the trial relating to the fodder scam cases against respondent nos. 4 and 5.
44. Union of India and Others v. Sushil Kumar Modi and Others, (supra) (3 Judges)
‘6. This position is so obvious that no discussion of the point is necessary. However, we may add that this position has never been doubted in similar cases dealt with by this Court. It was made clear by this Court in the very first case, namely Vineet Narain v. Union of India, JT 1996 (1) SC 708 that once a charge-sheet is filed in the competent court after completion of the investigation, the process of monitoring by this Court for the purpose of making the CBI and other investigative agencies concerned perform their function of investigating into the offences concerned comes to an end; and thereafter it is only the court in which the charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all matters relating to the trial of the accused, including matters falling within the scope of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We make this observation only to reiterate this clear position in law so that no doubts in any quarter may survive. It is, therefore, clear that the impugned order of the High Court dealing primarily with this aspect cannot be sustained.’ (emphasis supplied)
45. It is thus clear from the above judgment that once a charge-sheet is filed in the competent court after completion of the investigation, the process of monitoring by this Court for the purpose of making the CBI and other investigative agencies concerned perform their function of investigating into offences concerned comes to an end and thereafter, it is only the court in which the charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all matters relating to the trial of the accused including matters falling within the scope of Section 173(8).
46. We respectfully agree with the above view expressed by this Court. In our view, monitoring of pending trial is subversion of criminal law as it stands to mean that the Court behind the back of the accused is entering into a dialogue with the investigating agency. Therefore, there can be no monitoring, after the charge sheet is filed.
47. This Court issued a direction on 22.02.2005 to the President of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to submit a detailed report in regard to the allegations made by the petitioners. Pursuant to the directions of this Court, the President of ITAT filed a detailed report dated 09.03.2005. A perusal of which shows that there is not an iota of truth in the allegation and all the aforesaid averments are completely baseless. As noticed earlier, certain allegations were made against Mr. R.K.Tyagi and Mr. Mohanarajan who, according to the petitioners, were due for retirement was appointed to head the Tribunal. It was further stated that on 02.07.2004 Mr. R.K.Tyagi who had been hearing the appeal of respondent nos. 4 and 5 was sent on deputation for 2 weeks and was replaced by Mr. Mohanarajan, a person who was on the verge of the retirement to head the Tribunal and that the said Mohanarajan picked up only the cases pertaining to respondent nos. 4 and 5 and heard the matter and allowed in favour of the assesses and that no appeal has been filed against the said order.
48. On 22.02.2005, an order was passed by this Court directing the Union of India to produce before this Court the proposal of CBI dated 20.07.2004 and the entire file including notations pertaining to the appointment of Mr. Uma Shankar Sharma as prosecutor. The President, ITAT was directed to send to this Court all papers pertaining to constitution of the Bench of Mr. Mohanarajan and Mr. M.K. Sarkar and also to sent copies/order sheets of ITA Nos. 233-237 of 2000 etc. etc. The President, ITAT was directed to state whether Mr. R.K.Tyagi was sent on deputation for two weeks during the period the other two persons were appointed and if so why and on whose behalf he was sent on deputation.
49. On 09.03.2005, Mr. Vimal Gandhi, President, ITAT submitted his report. Flash figures of investigation, disposal and dependency of appeals for the month of April, 2004 and the position as on 01.05.2004 with reference to the various benches in the country was furnished (Annexure-2). It is seen from the report that Mr. D.K. Tyagi, JM, Patna had left India without obtaining permission as required under the rules and he was accordingly issued a show cause notice to explain about the acts of indiscipline. This was done in early June. Mr. Tyagi also explained the circumstances under which he had gone abroad etc. The President acceded to his request on compassionate grounds and permitted him to remain in Delhi without any T.A. D.A. for 1 month from June, 21 onwards. The President, ITAT, therefore, has stated that it is not correct to suggest that Tyagi was shunted out of Patna by him.
50. Insofar as Mohanarajan is concerned, the President has explained the position with regard to Mohanarajan and M.K. Sarkar. He said Mr. Mohanarajan joined the Tribunal as Judicial Member in November, 1995 and posted at Jabalpur, Chennai, Patna and Bangalore and he served in Patna from 02.09.2002 onwards till he was transferred to Bangalore in March, 2003. He is sober in nature and that he is to retire on 06.11.2009 and he had never sat with Mr. Sarkar earlier. When Mr. Agarwal’s inability to tour Patna was made known to the President in Bangalore, Mohanarajan’s name came to his mind as an appropriate person to replace Mr. D.K. Agrawal and he was accordingly directed to camp at Patna in June, 2004 and that the camp was organized accordingly. Insofar as Mr. M.K.Sarkar is concerned, he before joining the Appellate Tribunal was asked to manage Patna and other Benches on camp till regular members were available as pendency at Kolkata was also low. The details of tour of Sarkar to Patna in 2004 has also been furnished.
51. The learned solicitor general then invited our attention to Annexure-7 filed along with the report of the President, ITAT. Respondent no.4 Mr. Lalu Prasad, by his letter dated 15.10.2003, addressed a letter to the President, ITAT, New Delhi requesting for transfer of appeals filed before Patna Bench of the Tribunal to Delhi Bench in his case. On 17.10.2003, the President made a note on the said letter to call for comments/objections, if any, from the Department/Patna Bench by fax. Mr. Lalu Prasad has stated in the said letter that since he is elected as a Member of Rajya Sabha and performed duties as a Member of Rajya Sabha he has to be present in Delhi and, therefore, the appeals may be transferred from Patna to Delhi Bench. By annexure-8, the Patna Bench gave its response on 31.12.2003 stating that the legal aspect of the matter was being examined and that a final report will follow soon. By annexure-9 dated 08.01.2004, the Directorate General of Income-tax Patna addressed a letter to Assistant Registrar, ITAT Patna Bench as to whether constituting a special Bench for early disposal of the appeals of Shri Lalu Prasad (?). Annexure-9 was in reply to the ITAT Patna Bench letter dated 11.11.2003 and during that time the present Government was not in power. By Annexure-10 the DGIT by their letter dated 23.04.2004 stated that it would not be possible to agree to transfer the appeals of Mr. Lalu Prasad from ITAT, Patna Bench to ITAT, Delhi Bench and it may be worthwhile to consider constituting a special Bench for early disposal of these appeals. It is seen from annexure-12 dated 11.03.2004 signed by M.A. Bakshi, V.P. ITAT, Chandigarh Zone that it may not be necessary to constitute a special Bench for disposal of the appeals relating to Mr. Lalu Prasad.
52. In regard to the prayer for cancellation of the bail at the instance of the petitioner, we are of the opinion that the said request cannot at all be countenanced. Our attention was drawn to order dated 14.07.2003 passed by this Court which reads thus:
‘We have been extending bail from time to time for a period of six months in order to monitor the trial. In our view, it is not now necessary to do so any further. We, therefore, order that the bail which has been granted by this Court will continue for the duration of the case on the same terms and conditions. We clarify that it will be open to the C.B.I to apply for cancellation of bail in accordance with law in this Court. Further, if it is found that the petitioner is deliberately protracting the trial or taking unnecessary adjournments then that by itself would be a ground for cancellation of bail.’
53. Mr. Rohatgi submitted that respondent nos. 4 and 5 are interfering with the cause of justice so far as conduct of the trial and IT proceedings are concerned and, therefore, the bail granted to them is liable to be cancelled. This submission has no merits in view of the arguments advanced by learned solicitor general inviting our attention to the various documents and annexures etc. to the effect that the respondent nos. 4 and 5 have never interfered with the conduct of trail or with the IT proceedings. It is stated that respondent nos. 4 and 5 are deliberately protracting the trial by taking unnecessary adjournments. Then that itself would be a ground for cancellation of bail. This argument has no substance. It is a fact that the matter was adjourned at the instance of the defence on various occasions. Court itself has adjourned the matter for various reasons. We, therefore, cannot hold that the delay is solely attributable to respondent nos. 4 and 5 which, in our opinion, cannot be a ground for cancellation of bail when it is not proved that any of the bail conditions has been violated. The delay is attributable to both the prosecution and the defence and also to the Court. Therefore, respondent nos. 4 and 5 cannot be held responsible for the delay.
54. Mr. Rohatgi argued that Munni Lal Paswan should be changed from the present place and some other officer should be posted there. Mr. Ram Jethmalani, at the time of hearing, explained to this Court as to how and under what circumstances the earlier incumbent of the office – Mr. Yogendra Prasad was shifted at his own request and that how Munni Lal Paswan was promoted recently and posted at Patna for the conduct of the matters. We summoned the Registrar General of Patna High Court on 26.07.2006. The Registrar General Madhusudhan Singh has also filed an affidavit in regard to the three queries raised by us. The Registrar General explained to this Court in regard to the practice in the High Court of Patna and how the matter is placed before the Standing Committee and the remarks of the inspecting Judges and the guard files which are maintained separately of each officers which were made available to the Standing Committee. The said fact also finds mention in the decision dated 22.06.2005 of the Standing Committee. In regard to query no.3 the Registrar has submitted as follows:-
‘That in regard to query no.3 of this Hon’ble Court as mentioned in the order dated 26.7.2006, I respectfully say and submit that the remarks of the Hon’ble Inspecting Judge in case of Shri Jawahar Prasad Ratnesh was of the year 1985, 1986-87, 1988, 2001, 2003 and 2005 (and remarks recorded by P.O., Industrial Tribunal, Patna in 1998). In respect of Shri Ram Niwas Prasad, the remarks recorded by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judge was of 1985, 1986, 1997 and 2002. As regards Shri Munni Lal Paswan, the remarks recorded by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judge was of 1985 and 1990 and by Vice-Chairman, Industrial Tribunal, Patna Bench in 1997.’
55. We have perused the records submitted by the High Court in regard to the officers including Munni Lal Paswan. There is absolutely no adverse entry against Munni Lal Paswan and that poor record if any is not the record of integrity and that no gradation has been given to officers after 1997 onwards including Paswan.
56. We have perused the proceedings of the meetings of the Standing Committee held on 22.06.2005 in the chambers of the Hon’ble Chief Justice which reads thus:
Proceedings of the meeting of the Standing Committee held on 22nd June, 2005 in the Chambers of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice:
Agenda Decision
To consider the matter regarding Having considered the relevant service records of the
postings of three Special Judges at officers concerned and also taking into consideration
Patna for C.B.I. (Fodder Scam the fact that no allegation petition has been
Cases), C.B.I. (South Bihar) and received against Sri Muni Lal Paswan, Additional
Vigilance Cases (Court No.1) in District Judge, Saharsa. It is resolved that let him
place of S/Shri Yogendra Prasad, (Sri Muni Lal Paswan) be posted as Special Judge
Mungeshwar Sahoo and Jitendra for C.B.I. (Fodder Scam Cases) at Patna. It is
Mohan Sharma, respectively (P.F. further resolved upon consideration of the relevant
XXVII-5-98) service records of the officers concerned that Sri J.P. Ratnesh, Additional District Judge, Patna, be posted as Special Judge, C.B.I. (South Bihar) and Sri Ram Niwas Prasad, Additional District Judge, Patna as Special Judge for Vigilance Case (Court No.1).
In view of the urgency of the matter, the office is directed to take necessary steps for issue of notification immediately.
Sd/- Nagendra Rai, Acting, C.J.
Sd/- I.P.Singh, J.A.D. 1
Sd/- R.N. Prasad, J.A.D. II
Sd/- Barin Ghosh, J.
Sd/- M.L. Visa, J.
Sd/- Rajendra Prasad, J.’
57. It is thus seen from the above that all the relevant service records of the officers concerned including Munni Lal Paswan was placed before the Standing Committee which took into consideration the fact that no allegation petition has been received against Munni Lal Paswan, Addl. District Judge. It was resolved that Munni Lal Paswan be posted as Special Judge, CBI Fodder scam cases at Patna. The Registrar General had also stated at the time of hearing that the resolution of the Standing Committee was also placed before the Full Court which also approved the same.
58. Article 233 of the Constitution of India deals with subordinate courts. The appointment of persons, posting and promotion of District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Likewise, under Article 235 the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of and the grant of leave to persons belonging to judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court.
59. The appointment of lawyers is the prerogative of the Government and the prosecuting agency. The petitioners are trying to find fault with every attempt with every steps taken. In cases like this the delay is inevitable.
60. It is also settled law that appointment of advocates, public prosecutors etc. is the prerogative of the government in power and court has no role to play.
61. In the above case, the Standing Committee has taken a decision to appoint Munni Lal Paswan and other officers after scrutinizing the records, ACRs etc. in accordance with Article 233 and 235 of the Constitution of India which is the prerogative right of the Standing Committee and the High Court and when a decision is taken it is not for this Court to scrutinize the correctness of the decision that too at the instance of third parties.
62. In regard to the prayer of the petitioner to direct the Government of India to file the appeal in the income-tax matters, we are of the opinion that the said prayer also cannot at all be countenanced. In this regard, Section 260 A(1) and (2)(a) may be referred to which reads as under:
‘260A. Appeal to High Court (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) The Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner or an assessee aggrieved by any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and such appeal under the sub-section shall be
(a) filed within one hundred and twenty days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the assessee or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner;
(b) ******
(c) ******’
63. In this regard, counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance may be usefully referred to. It is stated in the said counter affidavit that the matter has been fully considered and legal opinion was sought by BCIT investigation, Patna and that the opinion of the learned ASG was received stating that there is no substantial question of law for filing an appeal and that the consideration of this aspect had been done properly and independently and there have been no extraneous consideration.
64. This apart, another affidavit was filed by Mr. L.K.Sighvi, the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (VIII), New Delhi para 1
‘I was the Director General IT (Inv.), Patna during the relevant period when decision was taken regarding filing of appeals pertaining to the ITAT orders in the cases of Smt. Rabri Devi and Shri. Lalu Prasad Yadav before the Hon’ble High Court at Patna. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the present petition was pending before this Hon’ble Court, I thought it fit to refer the matter to the CBDT for consideration and seeking opinion from the Ministry of Law. The CBDT and the Ministry of Finance obtained the opinion of the Ministry of Law to the effect that no substantial questions of law arose out of the judgments of the ITAT in the cases of Smt. Rabri Devi and Shri Lalu Prasad Yadav for filing appeals before the Hon’ble High Court. Accordingly, instructions were issued by me that appeals would not be filed in respect of these cases.
65. It is thus seen that the Government of India has taken into consideration the views of the Ministry of Law, Ministry of Finance to the effect that no substantial questions of law arise out of the judgments of the ITAT in the case of respondent nos. 4 and 5 for filing appeals before the High Court and instructions were issued that appeals would not be filed in respect of those cases.
66. Certain allegations have been made against CBDT and the Public Prosecutors, Members of the Income-tax Tribunal etc. None of them were made parties before us. Therefore, the allegations made against them are one-sided and cannot be looked into at all. We cannot also say that all these authorities have acted in a mala fide manner.
67. In our opinion, public interest litigation meant for the benefit of the lost and lonely and it is meant for the benefit of those whose social backwardness is the reason for no access to the Court. We also say that PILs are not meant to advance the political gain and also settle their scores under the guise of a public interest litigation and to fight a legal battle. In our opinion, the liberty of an accused cannot be taken away except in accordance with the established procedure of law under the Constitution, criminal procedure and other cognate statutes. We are also of the opinion that PIL is totally foreign to pending criminal proceedings. The records placed before us would only go to show that respondent no.4 had no hand in any of these matters whether in the appointment of judges or in the change of the prosecutor or on the decision not to file an appeal in the income tax cases.
68. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that both the writ petitions have no merit and is liable to be dismissed and accordingly we do so.
69. In the circumstances, we order no costs. Before concluding, we say that the petitioners are waging a political battle against respondent nos. 4 and 5 through the medium of public interest litigation. The venue for political battle, in our opinion, can never be this Court by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
S.H. KAPADIA, J. (Dissenting)
70. I have had the privilege of reading the opinions of Brother Justice Balakrishnan and Brother Justice Lakshmanan, I have to record my respectful dissent with the views expressed by my learned brothers.
71. In these writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, filed to enforce Article 14 of the Constitution, following three issues arise for determination:
(a) Whether the writ petitions were maintainable as Public Interest Litigation;
(b) whether there was failure of statutory and public duty on the part of the Revenue in not preferring an appeal to the High Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961; and
(c) whether the procedure adopted at the time of posting Mr. Munni Lal Paswan, ADJ as Special Judge, CBI, Patna (Fodder Scam Cases) on 22.06.2005, needs to be re-looked by the Patna High Court.
(a) WHETHER THE WRIT PETITIONS WERE MAINTAINABLE AS PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:
BACKGROUND FACTS:
72. Large-scale defalcation of public funds, fraudulent transactions and falsification of accounts, of around Rs.500 crores, came to light in the Animal Husbandry Department of the State of Bihar. This scam took place during the period 1977 to 1996. A similar situation existed in the Education, Corporation and Fisheries Departments. By judgment dated 11.03.1996 delivered by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Writ Petition No.459 of 1996 the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, took away the investigation from the State police and entrusted it to CBI. The said decision of the Patna High Court was challenged by the State vide Civil Appeal Nos. 5177-81 of 1996. By judgment dated 19.03.96, this Court observed that the exercise of the power under Article 226 in a public interest litigation was not to give any advantage to a political party or group of people but it was done to investigate corruption in public administration, misconduct by the bureaucracy, fabrication of official records and misappropriation of public funds. Therefore, this Court refused to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Patna High Court (See: State of Bihar and Another v. Ranchi Zila Samta Party and Another1.
73. In the case of Union of India and Others v. Sushil Kumar Modi and Others, (supra) certain allegations were made against the then Director, CBI, in the context of investigations into the above fodder scam. The relevant paragraphs 11 and 14 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:
’11. We deem it proper to emphasise that every officer of the CBI associated with the investigation has to function as a member of a cohesive team which is engaged in the common pursuit of a fair, honest and complete investigation into the crimes alleged. It is needless to further emphasise that the exercise has to be performed objectively and fairly, mindful of the fact that the majesty of law has to be upheld and the ‘rule of law’ preserved, which does not discriminate between individuals on the basis of their status, position or power. The law treats everyone as equal before it and this has to be kept in view constantly in every State action to avoid violation of the ‘right to equality’ guaranteed in Article 14 of the Constitution.
14. It appears necessary to add that the court, in this proceeding, is concerned with ensuring proper and honest performance of its duty by the CBI and not the merits of the accusations being investigated, which are to be determined at the trial on the filing of the chargesheet in the competent court, according to the ordinary procedure prescribed by law. Care must, therefore, be taken by the High Court to avoid making any observation which may be construed as the expression of its opinion on merits relating to the accusation against any individual. Any such observation made on the merits of the accusation so far by the High Court, including those in Para 8 of the impugned order are not to be treated as final, or having the approval of this Court. Such observations should not, in any manner influence the decision on merits at the trial on the filing of the chargesheet. The directions given by this Court in its aforesaid order dated March 19, 1996 have to be understood in this manner by all concerned, including the High Court.’
PLEADINGS
74. On 31.08.2004 the present Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos.197-198 of 2004 were filed for enforcement of Article 14 of the Constitution. Briefly, it is alleged that the Union of India (respondent no.1) and other respondents (including respondent nos.4 and 5) are allegedly committing acts of misfeasance in relation to the corruption cases pending before the Special Judge, CBI, Patna as well as in the appeals preferred by the accused before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Respondent no.4 is Smt. Rabri Devi, former Chief Minister of Bihar and respondent no.5 is Mr. Lalu Prasad, former Chief Minister of Bihar. In the writ petitions it is alleged that trial judge as well as the Member (Judicial) of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal who are found to be inconvenient are being transferred and supplanted with the chosen ones. That, even the judgment of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) allowing the appeal in favour of the assessees for the assessment years 1986-87 to 1996-97, though involving substantial questions of law, has not been challenged by the Revenue by filing appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the I.T. Act’) in order to protect some of the respondents-accused.
75. Respondent nos.4 and 5 as well as Union of India have categorically denied the allegations made by the petitioners. It is the case of the respondents that irresponsible statements have been made in the petitions without having any basis; that, political battles were being fought in the name of public interest litigation (for short, ‘PIL’) by politicians and that respondent nos.4 and 5 had no role to play either in the transfer of lawyers in the criminal case, in the transfer of the trial judge or in the constitution of the Special Bench of the Tribunal. They have further submitted that they have no role to play in Revenue Department not going in appeal to the High Court under Section 260A of the I.T. Act. It is submitted that the Revenue Department took the opinion of Additional Solicitor General of India who has certified that no substantial questions of law arise for determination by the High Court under Section 260A of the I.T. Act. Accordingly, it is submitted by the respondents that the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed with heavy costs.
SUBMISSIONS
76. Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos.4 and 5, raised the preliminary objection stating that PIL has no role to play in pending criminal proceedings. He submitted that if the petitioner is a politician and if it is found that the object is to win political battle then PIL should be dismissed with costs. He submitted that in the present case the PIL is politically motivated; that, in the present petitions there is no breach of Article 14 and, therefore, it deserves to be dismissed with strictures against the petitioners. Learned senior counsel submitted that PIL is meant for the benefit of the lost and lonely who have no access to courts or the legal system. Learned senior counsel submitted that when the provisions of the Constitution are violated and loss is caused to a group of persons who are handicapped then PIL is maintainable, if it is shown that they have no access to legal system. It is submitted that respondents 4 and 5 are the accused persons before the criminal court and the liberty cannot be taken away except by the procedure established by law; that, the criminal procedure code requires that the guilt of the accused must be determined by a Special Judge in the present case which is the court of exclusive jurisdiction and anybody, aggrieved by the decision of the Special Judge, is free to hold appeal. Learned senior counsel submitted that the assessment orders passed by the Revenue Department under the I.T. Act cannot be used to prove holding of disproportionate assets by respondent nos.4 and 5. He submitted that in the present case the CBI pressurized the assessing officer to pass assessment order against respondent nos.4 and 5. Learned senior counsel further alleged that in some cases even the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was persuaded to make order of assessment against respondent nos.4 and 5 and in such circumstances and even otherwise orders of assessment cannot form the basis of trials dealing with accusation of disproportionate assets by respondent nos.4 and 5. Learned senior counsel submitted that in fact a bare perusal of the decision of the Tribunal in the present case indicates although the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessees the Tribunal has decided every point against the assessee and in the circumstances the Department was right in not moving the High Court in appeal under Section 260A of the I.T. Act. Learned senior counsel further urged that respondent nos.4 and 5, who are the accused in the criminal trial, should be allowed to pursue their defence. Learned senior counsel stated that admittedly there was a scam and misappropriation of public property but that should not give right to the petitioners to obstruct the course of justice or obstruct the rights given to the accused under Criminal Procedure Code, Evidence Act and the Constitution.
77. Learned senior counsel submitted three propositions in the context of the parameters of the PIL. He submitted that firstly, every criminal trial has to proceed according to the procedure established by law and every deviation from that procedure, even if by a judicial order could violate Article 21 of the Constitution; secondly, in every PIL the locus standi of the petitioner should be examined at the threshold; and thirdly, the source of his information must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Learned senior counsel submitted that if any of the three conditions are not fulfilled then PIL should be dismissed. In this connection, learned senior counsel relied upon the judgments of this Court in support of his above submissions.
78. In the case of Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, (supra) this Court observed that violation of a fundamental right is the sine qua non of the exercise of the right conferred by Article 32; that, PIL is part of the process of participatory justice and in a competition between courts and streets the rule of law must win and, therefore, the rule of locus standi must be liberalized to meet the challenges of the times. This Court, further, noted the judgment in A.R. Antulay v. Ramadas Sriniwas Nayak and another1, in which it has been observed that locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal procedure jurisprudence except where the statute creates an offence which provides for the eligibility of the complainant to set the criminal case in motion.
79. In para 92 of the said judgment the concept of PIL has been explained. Any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of duty or violation of the Constitution. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and achieving the constitutional goals, subject to a caveat which states that the member of the public who approaches by way of PIL should be acting bona fide and not for personal gain, private profit or political motivation.
80. In the case of Union of India v. Sushil Kumar Modi and others, (supra) this Court has held that once a chargesheet is filed in the competent court after completion of investigation the process of monitoring for the purposes of making the CBI and other investigating agencies to perform their function comes to an end and, thereafter, it is only the court in which the chargesheet is filed has to deal with all matters relating to the trial of the accused, including matters falling within Section 173(8) of CrPC Relying on this judgment, learned senior counsel for respondent nos.4 and 5 stated that in the present case the chargesheet has been filed and, therefore, the process of monitoring has ended. It is urged that since the chargesheet has been filed the criminal trial should be allowed to take its own course without any further interference from any court outside the trial court.
81. In the case of Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (supra) the Division Bench of this Court on facts found that the petitioner was a lawyer who had filed PIL. He was a blackmailer. In the circumstances the PIL was dismissed with costs. It is in that light, that the Division Bench of the Court speaking through Pasayat, J. stated the parameters of PIL. Learned senior counsel for respondent nos.4 and 5 has referred to para 4 of the said judgment in support of his contention that PIL is maintainable to help poor and needy who have no access to the legal system. I quote hereinbelow para 4 of the said judgment.
‘4. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be ‘publicity interest litigation’ or ”private interest litigation’ or ‘politics interest litigation” or the latest trend ”paise income litigation’. The High Court has found that the case at hand belongs to the last category. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in The Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, JT 1992 (5) SC 213 and Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation, JT 1994 (3) SC 140. A writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. (See Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, JT 1992 (Supp) SC 370 and K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand, (1994) 6 SCC 620.’
82. To the same effect is the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab and Others1. In the said judgment it has been held that PIL will not lie in cases of personal and political rivalry. While laying down the parameters the Division Bench speaking through Pasayat, J. observed that in the PIL nobody should be allowed to make wild and reckless allegations spoiling the characters of others; that, PIL is not maintainable in cases of personal vendetta. However, in the said judgment it has been held that the court can act if it is satisfied with the correctness or the nature of the information given by the petitioner.
83. Mr. Goolamhusein E. Vahanvati, Learned Solicitor General of India, appearing for Union of India, adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel, on the preliminary issue. He, however, added that in the present case reckless allegations have been made without any basis against important functionaries, judges and authorities under the I.T. Act. He submitted that the petitioners cannot destroy the service careers of the government officers without any reason or basis, except for their own political rivalry with respondent no.5. He submitted that there is no violation of law or the Constitution, particularly, when Mr. Yogender Prasad, the earlier trial judge who had extensively heard the matter, was promoted as District Judge. Learned counsel further submitted that constitution of the Special Bench by the President of the Tribunal was done in the circumstances spelt out in the various affidavits; that the matter was required to be expeditiously heard which led to the constitution of the Special Bench; and that decision was not arbitrary, as alleged. There is nothing on record to indicate that favoured judges/members were appointed and that inconvenient judges/members were dispensed with to favour the accused in the present case.
84. Learned senior counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (98) v. Union of India and Others , (supra) where this Court speaking through learned Chief Justice of India has held vide para 26 as follows:
’26. For the last few years, inflow of public interest litigation has increased manifold. Considerable judicial time is spent in dealing with such cases. A person acting bona fide alone can approach the court in public interest. Such a remedy is not open to an unscrupulous person who acts, in fact, for someone else. The liberal rule of locus standi exercised in favour of bona fide public interest litigants has immensely helped the cause of justice. Such litigants have been instrumental in drawing attention of this Court and High Courts in matters of utmost importance and in securing orders and directions for many under-privileged such as, pavement dwellers, bonded labour, prisoners’ conditions, children, sexual harassment of girls and women, cases of communal riots, innocent killings, torture, long custody in prison without trial or in the matters of environment, illegal stone quarries, illegal mining, pollution of air and water, clean fuel, hazardous and polluting industries or preservation of forest as in the T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (I) v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267. While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that courts should not allow their process to be abused by a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration. (See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors., JT 1992 (5) SC 213).’
FINDINGS:
85. At the outset, it needs to be noted that in this case we are concerned not with the merits of the allegations but with the decision-making process, be it in the posting of Mr. Munni Lal Paswan, Special Judge, CBI, Patna or in the matter of the Revenue Department not moving in appeal to the High Court under Section 260A of the I.T. Act despite there being substantial questions of law arising from the impugned judgment of the Tribunal. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the present writ petitions should be seen in the context of the earlier two decisions of the Supreme Court under which investigations were handed over to CBI as an amount of around Rs.500 crores stands misappropriated in the fodder scam. It is the case of the petitioners that the present case should be seen in the light of the directions given by the Supreme Court in the cases of Ranchi Zila Samta Party (supra) and Sushil Kumar Modi (supra).
86. The present petitions are filed on the alleged acts of misfeasance. The test which one has to apply to decide the maintainability of the PIL concerns sufficiency of the petitioner’s interest. Under this test it is necessary to consider the subject matter to which the PIL relates. It is wrong in law for the court to judge the applicant’s interest without looking at the subject matter of his complaint. If the petitioner shows failure of public duty, the court would be in error in dismissing his PIL.
87. In the case of Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self-employed and Small Business Ltd.1, a declaration was sought that the Revenue had acted unlawfully in granting amnesty to the trade union of casual workers and accordingly a writ of mandamus was sought to assess and collect income tax from casual workers according to law. In the Divisional Court when the motion for judicial review came, the point of locus standi was treated as a preliminary point. The Divisional Court refused the leave saying that the petitioner had no power to bring such an action. The Court of Appeal by majority reversed the decision of the Divisional Court and made a declaration that the applicants have sufficient interest to apply for judicial review. Upholding the decision of the Division Court it was held by the House of Lords that the question of sufficient interest of the petitioner cannot be considered in the abstract. It must be taken together with the legal and factual context. It was held that the management of tax recovery falls within the domain of the Revenue but if that act of management is found to be based on exercise of its authority for extraneous reasons, then judicial review would certainly lie. It was held that the Revenue Department was incharge of assessment and collection of taxes for the welfare of the State; that, it was responsible for good management under the statute; that, if it was found that the Board was proposing to exercise its authority or if the Board was refraining itself from exercising its power not for good reasons of good management but for some extraneous or ulterior reasons then that action or inaction by the Board would be ultra vires and such a matter would be a proper matter for judicial review. In this respect the following observation made by the House of Lords at pages 636-637 is quoted hereinbelow:
‘It is, in my view, very much to be regretted that a case of such importance to the development of English public law under this new procedure should have come before this House in the form that it does as a result of what my noble and learned friend, Lord Wilberforce, has described as the unfortunate course that was taken in the courts below when, leave to apply for judicial review having been previously granted ex parte, the application itself came on for hearing. This has had the result of deflecting the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal from giving consideration to the questions (1) what was the public duty of the Board of Inland Revenue of which it was alleged to be in breach, and (2) what was the nature of the breaches of that duty that were relied upon by the federation. Because of this, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, against which appeal to your Lordships’ House is brought, takes the form of an interlocutory judgment declaring that the federation ‘have a sufficient interest to apply for judicial review herein.’
As my noble and learned friend has pointed out, these two omitted questions need to be answered in the instant case before it is possible to say whether the federation have ‘a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates,’ since, until they are answered, that matter cannot be identified. This is likely also to be the case in most applications for judicial review that are not on the face of them frivolous or vexatious. Your Lordships have accordingly heard full argument on both these questions.
As respects the statutory powers and duties of the Board of Inland Revenue, these are described and dealt with in several of your Lordships’ speeches. It would be wearisome if I were to repeat what already has been, and later will be, better said by others. All that I need say here is that the board is charged by statute with the care, management and collection on behalf of the Crown of Income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax. In the exercise of these functions the board has a wide managerial discretion as to the best means of obtaining for the national exchequer from the taxes committed to their charge, the highest net return that is practicable having regard to the staff available to them and the cost of collection. The board and the inspectors and collectors who act under their directions are under a statutory duty of confidentiality with respect to information about individual taxpayers’ affairs that has been obtained in the course of their duties in making assessments and collecting the taxes; and this imposes a limitation on their managerial discretion. I do not doubt, however, and I do not understand any of your Lordships to doubt, that if it were established that the board were proposing to exercise or to refrain from exercising its powers not for reasons of ‘good management’ but for some extraneous or ulterior reason, that action or inaction of the board would be ultra vires and would be a proper matter for judicial review if it were brought to the attention of the court by an applicant with ‘a sufficient interest’ in having the board compelled to observe the law.’
(emphasis supplied)
88. Applying the above test we have to ascertain in the present case whether the decision of the Government in not preferring the appeal to the High Court under Section 260A of the I.T. Act constituted inaction on the part of the Department. This question needs to be answered not in an abstract but having regard to position in law and having regard to the facts of the present case.
(b) WHETHER THERE WAS FAILURE OF STATUTORY AND PUBLIC DUTY ON THE PART OF THE REVENUE IN NOT PREFERRING AN APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT UNDER SECTION 260A OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961:
89. The facts of the case of the assessee, Smt. Rabri Devi, are as follows: On 14.10.1996 the assessee filed voluntary returns for assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97. On 14.11.1996 she filed voluntary returns for assessment years 1986-87 to 1994-95 declaring various incomes which had escaped assessment as she had not filed her returns earlier. The assessee also applied for waiver of interest and penalty under Section 273A of the I.T. Act. In the voluntary returns, the assessee disclosed income derived from dairy farming, agriculture and rent from house property. Upon receipt of returns for the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97 the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax issued notice of defecting returns under Section 139 of the I.T. Act in which it was alleged that regular books of accounts were not maintained; that, return was not accompanied by a statement indicating the amount of turn-over, gross receipts, gross profits and net profits from business/profession. The assessee also received notices under Section 148 of the I.T. Act for the period 1986-87 to 1994-95. The Assessing Officer recorded the reasons for reopening the assessment for each of the above years. For example, the reasons for reopening the assessment for the year 1986-87 are as follows:
‘A notice under Section 131 A of the I.T. Act’ 61 was issued to the husband of the assessee, asking him to furnish, among other things, details of income of other family members and details of assets owned by such family members. In reply to the said notice the assessee’ husband submitted that the assessee had been deriving rental income from house property at Sheikhoura since 1983-84 and from dairy farms since 1975. Subsequently, the assessee on 25.10.96 filed details of her immovable and movable properties before the ADIT (Inv.), Patna. From a perusal of this, it is noticed that the assessee has made substantial investments in residential house at Sheikhoura, in agricultural land at Saran and Patna and land at Danapur, Patna. It is also noticed that she has made substantial investments in FDs, Kisan Vikas Patras and National Savings Certificates, besides having a number of bank a/cs. The assessee has also contributed to the construction of her husband’s house property at Phulwari.
Despite having made such large investments, the assessee has never filed Income-tax returns, nor has she been assessed to Income-tax in past. Recently, the assessee had filed a petition under Section 273 A of the I.T. Act ’61 before the CIT, Patna. Pursuant to this petition, she had also filed a disclosure of income Rs.70,000 for the A/Y in question in order to explain the capital required for the investment that she has made.
All these information in our possession give us reason to believe that at the very least a sum of Rs.70,000 has escaped assessment for the A/Y 1986-87 owing to the failure of
the assessee to file return within stipulated time limit and to disclose material facts relevant to have assessment at the appropriate time.
As more than four years from end of the assessment year have lapsed, approval is solicited from DCIT, Range-1, Patna to issue notice under Section 148 of the I.T. Act’61. It is clarified that notice under Section 148 of the I.T. Act is issuable as income escaping assessment exceeds the amount stipulated in Section 149(1)(b).
Sd/- Nikhil Choudhary 20.11.96
Asst. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Spl. Inv. Circle-1, Patna.’
90. I need not go into further details regarding the alleged undisclosed income for each assessment year. Suffice it to state that additions have been made by the Department to the income of the assessee under various orders passed by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). These orders were challenged by the assessee before the Tribunal.
91. By the impugned judgment the appeals filed by the assessee were allowed by the Tribunal. While allowing the appeal of the assessee the Tribunal held that the case involved highly intricate issues; that, these issues were extremely difficult to understand; that, but for the assistance of the learned advocates on both sides it was difficult to adjudicate such disputes. At the same time the Tribunal without any basis castigated the officers of the Department including the Commissioner (Appeals) saying that rampant additions were made to destroy the case of the assessees and to destroy the political career of respondent no.5 (See: para 40 of the judgment of the Tribunal). Similarly, the Tribunal has castigated the higher officers of the Department saying that they were biased and that they had acted at the behest of the Centre in clubbing the income of respondent no.4 with that of respondent no.5 who was going through political crisis (See: para 54 of the said judgment).
92. There is no basis given in the impugned decision of the Tribunal for making such strong observations against the officers of the Revenue. Although the High Court under Section 260A of the I.T. Act would not have enquired into the sufficiency of materials or substituted its judgment for that of the Tribunal in regard to facts, nevertheless, if the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal is without any basis or based on irrelevant considerations then the High Court was required to interfere under Section 260A.
93. PIL is not maintainable to probe or enquire into the returns of another taxpayer except in special circumstances. It is the ratio of the decision of House of Lords in the case of National Federation of Self-employed (supra). However, when scams take place, accusation of disproportionate assets are required to be looked into.
94. In the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others1 (Taj Trapezium Matter), the Division Bench of this Court not only directed CBI to investigate the cases against the bureaucrats but also to enquire the outflow of Rs.17 crores released by the State of U.P. in respect of project undertaken by NPCC. In that matter the income tax returns of the former Chief Minister and other officials were ordered to be collected by this Court. They were directed to be collected from various income tax authorities. The point to be noted is that the source of the funds plays a crucial role in investigations by CBI in matters involving misappropriation of public funds. Departments have to work in tandem. The evidentiary value of the collected material in the criminal trial is a matter different from the collection of information by the officers of the Revenue Department. In the present case officers of the Revenue have been condemned by the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal. Comments have been made without any basis and yet till today appeals have not been filed by the Government under Section 260A of the I.T. Act. As stated above, even the Tribunal has observed in its judgment that complicated legal issues were involved in the matter; that, even the members of the Tribunal found it very difficult to understand those issues, particularly, matters involving interpretation of Sections 131, 131(1A), 273A and 147/148 of the I.T. Act. If the issues were so difficult for the members to understand, one fails to appreciate why high-ranking officers of the Department were castigated by the Tribunal. This Court has noticed in number of cases that even an innocuous statement of the Tribunal against the Revenue Officers is challenged before the higher courts on the ground that such observations are aspersions against the officers who have performed their duty and that they need to be expunged. Surprisingly, in this particular case till today no such appeal has been filed under Section 260A of the I.T. Act. There is one more reason which is required to be mentioned. The judgment of the jurisdictional Tribunal on the scope and interpretation of the above sections which the Tribunal itself says involve complex legal issues, is binding on assessing officers and the appellate authority within that jurisdiction. If so, one fails to understand why the Department has not moved in appeal under Section 260A of the I.T. Act. In the circumstances of this case, Union of India should apply its mind afresh and take its decision keeping in mind the factors referred to hereinabove.
95. Before concluding, it may be noted that arguments have been vehemently advanced on behalf of respondent no.1 saying that these petitions need to be dismissed as the petitioners have made irresponsible statements against judicial officers and members of the Tribunal whose service records are sought to be tarnished. Applying the same yardstick one fails to understand as to why the Revenue has not moved in appeal even when its own higher officers are branded as biased in deciding matters against respondent nos.4 and 5. Their service records are as important as the service records of members of the trial court or the judicial officers.
(c) WHETHER THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED AT THE TIME OF POSTING MR. MUNNI LAL PASWAN, ADJ AS SPECIAL JUDGE, CBI, PATNA (FODDER SCAM CASES) ON 22.06.2005, NEEDS TO BE RELOOKED BY THE PATNA HIGH COURT:
96. Institutional autonomy of the High Court on its administrative side under Article 233 and Article 235 is a well-known concept. It is based on public trust and confidence. Existence of the power, as a concept, is different from exercise of power. Promotions and posting of judicial officers fall within its domain on its administrative side. At the same time it is important to note that choice of the candidate falls in the domain of public law and, therefore, that choice has to be exercised on some standard, failing which judicial review steps in. Standards of evaluation in matters of promotion and posting have to be uniformly applied otherwise arbitrariness comes in. Integration of the evaluation process has to be maintained. If different standards or no standards are applied it breaks the integrity of the process which brings in discrimination and arbitrariness which violates Article 14 and therefore judicial review.
97. In the present case we are required to see whether the standards applied to evaluate Mr. J.P. Ratnesh and Mr. Ram Niwas Prasad, trial judges, appointed as Special Judges vide Minutes of the meeting of the Standing Committee dated 22.06.2005 were equally applied while posting Mr. Munni Lal Paswan as Special Judge, CBI, Patna (fodder scam cases).
98. By order dated 26.10.2005 this Court directed the Registrar General, Patna High Court, to forward this Court A.C.Rs recorded by the Inspecting Judges of the High Court in the case of Mr. Munni Lal Paswan. In reply the Registrar General has stated as follows:
‘The A.C.Rs, recorded by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judges in the years 1985, 1990 and by the Chairman of CAT in 1997, have been placed before the Supreme Court. Besides them no ACRs of Sri Munni Lal Paswan have ever been recorded by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judges. The A.C.Rs of Additional District and Sessions Judges are recorded by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judges.’
(emphasis supplied)
99. Mr. Munni Lal Paswan was promoted to the post of ADJ on 17th June, 2003. Therefore, when Mr. Paswan was promoted as A.D.J. there was no categorization available.
100. In the report submitted by the Registrar General to this Court on 18.12.2005 pursuant to our order dated 26.10.2005, the Registrar General has forwarded the consolidated statement showing the Outturn of the work done by Mr. Paswan during the period 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 (partly). This statement refers to various parameters like disposal, remarks of P.O., remark of D.J. etc. as approved by the court. At this stage, I do not wish to comment about the remarks mentioned therein. These remarks have been approved by the District Judge and by the courts. These remarks are heavily weighted against Mr. Paswan. It is not clear whether these remarks were ever noticed by the Committee and if not they need to be relooked by the High Court.
101. One more aspect needs to be stressed. There is a prescribed form in which the C.Rs are recorded. That form indicates various parameters, namely, knowledge of law, whether the officer is hardworking, the rating to be given in respect of the judgments, namely, A+(outstanding), A (very good), B+ (good), B (satisfactory). The point to be noted is that apart from honesty and integrity there are other parameters to be fulfilled by the judicial officers and that is where the disposals, ability and all other relevant factors come.
102. On 26th July, 2006 this Court put up the following three questions in the form of order to the Registrar General of the Patna High Court:
‘1. Is it the practice in the High Court of Patna to prepare gradation/ remarks of the Judicial Officers by the Inspecting Judges?
2. As regards the three officers, including Shri M.L. Paswan, who were appointed as Special Judges on 22.6.2005 by the Standing Committee of the High Court, whether any remarks/gradation expressed by the Inspecting Judges were available to the Standing Committee?
3. Whether the gradation/remarks of the Inspecting Judges were made as regards these three officers?’
103. In reply, the Registrar General of the Patna High Court stated as follows in paras 2 to 4:
‘2. That in regard to Query No. 1 of this Hon’ble Court as mentioned in the Order dated 26.7.2006, I respectfully say and submit that there is a practice in the High Court of Patna to record remarks of Judicial Officers by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judges of the concerned Judgeships which is known as Annual Confidential Remarks. The Annual Confidential remarks recorded by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judges which includes knowledge of law, integrity, behaviour with Bar, general reputation, industriousness, efficiency, behaviour towards superiors and subordinate colleagues and categorization made by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judges and net result categorization is to be placed before the Standing Committee where the gradation is given to the Officer by the Hon’ble Standing Committee.
3. That in regard to query no.2 of this Hon’ble Court as mentioned in the Order dated 26.7.2006, I respectfully say and submit that the 3 Officers, namely, Shri Jawahar Prasad Ratnesh, Shri Ram Niwas Prasad and Shri Munni Lal Paswan who were appointed as Special Judge on 22.6.2005 by the Standing Committee, the remarks of the Hon’ble Inspecting Judges as maintained in the Guard Files which are maintained separately for each officers, were available to the Hon’ble Standing Committee. The said fact also finds mention in the decision dated 22.6.2005 of the Hon’ble Standing Committee.
4. That in regard to query no.3 of this Hon’ble Court as mentioned in the Order dated 26.7.2006, I respectfully say and submit that the remarks of the Hon’ble Inspecting Judge in case of Mr. Jawahar Prasad Ratnesh was of the years 1985, 1986-87, 1988, 2001, 2003 and 2005 (And remarks recorded by P.O., Industrial Tribunal, Patna in 1998). In respect of Shri Ram Niwas Prasad, the remarks recorded by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judge was of 1985, 1986, 1997 and 2002. As regards Shri Munni Lal Paswan, the remarks recorded by the Hon’ble Inspecting Judge was of 1985 and 1990 and by Vice-Chairman, Industrial Tribunal, Patna Bench in 1997.
(emphasis supplied)
104. Reading para 4 it is clear that the remarks of Inspecting Judge, in the case of Mr. J.P. Ratnesh, were duly updated when they were placed before the Standing Committee of the High Court. In respect of Mr. Ram Niwas Prasad the remarks recorded by the Inspecting Judge for the years 1985, 1986, 1997 and 2002 were updated and placed before the Standing Committee of the High Court. However, in case of Mr. Munni Lal Paswan the remarks of the Inspecting Judge duly recorded are only of 1985 and 1990. Mr. Munni Lal Paswan was promoted as A.D.J. on 17.06.2003. He was posted as Special Judge on 22.06.2005. Therefore, it is clear that there is no gradation/categorisation of the confidential reports of Mr. Munni Lal Paswan by the Inspecting Judge of the High Court particularly after becoming A.D.J.
105. In the case of High Court of Punjab and Haryana, through Registrar General v. Ishwar Chand Jain and Another1, this Court has held as follows:
’32. Since late this Court is watching the spectre of either judicial officers or the High Courts coming to this Court when there is an order prematurely retiring a judicial officer. Under Article 235 of the Constitution the High Court exercises complete control over subordinate courts which include District Courts. Inspection of the subordinate courts is one of the most important functions which the High Court performs for control over the subordinate courts. The object of such inspection is for the purpose of assessment of the work performed by the Subordinate Judge, his capability, integrity and competency. Since Judges are human beings and also prone to all the human failings inspection provides an opportunity for pointing out mistakes so that they are avoided in future and deficiencies, if any, in the working of the subordinate court, remedied. Inspection should act as a catalyst in inspiring Subordinate Judges to give the best results. They should feel a sense of achievement. They need encouragement. They work under great stress and man the courts while working under great discomfort and hardship. A satisfactory judicial system depends largely on the satisfactory functioning of courts at the grass-root level. Remarks recorded by the Inspecting Judge are normally endorsed by the Full Court and become part of the annual confidential reports and are foundations on which the career of a judicial officer is made or marred. Inspection of a subordinate court is thus of vital importance. It has to be both effective and productive. It can be so only if it is well regulated and is workman-like. Inspection of subordinate courts is not a one-day or an hour or a few minutes’ affair. It has to go on all the year round by monitoring the work of the court by the Inspecting Judge. A casual inspection can hardly be beneficial to a judicial system. It does more harm than good. As noticed in the case of Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah, JT 1988 (2) SC 567 there could be ill-conceived or motivated complaints. Rumour-mongering is to be avoided at all costs as it seriously jeopardizes the efficient working of the subordinate courts.
33. Time has come that a proper and uniform system of inspection of subordinate courts should be devised by the High Courts. In fact the whole system of inspection needs rationalization. There should be some scope of self-assessment by the officer concerned. We are informed that the First National Judicial Pay Commission is also looking into the matter. This subject, however, can be well considered in a Chief Justices’ Conference as the High Court itself can devise an effective system of inspection of the subordinate courts. The Registrar General shall place a copy of this judgment before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for him to consider if the method of inspection of subordinate courts could be a matter of the agenda for the Chief Justices’ Conference.’
(emphasis supplied)
106. The above judgment emphasizes the importance of the remarks given by the Inspecting Judge. The object of Inspection is to assess the work performed, capability, competency besides integrity of the candidate. Those gradations/categorisations given by Inspecting Judges are required to be placed before the full court. In the present case, that exercise is done for two out of three judicial officers when they were posted. However, it appears from the affidavit of the Registrar General that no gradation/categorisation has been done after 1990 by the Inspecting Judge vis-a-vis the judgments of Mr. Munni Lal Paswan.
107. It is important to bear in mind that in the matter of economic scams be it security transactions or fodder scams or Taj corridor it is the economic interest of the country which is at stake. These cases are highly complicated in which complicated questions are involved and, therefore, posting plays a vital role.
108. In the circumstances, it seems that the procedure followed by the High Court in the meeting on 22.06.05 has lost sight of the above criteria. In the circumstances, a request is being made to the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to convene an urgent meeting of Administrative Judges and complete the exercise of giving appropriate gradation/categorisation after looking at the judgments and orders delivered by the concerned judge, Mr. Paswan. I may make it clear that this is just a request to the High Court and not a direction so that the evaluation standards are commonly applied to all the three candidates.
109. Before concluding, it may be pointed out that this decision is confined strictly to the decision-making process and it is not concerned with the merits of the allegations made in the petitions. The allegations made in the petitions are not only against the accused, they are also directed against number of functionaries. It is, therefore, made clear that this decision is only to rectify the procedure of decision-making at the High Court level and at the Revenue level so that in future such anomalies do not arise.
110. To sum up, the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court is requested to convene a meeting of Administrative Judges and have a fresh look at the evaluation in the case of posting of Sri Paswan as Special Judge for C.B.I. (Fodder Scam Cases) at Patna, vide Minutes of Meeting dated 22.06.2005. At the same time, Union of India is directed to reconsider approaching the High Court against the decision of the Tribunal dated 2.7.2004 under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in the light of what is stated above.
111. In the end it may be stated that true value of a decision lies in its propriety and not in the decision being right or wrong.