R.B.L.Banarsi Dass & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Shree Amar Trading Company
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal No. 835 of 1988
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6532/87)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6532/87)
Petitioner: R.B.L.Banarsi Dass & Co. Pvt. Ltd.
Respondent: M/s Shree Amar Trading Company
Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 835 of 1988
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6532/87)
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6532/87)
Judges: RANGANATH MISRA & MURARI MOHON DUTT,JJ.
Date of Judgment: Mar 09, 1988
Head Note:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
Eviction order passed on the basis of a compromise – Controller however suspended the decree of eviction till 8.7.1986 – Just before the period was about to expire, respondent filed a suit challenging the compromise decree – The trial and appellate court refused to grant interim injunction – On revision, the High Court granted the interim injunction – Grant of injunction was wholly uncalled for and would amount to an abuse of the process of the law – Order of High Court reversed – Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973; Section 15.
JUDGEMENT:
O R D E R
1. Special leave granted.
2. Notice issued in the special leave petition has been refused by the respondent and must, therefore, to be taken to be sufficient. There is no appearance for the respondent.
3. Eviction of the respondent was sought for under the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 on several grounds and ultimately eviction was ordered on the basis of compromise terms which were contained in a petition filed before the Controller. The Controller by his order dated 7.11.1981 while decreeing eviction suspended the decree till 8.7.1986 subject to the condition that the tenant should continue paying the rent in the meantime. The order or eviction was not challenged under section 15 of the Act. In the absence of such steps the provisions of section 15(5) of the act became operative and that provides:
“The decisions of the appellate authority and subject to such decision the order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided in sub-section (6) of this section”.
The respondent availed the benefit conferred by the order of the Controller, namely, suspension of the decree of eviction till 1986 and just before the period was about to expire filed a suit challenging the compromise decree and asked for injunction against the execution. The trial court and the appellate court refused to grant any interim injunction. On a revision petition filed by the respondent, the High Court has granted injunction. This appeal is against this injunction.
4. Ordinarily the order being interlocutory this court would not have entertained the special leave petition. We were, however, impressed by the feature that the respondent was not acting bonafide; he availed of the benefit under the compromise decree and remained in occupation for about five years without raising any dispute against the order of eviction and the institution of the suit is not a bonafide act. In the order of the High Court, we do not find any reference to these aspects and we agree with the counsel for the appellant that the respondent should not have been given any interim protection against eviction. The compromise decree which was more than five years old when the suit was filed should not have been stayed when execution was sought. Grant of injunction in this setting is in our view wholly uncalled for and would amount to an abuse of the process of the law. The order of the High Court is accordingly reversed. The appeal is allowed . There will be no order as to costs.
1. Special leave granted.
2. Notice issued in the special leave petition has been refused by the respondent and must, therefore, to be taken to be sufficient. There is no appearance for the respondent.
3. Eviction of the respondent was sought for under the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 on several grounds and ultimately eviction was ordered on the basis of compromise terms which were contained in a petition filed before the Controller. The Controller by his order dated 7.11.1981 while decreeing eviction suspended the decree till 8.7.1986 subject to the condition that the tenant should continue paying the rent in the meantime. The order or eviction was not challenged under section 15 of the Act. In the absence of such steps the provisions of section 15(5) of the act became operative and that provides:
“The decisions of the appellate authority and subject to such decision the order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided in sub-section (6) of this section”.
The respondent availed the benefit conferred by the order of the Controller, namely, suspension of the decree of eviction till 1986 and just before the period was about to expire filed a suit challenging the compromise decree and asked for injunction against the execution. The trial court and the appellate court refused to grant any interim injunction. On a revision petition filed by the respondent, the High Court has granted injunction. This appeal is against this injunction.
4. Ordinarily the order being interlocutory this court would not have entertained the special leave petition. We were, however, impressed by the feature that the respondent was not acting bonafide; he availed of the benefit under the compromise decree and remained in occupation for about five years without raising any dispute against the order of eviction and the institution of the suit is not a bonafide act. In the order of the High Court, we do not find any reference to these aspects and we agree with the counsel for the appellant that the respondent should not have been given any interim protection against eviction. The compromise decree which was more than five years old when the suit was filed should not have been stayed when execution was sought. Grant of injunction in this setting is in our view wholly uncalled for and would amount to an abuse of the process of the law. The order of the High Court is accordingly reversed. The appeal is allowed . There will be no order as to costs.
