Smt. Jiwani Vs. Rajmata Basantika Devi & Ors.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No.4347 of 1984
Petitioner: Smt. Jiwani
Respondent: Rajmata Basantika Devi & Ors.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No.4347 of 1984
Judges: KULDIP SINGH & P.B. SAWANT, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Jul 20, 1993
Head Note:
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908:
O. 21, RR. 11 and 17 – Execution of decree – Procedure on receiving the application – Execution application verified by a person who was dead on the date of filing the application – It was no application in the eyes of law – Even after remand of case by the High Court no attempt made to have the application amended – Executing Court suo moto permitted the amendment of the application after the dismissal of the objections of the appellant – Held that the procedure was violative of Rules 11 and 17 – Appeal allowed.
Held:
It is no doubt correct that the rules of procedure are hand- maids of justice and ordinarily the provisions of Order 21 Rule 17 are to be interpreted liberally and an amendment to the execution application should be permitted. It is further not disputed that an amendment when permitted dates back to the original filing of the application. The facts of the present case, however, do not warrant the liberal approach indicated by us. The execution application was filed in the Court on May 8, 1974 under the signatures of a dead person and as such there was no application in the eyes of law before the court. No notice of the said application was given to the appellant and warrant of possession was issued on the same date. The order which was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice was void and was rightly set aside by the High Court. It was only after the remand of the case by the High Court that the appellant got an opportunity of filing objections before the Executing Court which he did on August 13, 1981. Even on the date when the appellant filed objections before the Executing Court the execution – application bore the signatures of late Randhir Singh and no other person had signed or verified the same. It is thus obvious that even in the year 1981 when the Executing Court took notice of the execution application after remand from the High Court there was no signed application before the said Court on behalf of the decree holders. No attempt, not even a prayer, was made before the Executing Court for the amendment of the application. It was only on September 29, 1984 – after the dismissal of appellants objections – that the Executing Court suo moto permitted the amendment of the application. The procedure – on the face of it – was violative of the provisions of Rule 11 and 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. The suit in this case was decreed on December 31, 1965 and as such in the year 1981, when the Executing Court issued notice to the appellant, the unamended execution-application was even time barred.
Even otherwise there is no equity in favour of the respondents. The land in dispute having been given on tenancy to the appellant’s father in the year 1929 by the then Raja of Kathiwar, there is no justification whatsoever to deprive the appellant of her long possession of the land. The appellant and her late parents have been in possession of the land for over sixty years, it would be travesty of justice, to permit the land to be taken away from the appellant. (Paras 6 and 7)
Cases Reffered:
1. Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., 1955 (1) SCR 1369. (Para 5)
JUDGEMENT:
KULDIP SINGH, J. :
1. Suit for possession of the land in dispute, filed by the respondents-plaintiffs, was decreed on December 31, 1965. Execution-application was filed by the respondents on May 8, 1974. The appellant filed objections to the said application. The Trial Court, by its order dated August 10, 1984, rejected the objections and allowed the execution. Civil Revision filed by the appellant against the order of the Executing Court was dismissed in limine by the High Court on September 21, 1984. This appeal by way of special leave petition is against the order of the Executing Court as upheld by the High Court.
2. Pindu, father of the appellant, took possession of the land as a tenant from the respondents, in the year 1929. He died in 1950 and thereafter his widow Gangi stepped into his shoes and continued to be recorded as tenant in the revenue records. Gangi died in the year 1960 and thereafter the appellant, daughter and sole heir left by Gangi, came into possession of the land and was recorded as tenant. Rana Raghunath Singh and others instituted a suit for possession on December 13, 1963 which was decreed by the Trial Court on December 31, 1965. It is not disputed that the execution-application was prepared on November 27, 1973. It was signed and verified by one Randhir Singh who was a joint decree holder along with Rana Raghunath Singh and others. Randhir Singh died on April 1, 1974. It is further not disputed that the execution-application which was prepared on November 27, 1973 was not filed by Randhir Singh, before the Executing Court, during his life time. It was only on May 8, 1974, long after his death that the said application was filed in the Court of Sub Judge First Class Theog District Shimla. The execution-application was filed in the Court under the signatures and verification of Randhir Singh who had died on April 1, 1974. The Executing Court, without notice to the appellant, issued warrant of possession in respect of the disputed land by its order dated May 8, 1974. The appellant challenged the order before the High Court on the ground that the same was a nullity because the warrant of possession was issued behind the back of the appellant and in utter violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court by its order dated July 24, 1980 quashed the order of the
Executing Court dated May 8, 1974 and remanded the case for fresh decision in accordance with law.
3. The main objection filed by the appellant before the Executing Court, was that the Execution-application filed by the respondents was non est in the eyes of law because it was signed and verified by a person who was dead on the date of filing of the application. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the application was liable to the dismissed on the ground that the mandatory provisions of Order 21 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code were not complied with. The Executing Court came to the conclusion that the procedural defect could be remedied under Order 21 Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code and as such the court dismissed the objections filed by the appellant. While dismissing the objections on August 10, 1984 the Court adjourned the case to September 3, 1984 for obtaining the signatures of another decree holder on the execution application. None was present on behalf of the respondents on September 3, 1984. It was further adjourned to September 29, 1984 and on that date the execution application was signed by Devinder Singh and Narinder Singh.
4. Rules 11 and 17 of Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code, to the relevant extent, are reproduced hereunder:
“11. Oral application. – (1) Where a decree is for the payment of money the court may, on the oral application of the decree holder at the time of the passing of the decree, order immediate execution thereof by the arrest of a judgment debtor, prior to the preparation of a warrant if he is within the precincts of the court.
(2) Written application. – Save as otherwise provided by sub- rule (1), every application for the execution of a decree shall be in writing, signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, and shall contain in a tabular form the following particular, namely:-
(a) to (j) …………
(3) ………………
17. Procedure on receiving application for execution of decree. – (1) On receiving an application for the execution of a decree as provided by Rule 11, sub-rule (2), the Court shall ascertain whether such of the requirements of Rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with; and if they have not been complied with, (the Court shall allow) the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it.
(1-A) If the defect is not so remedied, the Court shall reject the application:
Provided that where, in the opinion of the Court, there is some inaccuracy as to the amount referred to in clauses (g) and (h) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11, the Court shall, instead of rejecting the application, decide provisionally (without prejudice to the right of the parties to have the amount finally decided in the course of the proceedings) the amount and make an order for the execution of the decree for the amount so provisionally decided)
(2) Where an application is amended under the provisions of sub-rule (1) it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented.
(3) Every amendment made under this rule shall be signed or initialled by the Judge.
(4) When the application is admitted, the Court shall enter in the proper register a note of the application and the date on which it was made, and shall, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained order execution of the decree according to the nature of the application:
Provided that, in the case of a decree for the payment of money, the value of the property attached shall, as nearly as may be, correspond with the amount due under the decree.”
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the observations of this Court in Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. (1955) 1 SCR 1369 which is as under :
“As a matter of fact Order XXI, rule 17 lays down the procedure on receiving applications for execution of a decree and enjoins upon the Court the duty to ascertain whether such of the requirements of rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with and if they have not been complied with the Court has to reject the application or allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it. When the application for execution in the present case was received by the City Civil Court, the Court should have scrutinised the application as required by Order XXI, rule 17(1) and if it was found that the requirements of rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable were not complied with as is contended for by the Appellant, the Court should have rejected the application or allowed the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by the Court. Nothing of the kind was ever done by the City Civil Court nor was any objection in that behalf taken on behalf of the Appellant at any time until the matter came before this Court. “
6. It is no doubt correct that the rules of procedure are handmaids of justice and ordinarily the provisions of Order 21 Rule 17 are to be interpreted liberally and an amendment to the execution application should be permitted. It is further not disputed that an amendment when permitted dates back to the original filing of the application. The facts of the present case, however, do not warrant the liberal approach indicated by us. The execution application was filed in the Court on May 8, 1974 under the signatures of a dead person and as such there was no application in the eyes of law before the court. No notice of the said application was given to the appellant and warrant of possession was issued on the same date. The order which was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice was void and was rightly set aside by the High Court. It was only after the remand of the case by the High Court that the appellant got an opportunity of filing objections before the Executing Court which he did on August 13, 1981. Even on the date when the appellant filed objections before the Executing Court the execution – application bore the signatures of late Randhir Singh and no other person had signed or verified the same. It is thus obvious that even in the year 1981 when the Executing Court took notice of the execution application after remand from the High Court there was no signed application before the said Court on behalf of the decree holders. No attempt, not even a prayer, was made before the Executing Court for the amendment of the application. It was only on September 29, 1984 – after the dismissal of appellants objections – that the Executing Court suo moto permitted the amendment of the application. The procedure – on the face of it – was violative of the provisions of Rule 11 and 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. The suit in this case was decreed on December 31, 1965 and as such in the year 1981, when the Executing Court issued notice to the appellant, the unamended execution-application was even time barred.
7. Even otherwise there is no equity in favour of the respondents. The land in dispute having been given on tenancy to the appellant’s father in the year 1929 by the then Raja of Kathiwar, there is no justification whatsoever to deprive the appellant of her long possession of the land. The appellant and her late parents have been in possession of the land for over sixty years, it would be travesty of justice, to permit the land to be taken away from the appellant.
8. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order dated August 10, 1984 of the Executing Court and dated September 21, 1984 of the High Court. The objections of the appellant filed before the Executing Court are allowed and the execution – application of the respondents is dismissed. No costs.
1. Suit for possession of the land in dispute, filed by the respondents-plaintiffs, was decreed on December 31, 1965. Execution-application was filed by the respondents on May 8, 1974. The appellant filed objections to the said application. The Trial Court, by its order dated August 10, 1984, rejected the objections and allowed the execution. Civil Revision filed by the appellant against the order of the Executing Court was dismissed in limine by the High Court on September 21, 1984. This appeal by way of special leave petition is against the order of the Executing Court as upheld by the High Court.
2. Pindu, father of the appellant, took possession of the land as a tenant from the respondents, in the year 1929. He died in 1950 and thereafter his widow Gangi stepped into his shoes and continued to be recorded as tenant in the revenue records. Gangi died in the year 1960 and thereafter the appellant, daughter and sole heir left by Gangi, came into possession of the land and was recorded as tenant. Rana Raghunath Singh and others instituted a suit for possession on December 13, 1963 which was decreed by the Trial Court on December 31, 1965. It is not disputed that the execution-application was prepared on November 27, 1973. It was signed and verified by one Randhir Singh who was a joint decree holder along with Rana Raghunath Singh and others. Randhir Singh died on April 1, 1974. It is further not disputed that the execution-application which was prepared on November 27, 1973 was not filed by Randhir Singh, before the Executing Court, during his life time. It was only on May 8, 1974, long after his death that the said application was filed in the Court of Sub Judge First Class Theog District Shimla. The execution-application was filed in the Court under the signatures and verification of Randhir Singh who had died on April 1, 1974. The Executing Court, without notice to the appellant, issued warrant of possession in respect of the disputed land by its order dated May 8, 1974. The appellant challenged the order before the High Court on the ground that the same was a nullity because the warrant of possession was issued behind the back of the appellant and in utter violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court by its order dated July 24, 1980 quashed the order of the
Executing Court dated May 8, 1974 and remanded the case for fresh decision in accordance with law.
3. The main objection filed by the appellant before the Executing Court, was that the Execution-application filed by the respondents was non est in the eyes of law because it was signed and verified by a person who was dead on the date of filing of the application. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the application was liable to the dismissed on the ground that the mandatory provisions of Order 21 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code were not complied with. The Executing Court came to the conclusion that the procedural defect could be remedied under Order 21 Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code and as such the court dismissed the objections filed by the appellant. While dismissing the objections on August 10, 1984 the Court adjourned the case to September 3, 1984 for obtaining the signatures of another decree holder on the execution application. None was present on behalf of the respondents on September 3, 1984. It was further adjourned to September 29, 1984 and on that date the execution application was signed by Devinder Singh and Narinder Singh.
4. Rules 11 and 17 of Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code, to the relevant extent, are reproduced hereunder:
“11. Oral application. – (1) Where a decree is for the payment of money the court may, on the oral application of the decree holder at the time of the passing of the decree, order immediate execution thereof by the arrest of a judgment debtor, prior to the preparation of a warrant if he is within the precincts of the court.
(2) Written application. – Save as otherwise provided by sub- rule (1), every application for the execution of a decree shall be in writing, signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, and shall contain in a tabular form the following particular, namely:-
(a) to (j) …………
(3) ………………
17. Procedure on receiving application for execution of decree. – (1) On receiving an application for the execution of a decree as provided by Rule 11, sub-rule (2), the Court shall ascertain whether such of the requirements of Rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with; and if they have not been complied with, (the Court shall allow) the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it.
(1-A) If the defect is not so remedied, the Court shall reject the application:
Provided that where, in the opinion of the Court, there is some inaccuracy as to the amount referred to in clauses (g) and (h) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11, the Court shall, instead of rejecting the application, decide provisionally (without prejudice to the right of the parties to have the amount finally decided in the course of the proceedings) the amount and make an order for the execution of the decree for the amount so provisionally decided)
(2) Where an application is amended under the provisions of sub-rule (1) it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented.
(3) Every amendment made under this rule shall be signed or initialled by the Judge.
(4) When the application is admitted, the Court shall enter in the proper register a note of the application and the date on which it was made, and shall, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained order execution of the decree according to the nature of the application:
Provided that, in the case of a decree for the payment of money, the value of the property attached shall, as nearly as may be, correspond with the amount due under the decree.”
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the observations of this Court in Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. (1955) 1 SCR 1369 which is as under :
“As a matter of fact Order XXI, rule 17 lays down the procedure on receiving applications for execution of a decree and enjoins upon the Court the duty to ascertain whether such of the requirements of rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with and if they have not been complied with the Court has to reject the application or allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it. When the application for execution in the present case was received by the City Civil Court, the Court should have scrutinised the application as required by Order XXI, rule 17(1) and if it was found that the requirements of rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable were not complied with as is contended for by the Appellant, the Court should have rejected the application or allowed the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by the Court. Nothing of the kind was ever done by the City Civil Court nor was any objection in that behalf taken on behalf of the Appellant at any time until the matter came before this Court. “
6. It is no doubt correct that the rules of procedure are handmaids of justice and ordinarily the provisions of Order 21 Rule 17 are to be interpreted liberally and an amendment to the execution application should be permitted. It is further not disputed that an amendment when permitted dates back to the original filing of the application. The facts of the present case, however, do not warrant the liberal approach indicated by us. The execution application was filed in the Court on May 8, 1974 under the signatures of a dead person and as such there was no application in the eyes of law before the court. No notice of the said application was given to the appellant and warrant of possession was issued on the same date. The order which was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice was void and was rightly set aside by the High Court. It was only after the remand of the case by the High Court that the appellant got an opportunity of filing objections before the Executing Court which he did on August 13, 1981. Even on the date when the appellant filed objections before the Executing Court the execution – application bore the signatures of late Randhir Singh and no other person had signed or verified the same. It is thus obvious that even in the year 1981 when the Executing Court took notice of the execution application after remand from the High Court there was no signed application before the said Court on behalf of the decree holders. No attempt, not even a prayer, was made before the Executing Court for the amendment of the application. It was only on September 29, 1984 – after the dismissal of appellants objections – that the Executing Court suo moto permitted the amendment of the application. The procedure – on the face of it – was violative of the provisions of Rule 11 and 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. The suit in this case was decreed on December 31, 1965 and as such in the year 1981, when the Executing Court issued notice to the appellant, the unamended execution-application was even time barred.
7. Even otherwise there is no equity in favour of the respondents. The land in dispute having been given on tenancy to the appellant’s father in the year 1929 by the then Raja of Kathiwar, there is no justification whatsoever to deprive the appellant of her long possession of the land. The appellant and her late parents have been in possession of the land for over sixty years, it would be travesty of justice, to permit the land to be taken away from the appellant.
8. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order dated August 10, 1984 of the Executing Court and dated September 21, 1984 of the High Court. The objections of the appellant filed before the Executing Court are allowed and the execution – application of the respondents is dismissed. No costs.
