Arnit Das Vs. State of Bihar
EmailAppeal: Review Petition (Crl.) No. 1290 of 2000
In
Criminal Appeal No. 469 of 2000
(From the Judgment and Order dated 28.1.2000 of the Patna High Court in Crl.R. No. 713 of 1999)
In
Criminal Appeal No. 469 of 2000
(From the Judgment and Order dated 28.1.2000 of the Patna High Court in Crl.R. No. 713 of 1999)
Petitioner: Arnit Das
Respondent: State of Bihar
Apeal: Review Petition (Crl.) No. 1290 of 2000
In
Criminal Appeal No. 469 of 2000
(From the Judgment and Order dated 28.1.2000 of the Patna High Court in Crl.R. No. 713 of 1999)
In
Criminal Appeal No. 469 of 2000
(From the Judgment and Order dated 28.1.2000 of the Patna High Court in Crl.R. No. 713 of 1999)
Judges: Dr. A.S. ANAND, CJI., K.T. THOMAS, R.C. LAHOTI, N. SANTOSH HEGDE & S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Aug 28, 2001
Appearances:
Mr. S.B. Sanyal, Senior Advocate, Mr. N.R. Choudhary, Mr. Devash-ish Bharuka, Mr. M.S. Mollah, Mr. J.P. Pandey and Mr. Somnath Mukherjee, Advocates with him for the Petitioner/Appellant.
Mr. Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Amitesh Lal and Mr. B.B. Singh, Advocates with him for the Respondent.
Head Note:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Constitution
Article 137 – Review – Question about the age of juvenile – Ques-tion decided by trial court and affirmed upto Supreme Court – Review on the ground that earlier decision not considered – Finding that accused was not a juvenile “on the date of offence” not put to issue – Apparent conflict between two judgments as to whether “date of offence” or the “date of first appearance” is crucial- Matter referred to larger Bench. Held that the reference in review is of academic interest and the Court does not decide the matters of academic interests. Review dismissed. (Paras 5, 6)
Cases Reffered:
1. Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (JT 2000 (6) SC 320) (Para 1)
2. Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1992 (2) SCC 202) (Para 3)
3. Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi (JT 1987 (2) SC 402) (Para 6)
4. R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984 (2) SCC 183) (Para 6)
5. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr. (1983 (1) SCC 147) (Para 6)
2. Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1992 (2) SCC 202) (Para 3)
3. Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi (JT 1987 (2) SC 402) (Para 6)
4. R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984 (2) SCC 183) (Para 6)
5. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr. (1983 (1) SCC 147) (Para 6)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. In an inquiry conducted under Section 32 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1986 Act’) the trial court recorded a finding to the effect that petitioner Arnit Das was not a juvenile on the date of occurrence. This finding was upheld by the learned Sessions Judge in an appeal filed by petitioner-Arnit Das. The High Court also dismissed revision petition filed by the petitioner against that finding. Order of the High Court was put in issue by the petition in SLP (Crl.) 729/2000. In an appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 469/2000) arising out of that special leave petition (since reported as Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (JT 2000 (6) SC 320 = 2000 (5) SCC 488) dealing with that issue, it was observed:
“24. So far as the finding regarding the age of the appellant is concerned it is based on appreciation of evidence and arrived at after taking into consideration the material available on record and valid reasons having been assigned for it. The finding ar-rived at by the learned ACJM has been maintained by the sessions court in appeal and the High Court in revision. We find no case having been made out for interfering therewith.”
2. Thus, this Court also affirmed the concurrent findings regard-ing the age of the petitioner and that on the date of the of-fence, the petitioner was not a juvenile within the meaning of the provisions of the 1986 Act.
3. After the judgment in Crl.Appeal No. 469/2000 was delivered by this Court on 9th May, 2000, the petitioner filed a review peti-tion seeking review of that judgment. In the memorandum of review petition, the only issue raised is to the effect that the two Judge Bench deciding Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (supra) while holding that crucial date to determine whether an accused is a juvenile or not under the 1986 Act is the date on which the accused first appears in the Court in inquiry proceedings, has overlooked the earlier view of a three Judge Bench in the case of Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1992 (2) SCC 202), wherein it had been held that crucial date in such cases is the date on which offence was committed and not when the accused first ap-pears before the court in inquiry proceedings. The correctness of the finding that petitioner was not a juvenile (under the 1986 Act) on the date of the offence, has not been put in issue in the memorandum of the review petition.
4. When the review petition came up for consideration on 19.1.2000, the Division Bench noticed that there appeared to be an apparent conflict of opinion on the question as to whether the date of commission of offence or the date on which the accused first appears in inquiry proceedings is relevant for the purposes of determining whether or not an accused was a juvenile under the 1986 Act. The review petition was, therefore, referred to a larger Bench to resolve the conflict between the two opinions. That is how, the matter is before us.
5. In view of the findings recorded in an inquiry conducted under Section 32 of the 1986 Act, that on the date of the offence the accused-petitioner was not a juvenile for the purposes of the 1986 Act, which finding has been affirmed right upto this Court, it is of no consequence, insofar, as this petition is concerned, as to whether the crucial date for purposes of the 1986 Act is the date of commission of the offence or the date when the ac-cused first appears in the court in the inquiry proceedings. The reference, therefore, insofar as this petition is concerned, is only of an academic interest and we decline to answer an academic question only.
6. It is settled practice that this Court does not decide matters which are only of academic interest on the facts of a particular case. (See with advantage : Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr. (1983 (1) SCC 147, R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984 (2) SCC 183 and Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi (JT 1987 (2) SC 402 = 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 931).
7. In this view of the matter, we find that the issue referred to the Constitution Bench does not require our consideration in this case. The review petition, which itself has been referred to the Constitution Bench, is accordingly dismissed.
8. We, however, clarify that since learned senior Counsel appear-ing for the petitioner had reserved his argument on the applica-bility of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which repealed the 1986 Act, for raising it in the trial court when the order of reference was made, we are not expressing any opinion on the question whether the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) 2000 applies to the facts and circum-stances of the instant case or not.
9. The review petition for what has been noticed above is dis-missed.
1. In an inquiry conducted under Section 32 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1986 Act’) the trial court recorded a finding to the effect that petitioner Arnit Das was not a juvenile on the date of occurrence. This finding was upheld by the learned Sessions Judge in an appeal filed by petitioner-Arnit Das. The High Court also dismissed revision petition filed by the petitioner against that finding. Order of the High Court was put in issue by the petition in SLP (Crl.) 729/2000. In an appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 469/2000) arising out of that special leave petition (since reported as Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (JT 2000 (6) SC 320 = 2000 (5) SCC 488) dealing with that issue, it was observed:
“24. So far as the finding regarding the age of the appellant is concerned it is based on appreciation of evidence and arrived at after taking into consideration the material available on record and valid reasons having been assigned for it. The finding ar-rived at by the learned ACJM has been maintained by the sessions court in appeal and the High Court in revision. We find no case having been made out for interfering therewith.”
2. Thus, this Court also affirmed the concurrent findings regard-ing the age of the petitioner and that on the date of the of-fence, the petitioner was not a juvenile within the meaning of the provisions of the 1986 Act.
3. After the judgment in Crl.Appeal No. 469/2000 was delivered by this Court on 9th May, 2000, the petitioner filed a review peti-tion seeking review of that judgment. In the memorandum of review petition, the only issue raised is to the effect that the two Judge Bench deciding Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (supra) while holding that crucial date to determine whether an accused is a juvenile or not under the 1986 Act is the date on which the accused first appears in the Court in inquiry proceedings, has overlooked the earlier view of a three Judge Bench in the case of Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1992 (2) SCC 202), wherein it had been held that crucial date in such cases is the date on which offence was committed and not when the accused first ap-pears before the court in inquiry proceedings. The correctness of the finding that petitioner was not a juvenile (under the 1986 Act) on the date of the offence, has not been put in issue in the memorandum of the review petition.
4. When the review petition came up for consideration on 19.1.2000, the Division Bench noticed that there appeared to be an apparent conflict of opinion on the question as to whether the date of commission of offence or the date on which the accused first appears in inquiry proceedings is relevant for the purposes of determining whether or not an accused was a juvenile under the 1986 Act. The review petition was, therefore, referred to a larger Bench to resolve the conflict between the two opinions. That is how, the matter is before us.
5. In view of the findings recorded in an inquiry conducted under Section 32 of the 1986 Act, that on the date of the offence the accused-petitioner was not a juvenile for the purposes of the 1986 Act, which finding has been affirmed right upto this Court, it is of no consequence, insofar, as this petition is concerned, as to whether the crucial date for purposes of the 1986 Act is the date of commission of the offence or the date when the ac-cused first appears in the court in the inquiry proceedings. The reference, therefore, insofar as this petition is concerned, is only of an academic interest and we decline to answer an academic question only.
6. It is settled practice that this Court does not decide matters which are only of academic interest on the facts of a particular case. (See with advantage : Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr. (1983 (1) SCC 147, R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984 (2) SCC 183 and Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi (JT 1987 (2) SC 402 = 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 931).
7. In this view of the matter, we find that the issue referred to the Constitution Bench does not require our consideration in this case. The review petition, which itself has been referred to the Constitution Bench, is accordingly dismissed.
8. We, however, clarify that since learned senior Counsel appear-ing for the petitioner had reserved his argument on the applica-bility of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which repealed the 1986 Act, for raising it in the trial court when the order of reference was made, we are not expressing any opinion on the question whether the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) 2000 applies to the facts and circum-stances of the instant case or not.
9. The review petition for what has been noticed above is dis-missed.
