Narottam Prasad Guatam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 1321 of 1997
Petitioner: Narottam Prasad Guatam
Respondent: State of U.P. & Ors.
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 1321 of 1997
Judges: G.B. PATTANAIK & B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Feb 22, 2001
Head Note:
SERVICE LAWS
Constitution
Articles 226, 136 – Termination – No reasons assigned – Before High Court positive assertion that it was based on misconduct – Supreme Court asking for record – Not made available on grounds of transfer of SSP. Held that adverse inference lies. No proce-dure was followed. Hence, termination set aside. Seniority to be counted but no backwages.
Held:
The position of law is undisputed that, if an order even though might not have cast a stigma on the face of it, but if the foun-dation for the order is the alleged misconduct, then the order would get vitiated. The order of termination in the case in hand was in fact penal in nature. Since admittedly no procedure had been followed before passing the order in question, the order is vitiated. (Para 2)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 548 of 1983. The appellant had been appointed as a constable in U.P. Police in the year 1968. While he was continuing as such, his services stood terminated by the order dated 15th January, 1976 without assigning any reason therefor. He immediately filed a representation to the Deputy Inspector General of Police and a further representation to the Inspector-General of Police. But, having failed in his attempt to have his grievances redressed, the appellant approached the U.P. Public Service Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”). The Tribunal not having granted the relief sought for, he approached the High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment came to the con-clusion that the order of termination was not by way of punish-ment, and since the petitioner did not have any right to post, the order of termination cannot be interfered with. Before the High Court the petitioner had made the positive assertion that though the order itself apparently appears to be innocuous, but the same had been passed as a penalty for the alleged misconduct on account of his absence from duty and for certain incidents that happened on 12.1.1976. The High Court, however, was not persuaded to accept this plea of the appellant and, examining the order of termination on its face, came to the conclusion that since the order does not cast any stigma, the same cannot be held to be penal in nature.
2. The position of law is undisputed that, if an order even though might not have cast a stigma on the face of it, but if the foundation for the order is the alleged misconduct, then the order would get vitiated. In view of the assertions made in the counter-affidavit which tend to indicate that the concerned authorities had terminated the services of the appellant on account of certain misconduct, we had directed the learned Coun-sel appearing for the State to produce the relevant records for our perusal to find out whether, in fact, the order in question is penal in nature or not. But, though the order was passed on 17th of January, 2001, and the period of four weeks has expired, yet the records have not been produced. The learned Counsel, however, prayed for adjournment saying that the records could not have been produced possibly because S.S.P. concerned has been transferred to the State of Uttaranchal. Transfer of SSP is of no relevance for production of the records of a proceeding in the court. We are unable to adjourn this matter any further in the facts and circumstances of the case. Necessarily, therefore, apart from taking into consideration the assertions made in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, we also are per-suaded to draw adverse inference on the non- production of the relevant records, and as such we hold that the order of termina-tion in the case in hand was in fact penal in nature. Since admittedly no procedure had been followed before passing the order in question, the order is vitiated. We, therefore, set aside the order of termination and direct reinstatement of the appellant in the Police Force either in Uttar Pradesh or in Uttaranchal. Needless to mention that the appellant would be entitled to count the period for the purpose of his seniority in the cadre and would not be entitled to any remuneration from the date of termination till the date of his reinstatement. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 548 of 1983. The appellant had been appointed as a constable in U.P. Police in the year 1968. While he was continuing as such, his services stood terminated by the order dated 15th January, 1976 without assigning any reason therefor. He immediately filed a representation to the Deputy Inspector General of Police and a further representation to the Inspector-General of Police. But, having failed in his attempt to have his grievances redressed, the appellant approached the U.P. Public Service Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”). The Tribunal not having granted the relief sought for, he approached the High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment came to the con-clusion that the order of termination was not by way of punish-ment, and since the petitioner did not have any right to post, the order of termination cannot be interfered with. Before the High Court the petitioner had made the positive assertion that though the order itself apparently appears to be innocuous, but the same had been passed as a penalty for the alleged misconduct on account of his absence from duty and for certain incidents that happened on 12.1.1976. The High Court, however, was not persuaded to accept this plea of the appellant and, examining the order of termination on its face, came to the conclusion that since the order does not cast any stigma, the same cannot be held to be penal in nature.
2. The position of law is undisputed that, if an order even though might not have cast a stigma on the face of it, but if the foundation for the order is the alleged misconduct, then the order would get vitiated. In view of the assertions made in the counter-affidavit which tend to indicate that the concerned authorities had terminated the services of the appellant on account of certain misconduct, we had directed the learned Coun-sel appearing for the State to produce the relevant records for our perusal to find out whether, in fact, the order in question is penal in nature or not. But, though the order was passed on 17th of January, 2001, and the period of four weeks has expired, yet the records have not been produced. The learned Counsel, however, prayed for adjournment saying that the records could not have been produced possibly because S.S.P. concerned has been transferred to the State of Uttaranchal. Transfer of SSP is of no relevance for production of the records of a proceeding in the court. We are unable to adjourn this matter any further in the facts and circumstances of the case. Necessarily, therefore, apart from taking into consideration the assertions made in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, we also are per-suaded to draw adverse inference on the non- production of the relevant records, and as such we hold that the order of termina-tion in the case in hand was in fact penal in nature. Since admittedly no procedure had been followed before passing the order in question, the order is vitiated. We, therefore, set aside the order of termination and direct reinstatement of the appellant in the Police Force either in Uttar Pradesh or in Uttaranchal. Needless to mention that the appellant would be entitled to count the period for the purpose of his seniority in the cadre and would not be entitled to any remuneration from the date of termination till the date of his reinstatement. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
