Lophinoris Shangpling & Ors. Vs. Hamboy Shullai and Anr.
EmailAppeal: Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2000
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2967/1999)
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2967/1999)
Petitioner: Lophinoris Shangpling & Ors.
Respondent: Hamboy Shullai and Anr.
Apeal: Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2000
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2967/1999)
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2967/1999)
Judges: K.T. THOMAS & R.P. SETHI, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Jan 08, 2000
Head Note:
CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Section 145 – Dispute over two houses – Civil suit also pending – Proceedings under Section 145 initiated but on evidence, dropped – One of the parties to proceedings, not residing in that area – Disputed property vacated in July 1997. Held that proceedings under Section 145 CrPC are quashed. Parties at liberty to go to civil court.
(Paras 5 to 7)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Learned Counsel for respondent no.2 points out that the said respondent should not have been joined as party as he has only rendered the order. On this objection being raised learned Counsel for the petitioner conceded to it. We, therefore, order that respondent no.2 be deleted from the array of the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. First appellant is the mother-in-law of the first respondent. Proceedings have been initiated under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of a property on which two houses are situated. First respondent claimed absolute right and possession in respect of one of the houses. He complained to the police that he was dispossessed therefrom by the persons led by his mother-in-law, the first appellant. It appears that there is a civil suit pending between the parties in respect of the disputed land. First respondent moved a petition before the High Court under Article 226 for initiating proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. An order was passed on 26.5.1998 pursuant to which an Executive Magistrate initiated proceedings. On the strength of the evidence collected by the Executive Magistrate, he dropped the proceedings on 9.7.1998.
4. A revision was filed against the said order dated 9.7.1998 which revision was made over to the Additional Deputy Commissioner for disposal. That revision was allowed in favour of the first respondent against which the first appellant approached the High Court in a second revision. As per the impugned order that revision was dismissed. The result of the impugned order is that proceedings under Section 145 of the Code would revive.
5. On a perusal of the evidence for the first respondent given before the Executive Magistrate we are of the opinion that no proceedings under Section 145 of the Code can continue in respect of the disputed property. First respondent has admitted in his evidence thus :
“It is a fact that on 26.8.1997 I no longer stay at Jalaw Pdeng within the disputed land.”
6. He also admitted that “it is a fact that I want to stay at Mandanniting of my own will without any outside force or coercion”. The preliminary order under Section 145 (i) of the Code was passed by the Executive Magistrate on 9.7.1998. If it is a fact that first respondent had vacated from the disputed property way back on 26.8.1997 there is no possibility of expanding the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate under the Section to cover a dispute regarding possession upto such a farther extent.
7. Learned Counsel for the first respondent made an attempt to interpret the scope of the proviso to Section 145(4) of the Code as to entangle a dispute of such a farther date. We are not impressed by the said interpretation and therefore we are not disposed to accept the said contention.
8. It is open to the parties to approach the civil court to vindicate their grievances and to have their claims properly adjudicated upon. Without prejudice to the said right we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order. We quash the proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Cr. P.C.
1. Learned Counsel for respondent no.2 points out that the said respondent should not have been joined as party as he has only rendered the order. On this objection being raised learned Counsel for the petitioner conceded to it. We, therefore, order that respondent no.2 be deleted from the array of the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. First appellant is the mother-in-law of the first respondent. Proceedings have been initiated under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of a property on which two houses are situated. First respondent claimed absolute right and possession in respect of one of the houses. He complained to the police that he was dispossessed therefrom by the persons led by his mother-in-law, the first appellant. It appears that there is a civil suit pending between the parties in respect of the disputed land. First respondent moved a petition before the High Court under Article 226 for initiating proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. An order was passed on 26.5.1998 pursuant to which an Executive Magistrate initiated proceedings. On the strength of the evidence collected by the Executive Magistrate, he dropped the proceedings on 9.7.1998.
4. A revision was filed against the said order dated 9.7.1998 which revision was made over to the Additional Deputy Commissioner for disposal. That revision was allowed in favour of the first respondent against which the first appellant approached the High Court in a second revision. As per the impugned order that revision was dismissed. The result of the impugned order is that proceedings under Section 145 of the Code would revive.
5. On a perusal of the evidence for the first respondent given before the Executive Magistrate we are of the opinion that no proceedings under Section 145 of the Code can continue in respect of the disputed property. First respondent has admitted in his evidence thus :
“It is a fact that on 26.8.1997 I no longer stay at Jalaw Pdeng within the disputed land.”
6. He also admitted that “it is a fact that I want to stay at Mandanniting of my own will without any outside force or coercion”. The preliminary order under Section 145 (i) of the Code was passed by the Executive Magistrate on 9.7.1998. If it is a fact that first respondent had vacated from the disputed property way back on 26.8.1997 there is no possibility of expanding the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate under the Section to cover a dispute regarding possession upto such a farther extent.
7. Learned Counsel for the first respondent made an attempt to interpret the scope of the proviso to Section 145(4) of the Code as to entangle a dispute of such a farther date. We are not impressed by the said interpretation and therefore we are not disposed to accept the said contention.
8. It is open to the parties to approach the civil court to vindicate their grievances and to have their claims properly adjudicated upon. Without prejudice to the said right we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order. We quash the proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Cr. P.C.
