Ajit Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.
EmailAppeal: Review Petition (Civil) Nos. 1504-1506 of 1999
IN
I.A. Nos. 1-3 of 1997
IN
Civil Appeal Nos. 3792-3794 of 1989
IN
I.A. Nos. 1-3 of 1997
IN
Civil Appeal Nos. 3792-3794 of 1989
Petitioner: Ajit Singh & Ors.
Respondent: State of Punjab & Ors.
Apeal: Review Petition (Civil) Nos. 1504-1506 of 1999
IN
I.A. Nos. 1-3 of 1997
IN
Civil Appeal Nos. 3792-3794 of 1989
IN
I.A. Nos. 1-3 of 1997
IN
Civil Appeal Nos. 3792-3794 of 1989
Judges: Dr. A.S. ANAND, C.J.I., S.B. MAJMUDAR, G.B. PATTANAIK, S.P. KURDUKAR & M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Aug 12, 1999
Head Note:
CONSTITUTION .
Constitution of India 1950
Articles 143 and 16(4) – Review – Ratio in Ajit Singh II case (JT 1999 (7) SC 153) – Right under Article 16(4) – If a fundamental right – Ratio in Indira Sawhney’s case (JT 1992 (6) SC 273). Held that Article 16(4) was “enabling provision” and view cannot be changed merely because reservation was created as reasonable classification. (Paras 3, 4)
Constitution of India 1950
Articles 143 and 16(4) – Review – Ratio in Ajit Singh II case (JT 1999 (7) SC 153) – Right under Article 16(4) – If a fundamental right – Ratio in Indira Sawhney’s case (JT 1992 (6) SC 273). Held that Article 16(4) was “enabling provision” and view cannot be changed merely because reservation was created as reasonable classification. (Paras 3, 4)
Cases Reffered:
1. Ajit Singh II v. State of Punjab JT 1999 (7) SC 153
2. P & T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association (Regd.) v. Union of India (1998 (4) SCC 147)
3. State Bank of India v. Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association JT 1996 (4) SC 347
4. Indira Sawhney and Ors. Etc. Etc. v. Union of India and Ors. Etc. Etc. JT 1992 (6) SC 273
5. C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India (1968 (1) SCR 721)
6. M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963 (Suppl) (1) SCR 439)
2. P & T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association (Regd.) v. Union of India (1998 (4) SCC 147)
3. State Bank of India v. Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association JT 1996 (4) SC 347
4. Indira Sawhney and Ors. Etc. Etc. v. Union of India and Ors. Etc. Etc. JT 1992 (6) SC 273
5. C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India (1968 (1) SCR 721)
6. M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963 (Suppl) (1) SCR 439)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Delay condoned.
2. We are of the view that there are no merits in the review applications.
3. In Ajit Singh II v. State of Punjab JT 1999 (7) SC 153 = (1997 (7) SCC 209), it was stated (at PP. 229-230) relving upon earlier judgments starting from 1963, that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision and did not impose any constitutional duty nor confer any fundamental right for reservation. The observations at page 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J. in Indira Sawhney relied upon in the review applica-tions do not deal with the above issue. It was the view of two Constitution Bench judgments of this Court one of 1963 in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963 (Suppl) (1) SCR 439) and another in 1968 in C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India (1968 (1) SCR 721) and also two three judgments of this Court in P & T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association (Regd.) v. Union of India (1998 (4) SCC 147) and State Bank of India v. Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association JT 1996 (4) SC 347 = (1996 (4) SCC 119), that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. The view was nowhere dissented in Indira Sawhney much less at page 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J.
4. It appears to us that all the nine Judges in Indira Sawhney were of the same view that Article 16(4) was not in the nature of a fundamental right and was only an enabling provision. In this connection, reference may be made with advantage to the view of Jeevan Reddy, J. (at pages 667-735) referring to Subba Rao, J. that Article 16(4) was a provision conferring a ‘power’ and referring to Article 16(1) alone as a guarantee and not to Arti-cle 16(4); to the view of Sawant, J. (at page 517, para 43 (4)), Pandian J. (at page 407, para 168). Thommen, J. (at page 449,para 284), Sahai, J. (at page 580) with whom Kuldip Singh, J. agreed, – all expressly stating that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. Thus, majority of the learned Judges expressly stated that Article 16(4) was an “enabling provision”. Merely because the reservation for backward classes was created as a reasonable classification and justified at page 691, that does not detract from the view that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision.
5. For the aforesaid reasons, we find there is no merit in these review petitions which are dismissed.
1. Delay condoned.
2. We are of the view that there are no merits in the review applications.
3. In Ajit Singh II v. State of Punjab JT 1999 (7) SC 153 = (1997 (7) SCC 209), it was stated (at PP. 229-230) relving upon earlier judgments starting from 1963, that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision and did not impose any constitutional duty nor confer any fundamental right for reservation. The observations at page 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J. in Indira Sawhney relied upon in the review applica-tions do not deal with the above issue. It was the view of two Constitution Bench judgments of this Court one of 1963 in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963 (Suppl) (1) SCR 439) and another in 1968 in C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India (1968 (1) SCR 721) and also two three judgments of this Court in P & T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association (Regd.) v. Union of India (1998 (4) SCC 147) and State Bank of India v. Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association JT 1996 (4) SC 347 = (1996 (4) SCC 119), that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. The view was nowhere dissented in Indira Sawhney much less at page 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J.
4. It appears to us that all the nine Judges in Indira Sawhney were of the same view that Article 16(4) was not in the nature of a fundamental right and was only an enabling provision. In this connection, reference may be made with advantage to the view of Jeevan Reddy, J. (at pages 667-735) referring to Subba Rao, J. that Article 16(4) was a provision conferring a ‘power’ and referring to Article 16(1) alone as a guarantee and not to Arti-cle 16(4); to the view of Sawant, J. (at page 517, para 43 (4)), Pandian J. (at page 407, para 168). Thommen, J. (at page 449,para 284), Sahai, J. (at page 580) with whom Kuldip Singh, J. agreed, – all expressly stating that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. Thus, majority of the learned Judges expressly stated that Article 16(4) was an “enabling provision”. Merely because the reservation for backward classes was created as a reasonable classification and justified at page 691, that does not detract from the view that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision.
5. For the aforesaid reasons, we find there is no merit in these review petitions which are dismissed.
