Manjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 842 of 2000
Petitioner: Manjit Singh
Respondent: State of Punjab
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 842 of 2000
Judges: K.T. THOMAS & R.P. SETHI, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Dec 14, 2000
Head Note:
CRIMINAL LAWS
TADA Act, 1987
Section 5 – Conviction – Acquittal of co-accused. Held, to be no ground to give benefit to other. (Para 8)
EVIDENCE
Evidence Act, 1872
a) Section 3 – Independent witness – Absence – Effects – Case relat-ing to period when terrorism in State of Punjab was high – Raid conducted at wee hours of the day – Only evidence of police offi-cials. Held that mere absence of independent evidence to support the evidence of police officials is no ground to brush aside the sturdy evidence as no public person is expected to be present and witness the incident. (Para 9)
b) Sections 3, 9 – Witnesses – Police officials – Reliability – Firing at police Sub-inspector – Fire-arm not sent for opinion of ballistic expert. Held that Sub-inspector was injured and was the best person to know as to who fired at him. Not sending the arm would not be a cause to disbelieve him. (Para 10)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Appellant was first accused in a case before a designated court. There were two more accused along with him, one was his brother and the other was his father. They were acquitted, but appellant was convicted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention Act, 1987 TADA). On the first count he was sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years and on the second count he was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 years. As this appeal was filed under Section 19 of the TADA appellant has a statutory right to maintain this appeal.
2. We heard Ms. S. Janani, Advocate in extenso. Mr. Udai Kumar, Advocate for the State of Punjab wanted some more time to produce the translated copies of the depositions but Ms. S. Janani, Advocate argued with reference to the evidence in this case and we felt that it would not be fair to adjourn the matter as the appellant is continuing in jail.
3. The prosecution case relates to an episode which happened on 31.7.1990. During the said period there was great turbulence in the State of Punjab. TADA was enforced to contain the terrorists activities. According to the prosecution PW-7 (Jarnail Singh) Sub-inspector of Police, on getting information that terrorists were being harboured in the house of the appellant, proceeded to that house with a posse of police personnel during the wee hours of the day. PW-7, father of the appellant was woken up (who was arraigned as A-3 in the trial court) from whom the police officer knew that some other persons were on the upstairs of the build-ing. He, therefore, rushed to that place and found the appellant, his brother (A2-Amar Singh) and another terrorist who was a pro-claimed offender. PW-7 immediately signalled to his police force to encircle the house, so that, any bid for escape by the terror-ist could be prevented. A2-Amar Singh fired at PW-7 with one AK-47 and he sustained injuries thereby. Appellant-Manjit Singh fired at PW-7 with a country made pistol/revolver (it is not clear as which was the one out of the two categories of firearms used by the appellant). The said firing hit PW-7 Jarnail Singh on his shoulder etc. Appellant was arrested from the same place and others escaped. Appellant had sustained injuries as the police force fired at him in self defence.
4. There can be no doubt that PW-7 had sustained firearm inju-ries. This is spoken to by PW-3 (Dr. B.D. Gupta) who examined PW-7. In fact the defence also could not dispute the fact that PW-7 sustained those injuries. He narrated the above prosecution version with all details. PW-5, a Head Constable (Harbans Singh) who too was in the force which reached the house of the appellant had given full details of the occurrence.
5. The trial court accepted the evidence of PW-7 and PW-5 and found that prosecution has proved the case against appellant beyond any doubt. Accordingly, he was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
6. However, the designated court was not persuaded to convict the second accused (Amar Singh) and A-3 (Mohinder Singh), according-ly, they were acquitted.
7. Ms. S. Janani, learned Counsel contended that the evidence of PW-7 is too insufficient for basing the conviction against the appellant. She highlighted mainly three points in support of her contention. First was that no independent witness had been exam-ined by the prosecution to support the police version. Second is that the pistol/revolver said to have been used by the appellant was not subjected to ballistic analysis. The third, which we also thought to be a forceful argument, is that on the same evidence the designated court found A-2 (Amar Singh) not guilty.
8. Dealing with the last contention we also felt that the acquit-tal of A-2 was not on sturdy grounds. But as the State of Punjab did not prefer any appeal against that acquittal it is not proper on our part to say anything more about the said acquittal. But benefit of that acquittal cannot be given to the present appell-ant.
9. Regarding the first point highlighted by the learned Counsel we have to observe that the incident happened during the wee hours of the day and no independent witness could be expected at that time to be present in a house where terrorist were feared to have been harboured. It is also a fact that in the condition which prevailed in Punjab during those years no independent person would dare to go and stand as a witness for any terrorist activity. Hence the mere fact that the evidence of PW-7 and PW-5 (Head Constable) was not further supported by any other independ-ent person is not a ground to brush aside the otherwise sturdy evidence of those two police officers.
10. We do not know whether the firearm was subjected to ballistic analysis. We accept the stand of the defence that the same has not been sent for ballistic tests. Nonetheless the fact remains that PW-7 himself was shot at by somebody at close quarters and PW-7 was the most competent person to say who that person could be. When PW-7 pointed at appellant as the assailant there is no reason to disbelieve him.
11. According to us the prosecution proved the case against the appellant beyond any doubt. Hence, the conviction passed on the appellant is only to be maintained, and we do so. At the same time, we are mindful of the improvement in the situation in Punjab and hence we are inclined to give some amelioration to the appellant in the matter of sentence. We, therefore, reduce the sentence to imprisonment for five years in respect of both counts. Sentence on both counts will run concurrently. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
1. Appellant was first accused in a case before a designated court. There were two more accused along with him, one was his brother and the other was his father. They were acquitted, but appellant was convicted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention Act, 1987 TADA). On the first count he was sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years and on the second count he was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 years. As this appeal was filed under Section 19 of the TADA appellant has a statutory right to maintain this appeal.
2. We heard Ms. S. Janani, Advocate in extenso. Mr. Udai Kumar, Advocate for the State of Punjab wanted some more time to produce the translated copies of the depositions but Ms. S. Janani, Advocate argued with reference to the evidence in this case and we felt that it would not be fair to adjourn the matter as the appellant is continuing in jail.
3. The prosecution case relates to an episode which happened on 31.7.1990. During the said period there was great turbulence in the State of Punjab. TADA was enforced to contain the terrorists activities. According to the prosecution PW-7 (Jarnail Singh) Sub-inspector of Police, on getting information that terrorists were being harboured in the house of the appellant, proceeded to that house with a posse of police personnel during the wee hours of the day. PW-7, father of the appellant was woken up (who was arraigned as A-3 in the trial court) from whom the police officer knew that some other persons were on the upstairs of the build-ing. He, therefore, rushed to that place and found the appellant, his brother (A2-Amar Singh) and another terrorist who was a pro-claimed offender. PW-7 immediately signalled to his police force to encircle the house, so that, any bid for escape by the terror-ist could be prevented. A2-Amar Singh fired at PW-7 with one AK-47 and he sustained injuries thereby. Appellant-Manjit Singh fired at PW-7 with a country made pistol/revolver (it is not clear as which was the one out of the two categories of firearms used by the appellant). The said firing hit PW-7 Jarnail Singh on his shoulder etc. Appellant was arrested from the same place and others escaped. Appellant had sustained injuries as the police force fired at him in self defence.
4. There can be no doubt that PW-7 had sustained firearm inju-ries. This is spoken to by PW-3 (Dr. B.D. Gupta) who examined PW-7. In fact the defence also could not dispute the fact that PW-7 sustained those injuries. He narrated the above prosecution version with all details. PW-5, a Head Constable (Harbans Singh) who too was in the force which reached the house of the appellant had given full details of the occurrence.
5. The trial court accepted the evidence of PW-7 and PW-5 and found that prosecution has proved the case against appellant beyond any doubt. Accordingly, he was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
6. However, the designated court was not persuaded to convict the second accused (Amar Singh) and A-3 (Mohinder Singh), according-ly, they were acquitted.
7. Ms. S. Janani, learned Counsel contended that the evidence of PW-7 is too insufficient for basing the conviction against the appellant. She highlighted mainly three points in support of her contention. First was that no independent witness had been exam-ined by the prosecution to support the police version. Second is that the pistol/revolver said to have been used by the appellant was not subjected to ballistic analysis. The third, which we also thought to be a forceful argument, is that on the same evidence the designated court found A-2 (Amar Singh) not guilty.
8. Dealing with the last contention we also felt that the acquit-tal of A-2 was not on sturdy grounds. But as the State of Punjab did not prefer any appeal against that acquittal it is not proper on our part to say anything more about the said acquittal. But benefit of that acquittal cannot be given to the present appell-ant.
9. Regarding the first point highlighted by the learned Counsel we have to observe that the incident happened during the wee hours of the day and no independent witness could be expected at that time to be present in a house where terrorist were feared to have been harboured. It is also a fact that in the condition which prevailed in Punjab during those years no independent person would dare to go and stand as a witness for any terrorist activity. Hence the mere fact that the evidence of PW-7 and PW-5 (Head Constable) was not further supported by any other independ-ent person is not a ground to brush aside the otherwise sturdy evidence of those two police officers.
10. We do not know whether the firearm was subjected to ballistic analysis. We accept the stand of the defence that the same has not been sent for ballistic tests. Nonetheless the fact remains that PW-7 himself was shot at by somebody at close quarters and PW-7 was the most competent person to say who that person could be. When PW-7 pointed at appellant as the assailant there is no reason to disbelieve him.
11. According to us the prosecution proved the case against the appellant beyond any doubt. Hence, the conviction passed on the appellant is only to be maintained, and we do so. At the same time, we are mindful of the improvement in the situation in Punjab and hence we are inclined to give some amelioration to the appellant in the matter of sentence. We, therefore, reduce the sentence to imprisonment for five years in respect of both counts. Sentence on both counts will run concurrently. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
