State of Bihar and Ors. Vs. Tata Engineering & Loco. Co. Ltd. & Anr.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No.8374 Of 1995
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.1773 of 1987)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.1773 of 1987)
Petitioner: State of Bihar and Ors.
Respondent: Tata Engineering & Loco. Co. Ltd. & Anr.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No.8374 Of 1995
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.1773 of 1987)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.1773 of 1987)
Judges: K. RAMASWAMY & B.L. HANSARIA, JJ
Date of Judgment: Sep 08, 1995
Head Note:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Precedent – Mining lease expired by efflux of time – Appeal was dismissed as withdrawn – Judgment of the High Court not to be construed to stand in the way of the appellant to grant mining leases in accordance with law and it would not form a precedent.
JUDGEMENT:
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard the counsel on both sides. Since the mining lease had already expired by efflux of time, we dispose of the appeal by stating as below :
One M/s. Douglas Dias had approached this Court by way of appeal, viz., C.A.No.3996/87. Since it has been dismissed as withdrawn by this Court’s order dated 25th January, 1993, the controversy does not survive for decision in this case, except that the impugned decision may be construed to stand in the way of the State to consider similar case differently in future. In fact in the application for condonation of delay, in filing this appeal, it was stated in paragraph 2, thus :
“Initially there was a decision taken that the petitioner should only file a counter affidavit to the special leave petition No.6337 of 1986, filed by the respondent no.2 herein, M/s. Douglas Dias, in the Supreme Court, but without there being a proper appreciation and perusal of the judgment done by the department they came to know that it may subsequently affect the rights of the petitioners, while granting any mining lease to any party. Ultimately, it was decided in the month of November, 1986, to file a special leave petition herein the Supreme Court and now the petitioners are filing a petition for special leave here in the Supreme Court.”
3. It is made clear that the judgment of the High Court would not be construed to stand in the way of the appellant to grant mining leases in accordance with law and it would not form a precedent.
4. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard the counsel on both sides. Since the mining lease had already expired by efflux of time, we dispose of the appeal by stating as below :
One M/s. Douglas Dias had approached this Court by way of appeal, viz., C.A.No.3996/87. Since it has been dismissed as withdrawn by this Court’s order dated 25th January, 1993, the controversy does not survive for decision in this case, except that the impugned decision may be construed to stand in the way of the State to consider similar case differently in future. In fact in the application for condonation of delay, in filing this appeal, it was stated in paragraph 2, thus :
“Initially there was a decision taken that the petitioner should only file a counter affidavit to the special leave petition No.6337 of 1986, filed by the respondent no.2 herein, M/s. Douglas Dias, in the Supreme Court, but without there being a proper appreciation and perusal of the judgment done by the department they came to know that it may subsequently affect the rights of the petitioners, while granting any mining lease to any party. Ultimately, it was decided in the month of November, 1986, to file a special leave petition herein the Supreme Court and now the petitioners are filing a petition for special leave here in the Supreme Court.”
3. It is made clear that the judgment of the High Court would not be construed to stand in the way of the appellant to grant mining leases in accordance with law and it would not form a precedent.
4. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
