Sri Swami Krishnanand Govindanand Vs. M/s. M.D. Oswal Hosiery (Regd.)
Email(From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.81 of the Delhi High Court in S.A. No. 275 of 1980)
(From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.81 of the Delhi High Court in S.A. No. 275 of 1980)
Mr. Rishikesh, Advocate for the Respondent.
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
Sections 22(d) and 40 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47 – Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 18 – Tenancy – Eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirements of the landlord – Registered society filing application for eviction of the re-spondent-tenant from the premises belonging to it on the ground of bona fide self requirement – Respondent in written statement denying both that the appellant was an institution and its re-quirement was bona fide – However, when the matter was posted before additional rent controller for hearing, respondent’s coun-sel conceding the facts disputed by the respondent in the writ-ten statement and accepting that the appellant was an institution and that its requirement was bona fide – Based on this statement of the advocate, duly recorded, trial court decreeing the suit for eviction – Review petition and writ against the eviction filed by the respondent-tenant dismissed – Subsequent appeal to the rent control tribunal also dismissed but second appeal allowed by High Court and decree set aside – Whether High Court justified in doing so – Whether additional rent controller justified in de-creeing the suit based on the statement of the tenant’s counsel. Held, whether the appellant was an institution and its require-ment was bona fide, were questions touching the jurisdiction of the additional rent controller and he can record his satisfaction only when he holds these questions in favour of the appellant and for so holding, he must have material on record to support his satisfaction. Statement of the counsel cannot be accepted as admission so as to bind the respondent. Excluding the statement, there being no material before the additional rent controller to record his satisfaction, the order of eviction passed by him was without jurisdiction. High Court’s order, therefore, called for no interference.
1. This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi allowing the respondent’s second appeal order no. 275 of 1980 on December 2, 1981.
2. The appellant-landlord of the suit premises is a registered society under the Societies Registration Act. It filed applica-tion against the respondent-tenant for his eviction from the suit premises under clause (d) of section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short “the Act”) on the ground that the premises are required bona fide for furtherance of its activities. The respondent filed written statement denying both that the appell-ant is an institution within the meaning of that provision and that it required the premises bona fide for furtherance of its activities. It appears that when the case was posted for trial, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent conceded the facts disputed by the respondent in his written statement before the court. That statement of the advocate was recorded by the additional rent controller thus: “The respondent’s learned coun-sel has admitted the ground of eviction and also the fact that applicant is a public charitable institution and for that purpose, it required the premises”. On that basis the eviction application filed by the appellant was allowed on 24th March, 1973. Within a week thereafter, the respondent filed a review petition which was dismissed. He then filed a writ petition challenging the validi-ty of the said order of eviction but that was dismissed as with-drawn on July 22, 1974. Thereafter, the respondent filed an appeal against the said order of eviction before the Rent Control Tribunal but it was also dismissed on September 5, 1977. Be that as it may, when the appellant filed a petition for execution of order of eviction, the respondent raised objections both under section 40 of the Act as well as under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By separate orders both the objection petitions were dismissed on April 5, 1980. That order was challenged by the respondent unsuccessfully before the Rent Control Tribunal. Dissatisfied with order of the tribunal dated May 16, 1980, dismissing the appeal, the respondent filed the aforementioned second appeal which was allowed on December 2, 1981. It is against that order of the High Court that the present appeal is filed by special leave.
3. Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant, has vehemently contended that statement made by the learned counsel of the respondent across the bar is indeed an admission of the party and, therefore, the additional rent con-troller recorded his satisfaction on the basis of the admission; the order of the additional rent controller cannot thereby be treated as being without jurisdiction. We are afraid we cannot accede to the contention of the learned counsel. Whether the appellant is an institution within the meaning of section 22 of the Act and whether it required bona fide the premises for furtherance of its activities, are questions touching the juris-diction of the additional rent controller. He can record his satisfaction only when he holds on these questions in favour of the appellant. For so holding, there must be material on record to support his satisfaction otherwise the satisfaction not based on any material or based on irrelevant material, would be vitiated and any order passed on such a satisfaction will be without jurisdiction. There can be no doubt that admission of a party is a relevant material. But can the statement made by the learned counsel of a party across the bar be treated as admission of the party? Having regard to the requirements of section 18 of the Evidence Act, on the facts of this case, in our view, the afore-mentioned statement of the counsel of the respondent cannot be accepted as an admission so as to bind the respondent. Excluding that statement from consideration, there was thus no material before the additional rent controller to record his satisfaction within the meaning of clause (d) of section 22 of the Act. It follows that the order of eviction was without jurisdiction.
4. The learned counsel next contended that the statement of the learned counsel for the respondent should be treated as a compro-mise as the court granted five years’ time to the respondent for vacating the suit premises. In our view, this contention has to be rejected. The compromise like a contract postulate consensus between two parties. A statement of a counsel conceding the grounds of eviction and seeking some time for the respondent to vacate the premises, cannot be termed as a compromise.
5. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order under challenge. The appeal is dis-missed with costs.
