Citizen Interest Agency Vs. Cochin Port Trust & Ors.
EmailAppeal: Civil Appeal Nos. 7906 – 7907 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7779-7780 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7909 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8071 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7910 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8186 of 2001)
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7779-7780 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7909 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8071 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7910 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8186 of 2001)
Petitioner: Citizen Interest Agency
Respondent: Cochin Port Trust & Ors.
Apeal: Civil Appeal Nos. 7906 – 7907 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7779-7780 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7909 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8071 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7910 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8186 of 2001)
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7779-7780 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7909 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8071 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7910 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8186 of 2001)
Judges: G.B. PATTANAIK & RUMA PAL, JJ.
Date of Judgment: Nov 20, 2001
Head Note:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE/ENVIRONMENT
Constitution
Articles 226, 136 – Writ, challenging orders of ministry of surface transport, granting lease for cement unloading and packing terminal – Lease granted within port trust area – Apprehension of violation of law, degradation of environment – High Court finding no infirmity in view of report of technical & financial wing – High Court further answering questions raised by parties – Lessees found to be liable to get statutory clearance. Held that High Court should have stopped after observing that lessees were obliged to get statutory clearance. Except that the remaining judgment declared to have no effect on authorities. (Para 5)
JUDGEMENT:
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the division bench of the Kerala High Court relating to a lease granted by the ministry of surface transport for setting up a cement unloading and packing terminal in Cochin Port.
3. It transpires that earlier in the years 1994-95, the port trust had invited tenders for granting long term lease of work with or without back up areas. At that point of time, writ petitions had been filed in Kerala High Court assailing the feasibility and legality of such projects contending inter alia that allowing such projects would disturb the sensitive aqua ecosystem of the estuarine circulation, thereby endangering the marine species and also is contrary to the CRZ notifications. While such writ petitions were pending before the High Court, the ministry of surface transport communicated its decision to the Cochin Port Trust that they do not consider it feasible to grant lease of the land for going ahead with the projects and in view of such communication, the writ petitions were held to be infructuous. Subsequent to the dismissal of the aforesaid writ petitions, Government of India, ministry of surface transport having passed an order on 15th October, 1998, granting lease of land within the port trust area, the appellants herein became apprehensive that the government is going to sanction the projects concerned in spite of several violations of law and environmental degradation and then approached the High Court assailing the aforesaid order of the ministry of surface transport dated 15.10.1998.
4. Before the High Court apart from challenging the legality of the order dated 15.10.1998, on behalf of the appellants, several other contentions appear to have been raised in relation to the question whether the proposed project is an industry; whether such project would violate the provisions of the CRZ zones and/or whether such projects are contrary to the environmental laws. On considering the affidavits filed on behalf of the Union of India as well as the lessees in whose favour the land has been leased out under the order dated 15.10.1998, the High Court came to the conclusion that there is no infirmity in the said order passed by the ministry of surface transport based on the report of its technical and financial wings. Having said so, the court also further observed that the order obliges the lessee to get statutory clearance as required by laws, which would allay the apprehension alleged by the petitioner (the present appellant). Perhaps it would have been better on the part of the High Court to close the chapter there. But, since arguments had been advanced on behalf of the present appellants before the court on several other issues, the Court thought it fit to examine and answer those issues. The present appellant is aggrieved by the conclusions and findings of the court on those issues which have been answered by the High Court.
5. Mr. Vaidyanathan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the appropriate authorities of the ministry of environment and all other authorities bound by those observations and, therefore, it would be a fait accompli and the projects are bound to be sanctioned irrespective of the fact whether or not they pollute the environment and violate the environmental laws. The learned solicitor general appearing for the port trust, learned additional solicitor general appearing for the Union of India, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the learned senior counsel appearing for Ambuja Cements and Mr. Dave, the learned senior counsel appearing for L & T, vehemently contended that all the subsequent observations and findings of the High Court are the outcome of the contentions raised by the writ petitioners (the present appellants) and by no means, those observations would bind the hands of the environmental authorities as well as all other authorities which are under law required to examine the feasibility of such projects and pass appropriate orders thereon. According to them, even the lessees themselves had given undertakings before the High Court to that effect and the court also subsequently recorded that the apprehensions of the appellants are wholly unfounded. It is true that such undertakings have been given, but at the same time, the conclusions and the findings being that of the High Court possibly the apprehensions of the appellant cannot be said to be wholly unfounded. In the circumstances, while upholding the judgment of the High Court so far as the legality of the order dated 15.10.1998 passed by the ministry of surface transport is concerned, we observe that all other subsequent findings and conclusions of the High Court starting from paragraph 37 onwards of the impugned judgment will not have any binding effect on any of the authorities of the ministry of environment and/or any other authorities who are duty-bound to consider the projects and sanction such projects only if they conform all requirements of law including environmental requirements.
6. Needless to mention, in view of the order dated 15.10.1998 having been held to be valid, the lease granted pursuant to the same would also remain valid.
7. These appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the division bench of the Kerala High Court relating to a lease granted by the ministry of surface transport for setting up a cement unloading and packing terminal in Cochin Port.
3. It transpires that earlier in the years 1994-95, the port trust had invited tenders for granting long term lease of work with or without back up areas. At that point of time, writ petitions had been filed in Kerala High Court assailing the feasibility and legality of such projects contending inter alia that allowing such projects would disturb the sensitive aqua ecosystem of the estuarine circulation, thereby endangering the marine species and also is contrary to the CRZ notifications. While such writ petitions were pending before the High Court, the ministry of surface transport communicated its decision to the Cochin Port Trust that they do not consider it feasible to grant lease of the land for going ahead with the projects and in view of such communication, the writ petitions were held to be infructuous. Subsequent to the dismissal of the aforesaid writ petitions, Government of India, ministry of surface transport having passed an order on 15th October, 1998, granting lease of land within the port trust area, the appellants herein became apprehensive that the government is going to sanction the projects concerned in spite of several violations of law and environmental degradation and then approached the High Court assailing the aforesaid order of the ministry of surface transport dated 15.10.1998.
4. Before the High Court apart from challenging the legality of the order dated 15.10.1998, on behalf of the appellants, several other contentions appear to have been raised in relation to the question whether the proposed project is an industry; whether such project would violate the provisions of the CRZ zones and/or whether such projects are contrary to the environmental laws. On considering the affidavits filed on behalf of the Union of India as well as the lessees in whose favour the land has been leased out under the order dated 15.10.1998, the High Court came to the conclusion that there is no infirmity in the said order passed by the ministry of surface transport based on the report of its technical and financial wings. Having said so, the court also further observed that the order obliges the lessee to get statutory clearance as required by laws, which would allay the apprehension alleged by the petitioner (the present appellant). Perhaps it would have been better on the part of the High Court to close the chapter there. But, since arguments had been advanced on behalf of the present appellants before the court on several other issues, the Court thought it fit to examine and answer those issues. The present appellant is aggrieved by the conclusions and findings of the court on those issues which have been answered by the High Court.
5. Mr. Vaidyanathan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the appropriate authorities of the ministry of environment and all other authorities bound by those observations and, therefore, it would be a fait accompli and the projects are bound to be sanctioned irrespective of the fact whether or not they pollute the environment and violate the environmental laws. The learned solicitor general appearing for the port trust, learned additional solicitor general appearing for the Union of India, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the learned senior counsel appearing for Ambuja Cements and Mr. Dave, the learned senior counsel appearing for L & T, vehemently contended that all the subsequent observations and findings of the High Court are the outcome of the contentions raised by the writ petitioners (the present appellants) and by no means, those observations would bind the hands of the environmental authorities as well as all other authorities which are under law required to examine the feasibility of such projects and pass appropriate orders thereon. According to them, even the lessees themselves had given undertakings before the High Court to that effect and the court also subsequently recorded that the apprehensions of the appellants are wholly unfounded. It is true that such undertakings have been given, but at the same time, the conclusions and the findings being that of the High Court possibly the apprehensions of the appellant cannot be said to be wholly unfounded. In the circumstances, while upholding the judgment of the High Court so far as the legality of the order dated 15.10.1998 passed by the ministry of surface transport is concerned, we observe that all other subsequent findings and conclusions of the High Court starting from paragraph 37 onwards of the impugned judgment will not have any binding effect on any of the authorities of the ministry of environment and/or any other authorities who are duty-bound to consider the projects and sanction such projects only if they conform all requirements of law including environmental requirements.
6. Needless to mention, in view of the order dated 15.10.1998 having been held to be valid, the lease granted pursuant to the same would also remain valid.
7. These appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
