State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. J. Satyanarayana
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Sections 5(1)(e), 5(2) – Conviction under – Disproportionate assets – Only 7% difference between the amount received and assets found – House property claimed to be of wife – Loan transactions and filing of tax return much before even registration of case – Also duly supported by loaners. Held that house property could not be included in the assets of accused and once, it is taken out, High Court was justified in recording acquittal.
(Para 7)
1. The State of Andhra Pradesh is in appeal against an order of acquittal of the respondent recorded by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on 29.1.1993.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that respondent J. Satyanarayana, entered into Government service in 1957 as a IIIrd Grade Clerk. He worked his way up and in March, 1986, after having put in about 29 years of service, was working as Revenue Divisional Officer at Miryalaguda, Nalgonda District, Andhra Pradesh. A case came to be registered against him by the Anti-Corruption Bureau on 20th March, 1986 for being in possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of his income. According to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the respondent was alleged to be in possession of disproportionate assets to the tune of more than rupees seven lakhs. After obtaining sanction to prosecute the respondent for offences under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, charge sheet was filed before the learned IInd Addl. Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Hyderabad by the Anti-Corruption Bureau on 29.4.1987. The learned trial judge after recording evidence and hearing parties, vide judgment dated 12th March, 1990 found the respondent guilty and convicted him for offences under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer further simple imprisonment for six months. The respondent put his conviction and sentence in issue through a criminal appeal filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. On 29th January, 1993, a learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the case against the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt and set aside his conviction and sentence. The respondent was consequently acquitted.
3. We have perused the judgment of the High Court and also examined the relevant record.
4. According to the High Court, the amount received by the respondent during the check period was Rs. 8,47,191.55 while the total assets acquired by the respondent were to the tune of Rs. 9,09,356.84. According to the High Court, thus, the unaccounted amount was about Rs. 59,000/-. i.e. just about 7% of the total amount received by the respondent during check period.
5. Mr. G. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing for the State of Andhra Pradesh submits that in making these calculations, the High Court fell in error inasmuch as it did not include the value of a house in Anand Nagar Colony, Hyderabad valued at Rs.4, 54,000/-. It is submitted that if this amount is added then the disproportionate assets in the hands of the respondent would be more than Rs.5,00,000/- justifying his conviction and sentence. The trial court had, rejecting the defence plea, included the value of the house in the assets the respondent.
6. A similar plea was raised in the High Court also, but rejected. The High Court found that the house in question, which is valued at Rs.4,54,000/- was in fact an asset belonging to the wife of the respondent as claimed by the defence. It was the plea of the respondent that his wife had borrowed a sum or Rs. 1 lakh from late Amruthareddy, Rs.50,000/- each from DW-15, DW-16 and DW-25 and that his father had given a sum of Rs. 1,34,000/- towards construction of that house. It was also stated that his wife had realised a sum of about Rs.70,000/- by sale of gold jewels belonging to her.
7. Evidence was led by the respondent in support of the above pleas. The prosecution itself placed on record, Ex.P-17 an income-tax return filed by the wife of the respondent for the previous year. It was produced from proper quarters and
proved by ITO, PW-8. Income-tax return, Ex.P-17 had been filed by the wife on 2nd of January, 1986, admittedly much before date of raid and even before registration of the case. The evidence regarding loans which were claimed to have been received by wife was led through DW-15 and DW-25 who stood the scrutiny of cross-examination well. Loans received by the wife from the lenders had found reflection in the accounts of those lenders with their accounts also prepared much earlier to the date of raid. It was argued before the High Court that Ex.P-17, income-tax return of the wife should not be relied upon and that it was an after-thought, brought into existence to save the respondent. The High Court rightly rejected it. We fail to understand how the income-tax return Ex.P-17, filed by the wife on 2nd of January, 1986 could be labelled as an after-thought when it had been filed much prior to even the registration of the case against the respondent by the ACB. Not only was that return filed but the assessment had also been completed. The receipt of various loans which had been shown by the wife in the return, thus, stood accepted by the income-tax authorities. The evidence led by the prosecution itself by filing of income-tax return of the wife coupled with the evidence of defence witnesses clearly goes to establish that the house in Anand Nagar Colony was an asset belonging to the wife of the respondent and not to the respondent himself. The High Court, therefore, rightly arrived at the conclusion that the said house could not be treated as an asset of the respondent by correct appreciation of evidence and proper application of law to the facts of the case. We are satisfied that the finding recorded by the High Court to the effect that the house in Anand Nagar Colony was an asset of the wife of the respondent and not of the respondent is correct and proper and suffers from no infirmity at all. Once we arrive at that finding, the conclusion becomes irresistible that an order of acquittal of the respondent recorded by the High Court is well merited. It suffers from no illegality, let alone perversity. We consequently, do not find any reason to interfere with the well-merited order of acquittal. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.